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           Abstract 
 
In recent years Iran has adopted a new form of urban governance, featuring a higher 
level of local autonomy, clarification and improvement of legal status and 
responsibilities, the development of new political and social organisations, and an 
enhanced professionalism.  
This thesis asks: ‗how is urban governance functioning in Iran?‘ and aims to answer this 
by assessing the process and structure of urban governance through a critical evaluation 
of how urban governance in the capital city of Tehran is understood by its various 
stakeholders. In doing so, it attempts to fill a gap in the literature, particularly the dearth 
of local governance studies in the Middle East, as well as providing general insights into 
what constitutes ‗good urban governance‘.     
To gain an initial overview, the research starts out with an appraisal of Tehran‘s 
governance based on UN-Habitat‘s Urban Governance Index (UGI). This tool allows 
the evaluation of local governance in Tehran through four dimensions: participation, 
accountability, equity and effectiveness. Based on the findings of this evaluation, as 
well as the method‘s limitations, a number of areas are identified as requiring deeper 
examination. The subsequent, central phase of analysis is thus based on interviews with 
eight different groups of stakeholders in the city including city executives, councillors, 
civic associations, citizens, urban experts and private sector actors.    
The findings indicate that despite the major shift towards decentralisation from 1997, 
local governance is still undermined by centralised decision-making, due to the 
continued involvement of central government ministries and departments in city 
management. A key challenge for local governance is thus to manage the attendant 
tensions between stakeholders. Local stakeholders expect to be given more space, 
institutional weight and autonomy in a process of devolution which would bring a more 
substantial transfer of authority and resources from central to local government, 
community groups and citizens.   
 Key Words: Urban Governance, UN-Habitat UGI, election, municipality, City 
Council, citizen participation, Tehran.  
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 1.0 Introduction  
 
The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, suggests that governance is a key 
element in enhancing development (UN, 1998). Governance and principles of good 
governance have been emphasised as a key focus of development procedures since 
1990. Yet what constitutes the concept of governance has remained multifaceted (Pierre 
and Peters, 2000). Governance is defined by UNDP (1996) as the complex ensemble of 
mechanisms, processes, practices and institutions through which citizens and social 
groupings manage their interests and conflicts. According to Hyden and Court (2002) 
governance should be considered as both a process and an activity through which policy 
is formulated. The concept of governance is broader than that of government and 
implies a bottom-up approach in the formulation of policy and in policy implementation 
mechanisms. To fully implement good governance, citizens must be empowered and 
counted in every sphere of society (UNDP, 2004). Governance practices that are 
―inclusive, participatory, transparent and socially balanced are more likely to generate 
effective developmental gains‖ (Sisk, 2004: 11). Taking this into consideration, good 
governance is the ―effective implementation of policy and mechanisms that are 
responsive to citizen needs‖ (World Bank, 1992:6).  
 
Good governance therefore should not be considered a top-down kind of administration, 
but rather public participation and engagement are an inevitable feature of good 
governance and government itself is but one of the actors. With good governance, 
decisions and policies are made through the interactions of various stakeholders, 
citizens are provided with a voice and decision-makers are obliged to hear citizens‘ 
voices. Good governance depends on how well all various stakeholders fulfil their roles. 
Kooiman (1993) suggests that good governance is not accomplished through a single 
measure, but is a complex and time-consuming process which involves different 
stakeholders. The central factor for enhancing the level of governance and arriving at 
good governance is to identify the mechanisms and practices that generate motivations 
and incentives for all stakeholders to function in a collective manner (World Bank, 
1997).  
 
According to Wilde et al. (2008), the investigation of governance is capable of 
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identifying breaches and limitations in processes of local policy-making. It can also 
expose needs to enhance decision-making capacity. Thus, the study of governance has 
become a popular focus of research, with different studies defining and measuring 
governance from a multiplicity of perspectives and angles, such as civil society 
(Heinrich, 2007), corruption (Chowdhury et al., 2008), democracy (IDEA, 2003); e-
governance (European Commission Directorate General for Information Society and 
Media, 2007; Holzer and Kim, 2007); the electoral system (O‘Grady, Lopez-Pintor and 
Stevens, 2007); gender equality (Corner and Repucci, 2009); conflict (Verstegen; Goor; 
and Zeeuw, 2005); media (UNESCO and IPDC, 2008); parliament (The Parliamentary 
Centre, 2007); political parties (Transparency International and Carter Centre 2007); 
and public administration (Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Bank 
Institute, 2007). Within this context, local governance and decentralisation (UN-Habitat, 
2004) are among the main themes. Nevertheless, due to the complex and dynamic 
nature of governance, their features and elements vary widely over place, time and 
level.  
 
Governance is varied in terms of the level it takes place at (i.e. international, national 
and local); and its major dimensions (i.e. economic, political, and administrative). This 
study mainly emphasises the political and administrative features of governance at the 
local/urban level. While political governance includes the establishment of policy, 
political structures and the way in which the political system is designed and functions 
with regard to citizens, administrative governance involves the mechanisms and 
methods of policy procedure as well as the competence of public administration (Hyden 
and Court, 2002; Manasan et al., 1999). Urban governance has a comprehensive and 
integrated vision at both the practical and theoretical levels that includes all formal and 
informal factors and elements that exist in a city, such as central government, local 
government, civic associations, and citizens. On this basis, it is necessary for this 
investigation to consider the dynamic nature of the many factors and elements within 
governance.  
 
1.1 City Governance Transformation in Iran 
 
In terms of practical steps towards arriving at improved governance, there has recently 
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been an escalating international trend of decentralisation and transformation of powers, 
responsibilities, functions, capitals, funds, authorities, tasks and decision-making from 
central government to the local government level (Ward, 1996, 1998; Ruble et al., 
2003). This has been determined by various socio-economic and political factors. 
According to Devas and Grant ( 2003) while in some geographical areas such as 
central/eastern Europe and Latin America the impetus towards democratic governance 
has been driven from a bottom-up dynamic, in others, such as Uganda and Ghana, focus 
on governance is a part of a national agenda and a top-down response to existing 
concerns. Furthermore, good governance implementation can be determined by external 
factors, such as demands and coercion from donor bodies (ibid., 2003). 
 
In a similar way, local governments in Iran have been at the centre of attention of 
political reforms, going back for more than a century (Moqeemi, 2007). Following the 
1979 Islamic revolution, Iranian cities have been at the heart of political and social 
changes (Hesamian and Eatemad, 1989; Shakoii, 1992), as well as the focus of 
economic and cultural processes. Demands for devolution led to a governmental shift 
and to the 1997 local-level governance transformation, which is considered the most 
significant example of institutional; decision-making and administrative devolution in 
Iran (an important transition which will henceforth be referred to as ‗the shift‘). Thus, 
the process and formation of a new form of urban governance in Iran can be dated to the 
beginning of February in 1997. Through the shift, Iranian cities now have an 
opportunity to design their local government mechanisms to a certain extent. While 
formerly most management and supervision tasks were handled by central government, 
following the shift, local governments and local powers have been offered opportunities 
to play a more active role in the city and the developing context of governance. In the 
new scheme in Iran the local institutions and organisations are able to contribute to the 
shaping and forming of urban areas, alongside the central government organisations 
such as the Ministry of State.  
This has been a shift from simple forms of urban management, with cities governed by a 
single mayor appointed by the State ministry, to a more complex and decentralised form 
of urban management in which Islamic City Councils play a significant role (Imanni-
Jajermi, 2000), and citizen inclusion and participation in urban decision-making can be 
facilitated. The new governance form includes features such as a higher level of local 
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autonomy, clarification and improvement of legal status and responsibilities, the 
development of new political and social organisations, and a sense of enhanced 
professionalism that has led to the emergence of new forms of communications between 
the actors and the public.  
1.2 The Context of the Study and Main Issues 
The key issues within the local governance transformation revolve around the questions 
of ―what exactly is being transformed and who are the actors involved‖ (Coaffee and 
Healey, 2003: 1982). To date, studies on Iranian cities seem to have focused little 
attention on city governance, despite the significance of the 1997 shift and the need to 
explore the new frameworks introduced for governance and participation processes. 
This necessitates consideration of the functions and responsibilities of the various 
institutions and bodies that are now involved in urban governance and in participation 
arrangements. While the shift in urban governance and urban regimes plays a significant 
part in the decentralisation process occurring in Iran, it is important to acknowledge that 
it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the complexities inherent in the transition 
and in the practices that it introduced.  
 
In light of democratic governance principles, public participation was thought of as a 
key component for the local transition in Iran, in terms of both enhancing citizens‘ 
engagement in city issues and in empowering citizens. However, despite the 
organisational amendments, it is becoming apparent that the shift suffers from major 
governance drawbacks that include issues of participation. Tavasoli, the first post-
revolution mayor of Tehran, believes that the public have had no real opportunity to be 
deeply involved in city governance (Sarmayeh, 2008). Despite the organizational and 
administrative reforms improving the functions of urban professionals, ordinary citizens 
are widely excluded from governance practices and decision-making processes that 
have an effect on their lives. A concern here is to what extent have local institutions 
succeeded, or can succeed, in achieving effective citizen engagement and improving 
governance practices. 
 
Moreover, despite the shift, the distribution of power between central government and 
local organisations in terms of their weight and influence in governance is unclear. 
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Moqeemi (2006) suggests that organisational autonomy and related issues are the major 
concern for local governments in Iran. Within this context, there is a lack of 
understanding of the manner in which local institutions and central government have 
interacted on the one hand, and on the other hand, of the way in which issues of 
governance and participation have been taken into consideration by both local and 
central government: these are therefore central to this research. 
 
Subsequent to the shift, Tehran has experienced three City Council elections. In order to 
elect the first council‘s representatives, an inaugural local election was carried out on 
March 8, 1999 and the 15 elected city councillors were legally empowered to begin 
their tasks by May 29, 1999. Second and third elections followed in 2002 and 2006. 
This research includes an examination of the capacity and level of voter turnout in the 
local elections, because in democratic theory, citizen participation has to do with 
quantity, that is, how many people are involved (Pateman, 1970). If governance refers 
to ―public‖ processes of decision-making which are made ―by‖ and ―for‖ the public, 
then participation is the application of governance and the enhancement of good 
governance. 
 
The manner in which the mayor is selected has also been at the centre of debates on 
Iran‘s urban governance (Aliabadi, 2003). While formerly, the selection of the mayor 
was among the state‘s ministerial responsibilities and exercised in a top-down and 
centralised manner, since the transformation, the responsibility of selecting a mayor for 
a four year term of office has been assumed by Islamic City Council (ICC) 
representatives. Thus, mayoral candidates are now selected and recommended through a 
new process based on the public‘s representations, though the continued state influence 
over the mayor chosen is undeniable. This follows from the fact that the mayor 
recommended by the ICC needs to gain the consent of the state ministry or governor in 
cities with, respectively, a population of more or less than 200,000. The new approach 
for mayoral selection is not without complexities, regardless of the reduction in state 
power in the urban governance machinery. An alternative mayoral selection proposal 
has recently come into view, offering participatory significance to the municipality, as 
the mayor would be selected through direct public participation. The advocates of this 
proposal believe that it would enhance governance principles, in particular participation 
in the city. Yet, it is important to recognise that to evaluate the aforementioned 
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approaches for the selection of mayor, research also needs to identify the limitations and 
potential capacities of these approaches in governance.  
 
This research evaluates urban governance in Iran to explore the barriers to effective 
citizen engagement in city matters. The aim of the study is to explore the basic issues, 
including structural and organisational factors, which influence governance at city level, 
by investigating the nature of key factors that are associated with urban governance and 
public participation. To fully understand the complex nature of governance in Iran 
requires analysing the role of key stakeholders and decision-makers who influence the 
machinery of governance in the city. While an exhaustive articulation of urban 
governance networks in Iran is beyond the scope of this research, the study will explore 
the Municipality; the Islamic City Council; the Neighbourhood Councils; and the Civic 
Associations and their circumstances with regard to the issue of participation, as the 
foundation for the current governance practices in the city. This study offers a review of 
recent research on governance and presents an analytical framework for city governance 
in Iran in relation to both the recent initiatives at national level towards decentralization 
and to local political discourses. 
 
Tehran has been influenced by political, economic, and social/cultural centralisation to a 
much larger extent than the other major cities of Iran. Equally the city has played an 
important role in shaping national urban policies and strategies. Tehran was selected to 
represent the level and quality of transformation of the new form of urban governance 
and participation practices, which were intended to provide a more publicly-oriented, 
inclusive, urban governance system and to reduce the challenges of the previous urban 
administrative system. Researching Tehran is therefore critical in identifying the 
strengths and weaknesses of the urban governance shift process in the face of its 
practical challenges and implementation opportunities. 
1.3 Research Aims and Associated Questions 
This study explores the dynamic nature of, and the interrelationships between, the 
factors that influence urban governance and local participation in Tehran.  
To achieve this aim the research questions are: 
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1. How can urban governance be evaluated? 
2.    Which of the basics of good urban governance in Tehran are currently adequate or     
failing? 
3.   What measures can be taken to improve governance in Tehran? 
 1.4 Research Strategy  
To achieve this aim, it is essential to gain sound and reliable knowledge of: 
 Developing a methodology for assessing good urban governance 
  The overall performance level of governance systems in Iran 
 What should be enhanced to improve governance 
 How far and where action is needed 
The study will explore a series of related themes such as the good governance principles 
of participation, accountability and effectiveness. A theoretical framework is derived 
through the analysis of a wide range of literature and then examined empirically. The 
study initially focuses on governance assessment strategies, in order to decide on a 
suitable assessment method. The early stages of this research draw on a quantitative 
approach using the UN-Habitat governance assessment method. This approach was used 
to understand the main areas of concern and deficits related to governance in Tehran, to 
highlight the main dimensions of the topic and indicate the areas that need to be 
explored in greater depth. This led to the development of a conceptual framework which 
needed to be examined in a deeper and more comprehensive manner through empirical 
research. The study is therefore based mainly on a qualitative approach, using a variety 
of data collection methods, including semi-structured interviews and secondary 
documentary data, the analysis of which has made it possible to clarify the governance 
pattern in Iran.  
This allowed an exploration of the limitations of areas identified by the UN-assessment 
through considering the role of different stakeholders involved in governance. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with various governance stakeholders, including 
citizens, urban experts, municipality executives, council representatives and government 
officials. The study procedure is cyclical rather than linear (Trochim, 2006) and based 
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on a sequence of steps. The initial key to this study is assessment of governance through 
applying the UN assessment approach. This leads to identifying the main problems and 
then to designing the research methodology and data collection strategies. 
Correspondingly, three months of field work in Tehran were designed to gather the 
central data for this investigation.  
1.5 Structure of Thesis  
 
Overall, the thesis is divided into ten chapters: 
 
Chapter One provides an introduction to the research project, as well as presenting the 
objectives and focus of the research. The chapter offers an overview of the features of 
the study area in terms of urban governance and participation. The section also contains 
a brief overview of urban governance in Iran/Tehran.  
 
Chapter Two develops a conceptual framework for understanding governance elements 
and principles. The chapter is focused on the literature of governance and its 
background, and reviews the definitions, aims and values of governance as expressed in 
the contemporary governance literature. The section looks at the shifts and 
transformations in the phenomenon of governance from a global prospective. In 
addition, a brief overview of approaches to evaluating governance is presented.    
 
Chapter Three presents the methodologies, methods and assumptions of the research, 
gives an explanation of the criteria for data collection, capture and integration processes, 
as well as clarifying the criteria for selecting the participant sample and data analysis 
procedures. It offers a summarised introduction to the research design and method 
applied in this study. In addition, it presents a discussion on the UN approach to 
governance evaluation and its application, and how this method will contribute to the 
research processes.        
 
Chapter Four presents an evaluation of urban governance in Tehran through the UN-
index indicators. It also demonstrates an overview of the circumstances of governance 
in Tehran based on the UN‘s four principles of good urban governance: Effectiveness, 
Equity, Accountability and Participation. Furthermore, it shows how the UN evaluation 
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method helps the researcher in identifying the existing gap between ―good urban 
governance‖ and governance in Tehran, as well as facilitating other aspects of the 
research process.  
 
Chapters Five to Eight present data collection and findings based on key themes and 
subjects. They analyse the qualitative empirical data through descriptive and narrative 
techniques. The chapters present an in-depth analysis and critical appraisal of the 
aspects and features of urban governance. They also unravel the actors and bodies in the 
decision making process as well as their positions, functions and responsibilities.   
 
Chapter Five is devoted to the Elected Council (ICC) and its role in city governance. 
Chapter Six presents a discussion on role of voter turnout and representative 
democracy in the city and its effect on the machinery of governance. Chapter Seven is 
devoted to the selection of a mayor and the manner in which the mayor has been 
chosen. This chapter also explores the impact of the municipal election on the quality of 
governance delivery in the city. Chapter Eight presents the role of existing ―Public 
Forums‖ or ―Neighbourhood Councils‖ in the enhancement of governance in Tehran. 
This chapter is also devoted to Civic Associations and Community Based Organisations 
in the city and investigates their contribution to governance.    
 
Chapter Nine aims to link the data back to the research objectives, to theoretical 
frameworks, to the UN approach to governance evaluation and to the fieldwork 
findings. The discussion covers the research objectives, the literature review, research 
findings and methods, considered through an integrated approach. The chapter 
highlights the gap between the status and definition of urban governance in theory and 
practice. Chapter Ten finally summarises and concludes the study‘s investigation of 
governance in Tehran. This is followed by a presentation of the study‘s limitations. 
Furthermore, as well as underlining the original contribution of this research to the 
existing literature, it formulates recommendations in light of the results. 
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 2.0 Introduction 
 As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the purpose of this research is to explore the 
dynamic nature of and the interrelationships between, the factors that influence urban 
governance and local participation in Tehran. This chapter considers the multiple 
dimensions of governance with respect to its definitions, values and principles. The 
chapter presents background knowledge central to the study themes and reviews 
literatures devoted to urban governance and its features, including participation, 
effectiveness and accountability. The literature that is most closely associated with the 
research topic will be highlighted in this chapter and the review will present and define 
key words for the research topic. The aim is to develop a theoretical framework that 
would form a basis for undertaking the investigation. 
The discussion on the principles and components of governance contributes to the 
research not only in providing an inclusive vision of the assessment and evaluation of 
governance, but also in enabling an exploration of the extent to which these values 
identified through the literature are taken into account in governance implementation. 
This chapter firstly reviews the existing definitions of governance and how they differ 
from government, describing the complexity and variation of perspectives in the term 
governance. Secondly, it outlines the main principles of good governance and presents a 
comprehensive overview of these principles. Finally, this chapter presents approaches to 
governance assessment and the implementation of these approaches in the evaluation of 
governance. 
2.1 Definitions of Governance 
Since the 1980s, the utilisation of, and demand for, the concept of governance to 
measure the practice of urban policy has developed considerably, with a growing 
number of organisations adopting the governance concept. Governance refers to the 
procedures and trends according to which public policy decisions are formulated and 
practiced (Wilde et al., 2008). On a deeper level, governance can be defined as ―public‖ 
processes of policy making which apply to the processes of decisions that are made 
―by‖ and ―for‖ the public. Governance is defined by the UNDP (1996) as the complex 
ensemble of mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and social 
groupings manage their interests and conflicts. Additionally, the UNDP (2001) 
characterizes governance as the set of machineries, procedures and associations through 





which public and civil societies communicate their interests, apply their citizenry rights 
and commitments and reconcile their dissimilarities.  
 
The World Bank mainly views governance from an economic and financial perspective, 
according to which it refers to transformations in the public sector towards privatization 
and marketization (World Bank, 1992). Many other organisations consider governance 
from a democracy perspective. Amongst these is the International IDEA (Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance), which defines governance as the stage of 
democracy where there is a possibility of efficient citizen involvement in the decision-
making process (IDEA, 2001). However, other, divergent meanings of the term have 
been appealed to. For instance, the Local Government and Whitehall Plan (organised by 
the British Economic and Social Research Council) employed governance to refer to an 
innovative form of interaction between civil society and state (Stoker, 1999). 
Governance was identified by UNESCO
1
 as a set of processes that conduct and consider 
various relationships involving the government, local establishments and citizens. It 
considers both bottom-up and top-down approaches to support the involvement of 
publics and collaboration among stakeholders, enhancing the transparency of decision-
making, and advancing urban executive policies and strategies. The focus on 
―interactions‖ between governance stakeholders is encapsulated in the significance 
given to them, which spells out ―how‖ tasks are implemented and put into practice.  
 
Alongside emphasizing ―processes‖ of governance and ―how‖ governance works, it is 
also important to acknowledge ―who‖ is making decisions and ―who‖ is being 
influenced by decisions, meaning therefore that the nature of governance includes both 
actors and processes. Schacter (2000) suggests governance relates to power, in terms of 
who has influence, who makes decisions; interaction and answerability; how citizens 
and other stakeholders get their voice heard; and how decision makers are held 
responsible. The concept of governance merges concepts concerning political authority 
and the management of economic and social capitals (which are more fully defined later 
in this chapter), as well as the capability of governments to devise sound policies and 
perform their roles in a valuable, competent and fair manner (Smith, 2007). 
The functions and forms of government itself have been modified over time and 
nowadays, better incorporate the notion and patterns of ―governance‖ (Table 2.1). This 





gives rise to dissimilarities between the notions of government and of governance; in 
this context, considering ―good government‖ and ―governance‖ as equivalent might be 
an issue and merits further discussion. Governance is noticeably broader than 
government − even the ideal of good government. The complexity and extensiveness of 
urban governance makes it difficult to view formal structures and notions such as 
government or management within governance on an equal footing. While governance 
corresponds to the running of the city by all its actors and stakeholders, the function of 
government and management is that of guidance, formal leadership and supervision of 
decision-making. Governance is therefore much more complex than government. 
According to the UNDP (2002), governance as a concept recognises that power exists 
inside and outside the formal authority and institutions of government, including the 
civil metropolitan authority, especially power over financial matters.  
 
  Table 2.1 Comparing the functions of the new and old government 
 
 
















      
Source: adapted by the author from Thorns, 2001; Bogason, 2000 and Dear, 2000. 
 
 
   Governance refers to the correlation that exists between ―civil society and state, 
between rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed‖ (Irazabal, 2005: 3). The 
factors of creditability and legitimacy of both governing institutions and community 
institutions, and their respective politicians and leaders, play central roles in governance 
(ibid., 2005). The pathway to enhancing integrity and authenticity leads through 
responsibility, intelligibility, receptiveness, genuine contribution, empowerment of 
Old Form of Government  
(Modern period) 
New Form of Government  
(Post-modern period) 
 
Self-command Not exclusively self-commanded 
Territorial Not exclusively territorial 
Military Non-military 
Single sovereignty Shared sovereignty 
Single law Shared law 
Closed citizenship Shared citizenship 




Autonomy in policy-making Shared policy-making 
Autonomy in finance and 
taxation Financial control and shared taxation 
Welfare autonomy Transnational welfare 





communities in civil society and public consultation. These are the characteristics that 
certify an open and valid relationship between society and the state. It is this 
relationship that differentiates governance from government (Laquian, 2002b).  
Within this context, the shift from government to governance refers therefore to a move 
away from centralised and hierarchical structures of government towards a collaborative 
approach with social agencies and non-governmental actors, including the private 
sector. One important effect of this shift has been to blur the distinction between state 
institutions and civil society (Hirst, 2000). In these terms, governance can then be 
conceptualized as a move towards decentralization, whereby the shift from government 
to governance can be paralleled with the change from centralization to decentralization. 
In other words, by considering the main basics of the decentralization process, it can be 
generalized into a process of shift from government to governance. However, while 
decentralization takes place through a set of political, administrative, organizational and 
financial bottom-up shifts, to arrive at the governance arena a sort of transformation in 
power, tasks and decision-making through a top-down approach is required. At the same 
time, it is important to recognise that decentralization alone cannot ensure the formation 
of governance, although governance can be supported and affected by the 
decentralization process and its mechanisms. For example, a large scale decentralization 
process has recently taken place in African countries, but the process has failed to 
launch practical local institutions and governance practices (International IDEA, 2004). 
By contrast, the successes of decentralization processes in Latin American countries to 
some extent appear to have endorsed the governance process (Sisk and et al., 2001). In 
this regard, what is at issue here might be the depth and efficiency in the 
decentralization process, as decentralization itself can vary in terms of degree and 
extent. ―Deconcentration‖, for example, consists of relocating certain duties and tasks to 
lower levels of decision-making, while the main responsibilities still remain under 
central government control. Basically this type of transformation leads to forming 
―government at local level‖ (Figure 2.1). On a deeper scale ―devolution‖ is identified as 
powers and authorities shifting from central government to locally independent and 
legitimated subordinate bodies or divisions of decision-making that can result in ―local 
government‖ (Figure 2.2). However, some suggest that ―delegation‖ would be a more 
appropriate term for what happens when responsibilities and decision-making 
procedures are transferred in a context of deconcentration and devolution (Coudouel 





and Paternostro, 2006). It follows that a deeper degree of decentralization, or in other 
words devolution proper, might be a more likely turning point for the achievement of 
democratic governance. Furthermore, the idea of governance highlights the role played 
by a broader set of institutions, organisations or associations beyond the formal 
structure of local, regional and national government (Boddy and Parkinson, 2004). 
These authors consider governance as the sphere of public debate, partnership, interface, 
dialogue and conflict entered into by local citizens and organisations and by local 
government. Mhlahlo (2007) points out that governance also involves the understanding 
of a set of rules made by society and by its institutions. Such rules are approved by all 
groups and represent the values of that society (Mhlahlo, 2007). However, it could be 
argued that even the acceptance of one particular rule by all groups in today‘s widely-
differentiated societies might be too idealistic. This further reinforces the fact that 
defining governance is not a straightforward task, due to the lack of consensus on its 
meaning and on the rules by which it should work. This may be associated with the 
complex and dynamic nature of governance, which embraces a wide range of issues 
such as democracy, civil society, e-governance, the electoral system, public 
administration and decentralisation.  
                         
Figure 2.1 “Deconcentration”                                       Figure 2.2 Devolution or “local 
Or “government at local level”                                     government” 
Source: Coudouel and Paternostro, 2006. 
 
In this context, what is central to this research is to acquire a wider and an inclusive 
insight into the variety of views of governance, and select an approach that is in line 
with the Iran/Tehran context. On such a basis, Schacter‘s definition of governance 
seems to provide the best fit for this study. He suggests that governance regards power, 
―who‖ has influence, ―who‖ makes decisions, interactions and answerability; ―how‖ 
citizens and other stakeholders get their voice heard, and ―how‖ decision makers are 





held responsible (Schacter, 2000). This definition embraces values and principles of 
governance; while at the same time including practical aspects about the 
implementation of governance. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 1, since the 
implementation of, and move towards, governance in Iran is somewhat recent and still 
uncertain, an engagement with the full range of these practical aspects is likely to be 
required, if an inclusive governance system is to be built in the country.   
2.2 Defining Good Governance 
At a local level, ‗good governance‘ signifies the value, competences and capabilities of 
local direction and delivery of local services; the capacities of local community and 
decision-making practices, their inclusion and precision, and their responsibility; and 
the way in which authorities and rights are implemented at the local level (Wilde et al., 
2008). Good governance ―concern[s] integrity, efficiency, effectiveness and economy of 
government in meeting the ends to which government organization and activity are 
directed‖ (UNDP, 2001: 15). There are numerous variations in the preconditions for the 
foundation of good urban governance which are mentioned by individual researchers or 
organisational scholars. The UNDP (2001: 15) suggests that attributes of good 
governance include ―participatory, transparent; accountable; efficient in using 
resources; rule of law; includes central government, civil society and private sector‖.  
 
If governance is considered as the ―interactions‖ between main actors, then good 
governance regards the manner in which the ―effective interactions‖ of the state, civil 
society and the private sector take place. In this respect, the focal issue for building 
good governance is associated with the formation and configuration of these 
stakeholders in a society. Most developed countries have been able to create a balance 
between the three stakeholders. While central government delivers the political and 
legislative setting, the private sector creates employment and revenues, and civil society 
motivates the public. Mubvami (1997) underlines that effective governing or ruling is 
believed to follow a set of provisions. These comprise responsibility, unambiguousness, 
competence and responsiveness to the needs of the public and the offer of options to the 
governed (ibid., 1997). However, in most developing states the influence of the private 
sector and of civil society are insignificant and undermined by the state, and non-
comparable with the central government in weight and role (International IDEA, 2004). 





This is said to affect the process of delivering good governance in developing societies 
(ibid.).  
The notion of good governance represents the concept of a modification of the function 
of governments (Marc and Byong-Joon, 2002). Good governance is a term that 
symbolizes the quality of governance as it articulates itself through multiple dimensions 
and principles (Abdellatif, 2003). According to Surendra (2004: 33) good governance: 
 
signifies a participative manner of governing that functions in a responsible, 
accountable and transparent manner based on the principles of efficiency, 
legitimacy and consensus for the purpose of promoting the rights of individual 
citizens and the public interest, thus indicating the exercise of political will for 
ensuring the material welfare of society and sustainable development with social 
justice (Surendra, 2004: 33).  
 
2.3 Accomplishing Good Governance 
 
There is a mounting tendency among local and international bodies to endorse wide-
reaching principles that are presented as a prospective direction for achieving 
democratic urban governance. According to the World Urban Forum (WUF) (2006), the 
capacity of incorporated decision-making at international scale among local actors and 
international organisations for achieving and building a universal approach in governing 
cities is at an exceptional stage of development. In this respect the UNDP‘s agendas, 
such as the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), The Urban Governance 
Initiative (TUGI) as a regional urban governance programme, and the UN-Habitat 
Global Campaign on Urban Governance, have been intended to lead the formulation of 
theories, strategies, and policies in both developed and developing states. Their aim is to 
identify challenges and improve the capacities of urban governance development, and 
eventually prioritise local governance concerns. The World Bank employed the concept 
of ―good governance‖ as a benchmark for making loans to developing countries (World 
Bank, 1992).  
Since 1996, the World Bank has published good governance classifications for 209 
countries at the urban/local level, using several hundred indicators in order to tackle the 
six main features associated with good governance. These main features include voice 





and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption (World Bank, 
2006). Similarly, UN-Habitat looks at 26 good governance factors grouped into five 
clusters: effectiveness, equity, participation, accountability and security (Table 2.2; 
United Nations, 2004). Due to the complexity of gathering local information, a smaller 
number of attempts have been made to attend to good governance at the local scale. 
 
Table 2.2 UN-Habitat urban governance indicators project categories and measures of “Good” 
urban governance 
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Source: UN-Habitat: Urban Governance Index, 2004. 
 
To accomplish good governance by meeting its principles and themes requires huge 
financial resources, implementation tools, a systematic decision-making process, and 
transparency of regulations and functions. This further widens the gap between 
developed countries and the developing countries in terms of the degree of financial and 
practical powers, systematization of actors, mature regulations and plans. For example, 
in some developing countries, governments are unable to progress basic governance 
tasks, and citizens struggle to achieve elementary rights as a result of deficiencies in 
funding, institutional design and regulation. By contrast, most countries in the 
developed nations are placed at an advanced stage of governance practice. Financial 
resources and funding are considered instrumental for ensuring good urban governance 





in developing states. Thus the economic underpinning of governance is a complicating 
factor in achieving good governance. However, Omar (2009) argues that inadequate 
financial resources should not be a key factor: even without the necessary funds, local 
governance should be able to perform better than the almost insignificant level of 
service delivery that currently exists. He signifies a lack of transparency and 
mismanagement issues as key matters that are faced by developing countries.  
The World Bank‘s diagnostic approach for exploring governance provides a useful 
framework for clarifying the potential financial and fiscal concerns with regard to 
achieving good governance. These comprise the level or frequency of corruption; state 
confidentiality; unofficial money laundering; street crime; red tape; cost of imports; 
diversion of public funds; illegal party financing; reliability of banks and trust in 
politicians (Kaufmann et al., 2004). 
The UNDP–TUGI2 has been one of the primary regional projects to intentionally move 
beyond urban management to the wider notion of urban governance. UNDP–TUGI 
points out five visions for well-governed and sustainable cities that rely on the principle 
that, if cities are definitely our habitat, then they should operate in a social context of 
justice, ecological sustainability, political participation, economic productivity and 
cultural vibrancy. 













                     Source: UNDP-TUGI, 2006. 
 
When introducing and popularizing the concept of good urban governance, the UNDP–
TUGI (2006) has adopted the 11 principles of good urban governance put forward by 
the UNDP and the UN–Habitat Global Campaign on Good Urban Governance. These 
are participation; rule of law; responsiveness; consensus orientation; equity; 
Socially just – the benefit of economic development would be shared equitably by all sectors of 
society, including the poor, women, children and the physically challenged.  
 
Ecologically sustainable – the maintenance of the ecological processes that keep the ecosystem in 
balance; the renewable use of natural resources; the maintenance of biological diversity.  
 
Politically participatory – the participation of all sectors of society in development and  governance 
activities. 
 
Economically productive – the creation of employment and the generation of income for the on 
population in order to meet its needs.  
 
Culturally vibrant – the sustenance of a culture with a proactive respect for diversity. 





effectiveness and efficiency; accountability; security; subsidiarity; strategic vision; and 
security (UNDP–TUGI, 2006).  
A different approach to the issue is exemplified in the Government of India‘s launch 
with the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) in September 2001 of 
a Good Urban Governance Campaign (GOI, 2001). This included a study which 
monitored urban governance movements at national and local levels, with networked 
debates between local bodies, public societies, service suppliers and other stakeholders. 
The operation put forward that good urban governance is characterized by the following 
interdependent and jointly emphasised means (ibid., 2001): 
 
- Sustainability in the entire scope of urban development.  
- Complementarity of powers and capitals (financial) at an appropriate contiguous level. 
- Fairness of access to decision-making procedures and to the essential requirements            
of urban life.  
- Effectiveness in the delivery of public services and support for local economic growth.  
- Transparency and accountability of decision-makers and all stakeholders.  
- Public commitment and citizenship.  
- Security of individuals and their living environment.  
the motor and political driving force, keeping the different elements of sustainable 
development in balance, integrating them in policies, and ensuring that all the different 
Laquain (1995) suggests that the governance of metropolitan regions needs to achieve 
the following main factors: efficiency in the delivery of urban services; equity in urban 
society; economic development; and environmental sustainability. Based on innovative 
views supported by Laquain (1995), good governance is a process in which the 
problems of urban society in various physical, social, economic and managerial sectors 
can be solved and settled by collective efforts depending on public power. Moreover, in 
any case where a concept of governorship emphasizes ―quality‖ and ―how‖ to perform 
its tasks, the concept of governance should be present. Hall and Pfeiffer (2000) consider 
good governance as comparable to sustainable development (Figure 2.3). They argue 
that the several components of good governance will work towards good urban 
development that acts as:   
  





agencies in the city share the responsibilities and the benefits of sustainability as the 






















































Figure 2.3 Good Governance, an all-embracing concept with sustainable development as its central 
objective 
 
Source: Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000. 
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It seems from the above that the main principles and elements that illustrate good urban 
governance require collective decision-making, and the sharing of powers and 
responsibilities between citizens and states. In fact, identifying the capacity of social 
capital to formulate collective decision-making and consequently design good urban 
governance is considered an essential step (Maloney et al., 1999). The capacity of 
governance is identifiable at three levels: the institutional, organizational and individual 
levels. Principally capacity is required to consist of two key features: the individual 
abilities of the public (their skilfulness, aptitudes and manners) and the organizational 
potentials (practical, systemic, political and innovative competences) (Morgan, 2006). A 
number of researchers have considered social capital as the key characteristic for 
creating good governance (Leadbeater, 1997). Social capital is defined as a citizen‘s 
tendency to participate in voluntary associations and to engage in social networks aimed 
at the provision of collective goods. Social capital and its attendant propensity of 
trusting one‘s own fellow-citizens has been classified into three types: ―bonding social 
capital‖, characterised by tight links within a homogeneous group, ―bridging social 
capital‖, meaning weaker links that connect different groups and associations; and 
―linking social capital‖ between those with differing levels of power and social status 
(Woolcock,  2001).  
 
To arrive at good governance, it is necessary to formulate competence across three 
arenas. At the individual level, there should be an emphasis on building social capital, 
raising the knowledge level of civil staff and other actors, as well as developing 
stakeholders‘ skills and acquaintanceships. At the institutional level, consideration 
should be given to transforming formations and practices existing inside associations; 
and to the direction and circumstances of interactions amongst institutions. In the 
systemic arena, reforms will target legitimating, legislative; and regulatory instructions 
and guidelines that exist within organizational and administrative sectors to augment 
competencies. In Figure 2.4 core elements of developing capacities for good governance 











































Figure 2.4 Essential elements of building capacities for Good Governance 
 
Source: Astillero and Mangahas, 2002. 
 
 
2.4 Four Principles for “good governance” 
 
As discussed, to realise ―good governance‖, certain features and elements need to be 
attained. For the purposes of governance research in Iran, the literature review will 
explore good governance elements and principles, as well as highlighting various 
propositions about good governance.  
 
2.4.1 Citizen Participation and Involvement 
According to Prud‘homme (2001), citizens prefer the decisions they made themselves to 
decisions that have been imposed upon them and consequently, the development of 
good governance is vitally connected to the concept of local participation. Following the 
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participation and the citizens‘ role in particular, have been thought to progress due to 
the initiation of new spaces for local level involvement and community-based 
organisations. In fact, political involvement and participation connected with a liberal 
democratic system has led to the development of new democratic practices based on 
common foundations, contributing to new political prospects. This has resulted in new 
strategies offering participation opportunities in budgeting, policy discourses, planning, 
development, poverty measurement, observation or appraisal, and ―participatory‖ 
alternatives to the more traditional expert-driven processes (Cornwall, 2000). Such 
participatory approaches can trigger a fundamental transformation, for example, 
between a situation which delivers central government-led urban administration to one 
where urban governance is based on public participation in decision and policy making. 
A number of institutions and scholars have reflected upon the role of participation in 
good governance. According to UN-Habitat,  
Participation in governance implies mechanisms that promote strong local 
representative democracies through inclusive, free and fair municipal elections. It 
also includes participatory decision-making processes, where the civic capital, 
especially of the poor, is recognized and there exists consensus orientation and 
citizenship. (UN-Habitat, 2004:4).  
This definition, despite being universally applicable, places great emphasis on 
representative democratic processes for electing local officials, mayors and the 
institutions that are brought into power in democratic settings. Yet a more holistic view 
of participation requires a cautious consideration of both representative and 
participatory democracy (Figure 2.5). Commonly in the traditional form of participation 
known as representative democracy, public involvement takes place through voting 
activities, contributions to political parties; supervision of electoral processes and 
participation in exchanges with representatives. However, in participatory or direct 
democracy citizens take part in initiatives, local consultations, in the collection of 
information and in civil society procedures. In representative democracy, elections 
present a new authorization on a specified occasion, where nominated representatives 
are followed by an executive on behalf of the citizens and are held responsible to the 
citizens. Overall, in representative democracy, citizens play a passive role in shaping 
their cities. By contrast, in participatory democracy citizens play a noteworthy role in 





the decision-making processes that have an effect on their quality of life (Centre of 
Governance and Democracy, 2000). There is thus an urgent concern about the extent to 















Figure 2.5 Representative and Participatory Democracy 
Source: International IDEA, 2004. 
 
Haus et al. (2004) argue that it is principally the citizens‘ involvement that translates 
government to governance. In reality, long-established citizen participation in 
governmental administration signifies contributing to the procedural code, course and 
performance of community policies. For instance, this sort of participation is 
summarised in the writing of letters to council members, remonstrations, in the presence 
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Consequently, there are elements that enhance a system of ―direct democracy‖, 
initiating a deeper ―representative democracy‖. ―Direct democracy‖ is associated with 
the establishment and systemization of citizen involvement in decision-making, 
generating methods for constructing participation as a standard aspect of civic 
contributions (Transparency International and United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme, 2004:7). In effect, methods such as boosting the nature and occurrence of 
public participation, intensifying the rationale of citizen liability and expanding the 
accountability of elected bodies can lead to a deepened democracy.    
As Blair (2000: 25) points out, ―increased representation offers significant benefits in 
itself‖. For instance, he suggests that involvement in local self-government elections 
should direct an improvement of character and worth, and help to disintegrate cultures 
of imbalance and intolerance. Moreover, participation in local decision-making bodies 
is able to offer determining roles (e.g. leadership) at the neighbourhood scale. However, 
contributions to governance also have the potential to be associated with involvement in 
a comprehensive rationality of participation. Taking part in governance is tied strongly 
to mechanisms relating to cooperative decision making, whereby publics, consumers, 
political parties and private foundations take part in the decision-making process and 
are engaged in its outcomes (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). Additionally, participation in 
governance is equivalent to civic engagement, which is appreciated as the dynamic 
involvement of the public in city issues. Another definition of participation, put forward 
by Gaventa (2001), is that it can represent a mechanism whereby economically deprived 
citizens can exercise their voice through new configurations of inclusion, symposium 
and assembly, in the interests of enlightening and persuading local institutions and of 
influencing policies.  
It is possible to contend that the level, value and quality of participation in urban 
matters differ between the global North and South. While participation in the North 
often goes beyond municipal and council elections, participation in the South places 
more emphasis on the political and traditional sides of participation, focusing on local 
and urban elections. In fact such dissimilarities, and the extent to which practices and 
traditions are democratic, determine the characteristics of delivering urban governance 
in the North and South. A comprehensive evaluation of political participation traditions 
in different contexts should, therefore, include a consideration of a range of 





circumstances, such as ―contest competitiveness, seat-to-vote proportionality, and 
whether those elected to local legislatures reflected demographic characteristics of the 
general population‖ (Stewart, 2006: 5). Elections are significant in improving citizen 
participation, local government accountability and the provision of information to 
electors. However, undesirably, funding issues, violent behaviour and fraud often 
dominate both municipal and general elections (Olowu, 2003).  
When analysing the notion of participation it is important to note that good participation 
may not always have positive outcomes and does not guarantee good governance. 
However, the level and quality of participation can nevertheless determine the quality of 
governance. Furthermore, while public participation can be considered an essential 
factor, it does not guarantee a transition to democracy. This echoes the views of 
Lowndes and Wilson (2001: 639), who argued that ―Institutional arrangements that 
ensure access for interest groups and individual citizens to the processes of government 
do not necessarily guarantee democratic decision-making‖. Participation mechanisms 
will only be successful in entrenching good institutional delivery if institutions take full 
account of their accountability to the public (Brett, 2003). On the contrary, participation 
and local engagement may not foster the achievement of a local cohesive community, of 
social inclusion and self-sufficient decision-making, nor will they manipulate input. 
Nevertheless, participation and local engagement might augment public association 
(Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Jones, 2003; Peck and Tickell, 2002).  
Enhanced participation is likely to create more confidence in the end result and in the 
institutions which deliver policies (Bull and Jones, 2006: 10). Citizen participation can 
contribute to good governance if it is aimed at boosting the quality of policy-making 
and at stimulating the autonomous character of local communities (Haus, 2005). Biased 
participation in deliberative processes (in terms of gender, class or occupational status) 
can be compensated by the opportunity of the citizenry to make use of their electoral 
veto power (ibid., 2005). In democratic theory, citizen participation is based on quantity 
− how many people are involved − as well as quality – what effect citizen participation 
has on the outcomes of the policy process (Pateman, 1970). Also, Boddy and Parkinson 
(2005) suggest that the process of participation is sustainable where power is devolved. 
The achievement of urban governance therefore depends on an understanding of 
participation and on an awareness about local affairs.  





Advocates of participation have argued that public involvement is not possible without 
―Institutionalizing a decision-making role for that involvement‘‘ (Thomas, 1995: 163).  
Citizens who are resident in areas with well-constructed establishments and institutions 
are likely to have a greater tendency to participate by virtue of the fact that the 
mechanisms for them to do so are already in place. Conversely, residents in areas that 
have less responsive institutions are less likely to be involved (Berry et al., 1993). Thus, 
the extent of citizen contributions and involvement appears to be directly related to the 
quality of existing structures of administration (Bull and Jones, 2006). Other socio-
economic factors such as wealth, education and class play a key role in the level and 
quality of participation as well, whereby middle class residents tend to participate more 
than the poorer and less educated citizens.  
There is a considerable body of literature concerning the dissimilarity of participation in 
terms of level and quality in different parts of the globe (Hickey and Mohan, 2005). In 
spite of the function of political, economic and social aspects in defining the level and 
quality of participation in diverse geographical territories, the common issue that 
reduces participation appears to be ‗loss of trust‘, and the need for ‗confidence-building‘ 
(Veenstra, 2002). Indeed, a lack of faith and confidence may result in the withdrawal of 
citizens and dishearten them from becoming involved in the decision making process 
(Transparency International and UN-Habitat, 2004). Trust in a ―public body is affected 
by on the one hand the quality of services that citizens receive and on the other hand 
how open and honest [the] performance of urban establishments [is]‖ (The Audit 
Commission 2003: 8). Trust enhances the level and quality of participation, and is 
directly related to transparency and accountability. It could be argued that there is an 
interconnection between the features and characteristics of good urban governance and 
thus there is a need to evaluate governance with an integrated approach.  
According to Vreeker et al. (2009) citizen participation can be empowered by: 
 
   Promoting strong local democracy through free and fair municipal elections. 
   Establishing the legal authority for civil society to participate effectively through 
  such mechanisms as development councils and neighbourhood advisory committees. 





 Making use of mechanisms such as public hearings and surveys 
 Promoting an ethic of civic responsibility among citizens through mechanisms such as 
city or neighbourhood watch groups. 
 Undertaking city referenda on important urban development options. 
 
Given that enhanced participation can be achieved through inclusiveness and the 
empowerment of citizens in the decision-making process, the ―Inclusive City‖ identified 
by the Global Campaign on Urban Governance appears to provide the appropriate 
space where every individual, regardless of affluence, sexual category, age, ethical or 
religious background, is facilitated effectively and confidently to contribute to the 
cities‘ developmental and decision-making processes (Global Campaign on Urban 
Governance, 2002). The Campaign labelled ―participation‖ as the main and universally-
accepted principle of good urban governance (Table 2.4).  
 
Table 2.4 Principles, objectives and practical measures for the inclusive city 











 Making use of mechanisms such as public hearings and 
surveys, town hall meetings, citizen‘s forums, city 
consultations and participatory strategy development,  
including issue-specific working groups;  





 Promoting strong local democracies through free and fair  
municipal elections and participatory decision-making 
processes;  
 
 Promoting an ethic of civic responsibility among citizens  
through such mechanisms as ―City Watch‖ groups 
Enablement   Enabling the equal contribution of men and women and 
 the full participation of citizenry in civic life  
 
 Establishing the legal authority for society to participate  
effectively through such mechanisms as development  
councils and neighbourhood advisory committees.  
 
           Source: UNDP, The Global Campaign on Urban Governance, 2002: 27. 
 






Accountability and transparency are known as fundamental aspects of good 
governance that necessitate government, private sector and the public to work together 
to highlight outcomes, communicate comprehensible goals and make progress towards 
efficient approaches, scrutinizing and explicating achievements (UNDP, 2001).  
A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A‘s (past or future) actions 
and decisions, to justify them and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual 
misconduct (O‘Donnell, 1999: 17).  
To what degree can urban managers be held accountable for their actions? Are there 
forums for citizen complaints and feedbacks? Who is responsible for the activities of 
the urban governance network? From the government viewpoint and following 
Irazábal (2005) there are three aspects of accountability which are essential in urban 
governance: political, legal, and bureaucratic. She suggests that an organisation is 
politically accountable when the political platform is based on a credible and reliable 
voting process; that legal accountability requires public officials‘ strict compliance 
with the rule of law; and that bureaucratic accountability necessitates the free exercise 
of governance and the competent flow of information by the mass media, public press 
and executors regarding decision-makers relationships with citizens (Irazábal, 2005). 
Mehta (1998) considers urban governance through its feature of accountability, drawn 
from the manner in which cities handle their financial affairs, utilize resources and 
their benefits for their publics, and linked to executive necessities and decision-making 
procedures. An issue arising from the literature on accountability is an over-emphasis 
on governmental and administrative accountability, and a disregard of the function and 
role of citizens in accountability. Hyden et al. (2003) suggest that in building good 
governance, accountability is an inevitable requirement, and not only for the 
governmental and organizational sectors. They believe citizens too should be 
accountable to the administration and its regulations. 
Accountability signifies that people will be able to hold government responsible for its 
actions as they are affected by them. The combination of ―accountability‖ and 
―participation‖ are at the heart of the democratic factor in local governance (Blair, 
2000). According to UN-Habitat,  





Accountability implies that mechanisms are present and effective for 
transparency in the operational functions of local government; responsiveness 
towards the higher level of local government; local population and civic 
grievances; standards for professional and personal integrity and rule of law and 
public policies are applied in a transparent and predictable manner. (UN-Habitat, 
2004: 5).  
According to The UN Global Campaign on Urban Governance (2002), the 
accountability of local bodies to their public is a fundamental element of good 
governance. Accountability is vital to participant comprehension of local government 
and is further enhanced by appraisal and performance measures:  
Formal publication of contracts, tenders, budget and accounts; control by higher levels 
of government; Codes of conduct; Facility to receive complaints; Anti-corruption 
commission; Disclosure of personal income and assets and Regular independent audit 
are the key elements of accountability in urban regions. (The Global Campaign on 
Good Urban Governance, 2004: 6).  Within this context, Table 2.5 presents the 
Institute of Development Studies‘ framework on how to enhance accountability for 
both citizens and local government officials. 
 
            Table 2.5 Citizen Voice and organizational responsiveness 
Conditions for effective citizens‟ voice 
initiatives 
Conditions for effective responsiveness of local 
government 
 
 Broad membership base and alliance 
with middle class and elite groups 
 Internal champions/reform 
entrepreneurs 
 Technical knowledge  External pressure 
 Knowledge of official policy discourses 
and of effective alternatives 
 Vertical slice strategies − commitment 
of top leadership to reform 
 Publicity − ability to effectively utilise                     
the media 
 Incentive system rewarding 
 Lots of time and starting small  Participatory processes and client focus 
 Social capital – where trust and mutual 
support has been built 
 Involvement of street level bureaucrats 
in policy making and planning of 
service delivery 
 Horizontal coalitions with other bodies  Involvement of external actors in local 
monitoring systems 
 Formal standing in policy making areas 
and in oversight agencies 
 Linking agency income to 
performance-user fees, bonuses etc 
 Investment in attitudinal change 
           Source: Adapted from Institute of Development Studies, 2001. 
 





Accountability stands on three key pillars: financial, political and administrative. 
Jabbra and Dwivedi (1989) argue that the term also includes executive, authorized, 
proficient, political and moral dimensions. In addition, scholars such as O‘Donnel 
(1999) differentiated accountability into horizontal and vertical types, in reference to 
opposing or alternating concepts. Horizontal accountability stresses the capacity of 
public institutions to monitor and evaluate the activities of other urban institutions, and 
the subdivisions of state government. In other words, horizontal accountability 
expresses the powers of state institutions to check abuse of office and excesses of 
other governance institutions. On the other hand, vertical accountability is a means 
through which public officials are held accountable and urged to implement the 
principles of good performance by citizens and civil society. There is diverse opinion 
as to what comprises horizontal and vertical accountability (Cornwall and Gaventa, 
2001), based on who determines whether one agency of government exercises control 
or supervision over the other. The typical top-bottom flow of authority in the civil 
service may be viewed as vertical accountability, while horizontal accountability is 
society‘s ability to participate directly or indirectly in the imposition of accountability 
from the public service. 
Another form of accountability is that of ―diagonal accountability‖; it better represents 
convergence between horizontal and vertical accountability, highlighting citizens‘ 
participation in policy-making practice and their interactions with horizontal 
accountability through getting their voices heard (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001). 
Accountability has an administrative dimension whereby elected government officials 
and representatives of the public must be accountable to the citizens (Blair, 2000).  
The World Bank categorised accountability into three major types: political 
accountability, expressed in local elections; administrative accountability, exercised 
using administrative structures by organizations; and social accountability, linked to a 
system and process that holds establishments accountable to the public (World Bank, 
2004). Political accountability based on elections has an inadequate capability to 
endorse accountability due to its intermittent nature, and its role in supporting 
mechanisms against corruption is rather restricted (Transparency International and 
UN-Habitat, 2004). Administrative accountability appears to limit itself to horizontal 
and vertical mechanisms involving institutions. Their interrelationships do not always 
admit a significant contribution from outside decision-makers in urban governance. 





The major difference between the World Bank and UN propositions on accountability 
is that, in the latter, the public has become the single hub of social accountability; 
while in the former, stakeholders, including government institutions, citizens and the 
private sector, are involved in the decision making process through their different roles 
and capacities to achieve the goal of good urban governance (ibid., 2004). 
The contemporary debate in the governance literature is that of measuring 
accountability and what type of scheme and process can enhance and guarantee 
accountability. It is generally recognized that accountability schemes are efficient and 
successful once they are collective and inclusive (Olowu, 1999b; Blair 2000). In some 
developing countries, the mechanism for solving local government accountability 
issues emphasises central government horizontal power and monitoring. The failure of 
this form of accountability is that governmental supervisors often mishandle and 
mistreat their widespread influence and control over local governments. For example, 
local bodies are exploited on the basis of political affiliations or by prejudicing urban 
councils run by an opposition party, and severe delays are inflicted on the 
disbursement of budgetary allocation to local governments. These are current issues in 
assessing accountability which are also common issues in tackling good urban 
governance across a number of developing countries (Haque, 1997; Olowu, 1997). In 
fact, a major difference between the global South and the North in exercising urban 
governance lies in their mechanisms for applying legislative control when government 
institutions are not adhering to appropriate administrative ideals or the functioning of 
citizens‘ accountability is flouted (Boachi-Danquah, 2001). 
One major concern that has constrained the quality of accountability, particularly in 
developing countries, is the issue of funding and the financial dependency of local 
bodies. Evidence has shown that central government uses financial power as a tool to 
influence local government. The increasing dependence of NGOs and urban 
administrations on the state for resources and financial support negates the needs for 
bottom-up accountability mechanisms (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). Another major 
aspect of measuring accountability is the quality of service delivery in cities and often 
the delivery of urban services is shaping the relationship between government, 
consumers and providers. The World Development Report (2004) developed a 
framework that explores accountability for urban services by characterising the ―short 





route‖ between the public and service providers and the ―long route‖ between citizens, 
decision-makers and service providers. The report suggests that the most influential 
remedy for an absence of strong accountability is empowering citizens with a stronger 
voice, as well as increasing customers‘ participation in service delivery, which can 
guarantee that local bodies or central government are made aware of the quality of 
government services, and that the public‘s needs are met. Likewise, as part of the 
inclusive city, the global campaign on good urban governance designed a guideline for 
urban governance stakeholders, to aid development of the principle of accountability 
(Table 2.6). However, ―to create real accountability is by far more complex than many 
participatory theorists currently assume‖ (Brett, 2003: 6).  
           Table 2.6 Principles of Accountability 










 Regular, organized and open consultations of 
citizens on city financial matters; and of others on 
the participatory budget; transparent tendering and 
procurement procedures and the use of integrity pacts 
and monitoring mechanisms in the process; internal 
independent audit capacity; and annual external audit 
reports that are publicly disseminated and debated; 
 
 Creating public feedback mechanisms such as an 
ombudsman, hotlines, complaint offices and 
procedures, citizen report cards and procedures for 
public petitioning and/or public interest litigation. 
Access to 
information  
  Promoting the public‘s right of access to city            
information; 
 
 Providing access to city information to create a level 
playing field for potential investors. 
High 
standards  
of ethics and 
professional 
conduct 
 Regular, independently executed programmes to test 
public official integrity;  
 
 Removing administrative and procedural incentives    
for corruption, including simplifying practical 
measures, local taxation system  and reduction of 
administrative discretion in permit processing; 
 
 Promoting an ethic of service to the public among 
officials while putting into place adequate 
remuneration for public servants; 
 
 Establishing codes of conduct and provision for 
regular disclosure of assets of public officials and 
elected representatives; 
 
 Developing practically enforceable standards of 
accountability and service delivery, such as ISO, that 
will transcend the terms of public office holders. 
           Source: UNDP, The Global Campaign on Urban Governance, 2002: 28. 





2.4.3   Effectiveness  
Studies about effectiveness in governance have been faced with major concerns at both 
the organisational (Goodman and Pennings, 1977) and network level (Provean and 
Milward, 2001), with the key question guiding these studies being: effectiveness for 
whom? Although ―effectiveness‖ has been investigated from an array of perspectives 
such as network and organisation approaches, unexpectedly scant attention has been 
paid to ―urban/local governance effectiveness‖. Effectiveness in the local context is 
viewed at the scale of urban governance, using the following questions to guide the 
discussion. What criteria can formulate effective urban governance? Is it driven by the 
quality of public service delivery or by the interactions of the private sector and NGOs, 
or through the efficiency of financing policy and funding factors? It is apparent that all 
of the features reflected in the questions can potentially have a strong contribution in 
generating an effective system of governance. Effectiveness means the best exercise of 
the existing resources is achieved in procedures and institutions (Giya and 
Mukotsanjera-Kowayi, 2009). A number of scholars who consider effectiveness in 
urban governance focus on issues such as bureaucratic powers within large hierarchies. 
They identify a lack of responsiveness and innovation as causes of deficiencies in 
effectiveness (Barton, 1980; Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999). While there is a pessimistic 
tendency regarding the function of public bureaucracy (Goodsell, 1994; Stillman, 1996), 
others describe and explore admirable direction and supervision within governmental 
organizations (Cohen and Eimicke 1995; Holzer and Callahan, 1998).  
In clarifying the concept of effectiveness, it is necessary to distinguish it from the 
concept of ‗Efficiency‘. The notion of efficiency compares the quantity of a service 
provided (e.g. tons of refuse collected) to the resources (e.g. labour hours) used to 
provide it, and thus efficiency provides a measure of how reasonable service costs are. 
But, as Epstein (1998) spells out, effectiveness measures service responsiveness to 
public needs and desires; service quality is an important effectiveness consideration. 
The valuation of effectiveness in local governance may include analysing public 
circumstances, capacity achievements, public or customer contentment, awareness of 
individuals and combating corruption (Sisk, 2001).  
According to the UN (2004: 21)  





Effectiveness of governance measures the existing mechanisms and the socio-
political environment for institutional efficiency (through subsidiarity and 
effective predictability) in financial management and planning, delivery of 
services and response to civil society concerns.  
For its part, the World Bank views Government Effectiveness (GE) as comprised of 
citizen perspectives concerning the quality of public services, measures of its autonomy 
from political forces, the quality of originating policy and its accomplishment, and the 
ability of the central administration to adhere to such guidelines (World Bank, 2009). 
Similarly, Kaufmann et al., (1998) use government effectiveness as a principle of good 
governance, making it refer to the combination of inspections of the quality of civil 
service delivered, the quality of officialdom and the administrative system, the 
capability of public staff, the autonomy of public facilities and provisions from central 
government forces and the reliability of the local administration‘s dedication to 
following correct procedures. It is clear based on the abovementioned characteristics 
that governance efficiency needs to be addressed through organizational, operational
3
 
and institutional frameworks. Supporting this is the argument that the cooperation and 
assistance of NGOs play a key role in shaping the effectiveness of local governance (as 
proposed in Pierre‘s Urban Regime Theory − Pierre, 1998). That means that 
effectiveness as an output of local bodies such as municipalities and urban councils is 
dependent on the cooperation of citizens, NGOs and the private sector.  
Therefore, an inclusive approach is required to assess the effectiveness of the 
administrative system in cities. Lindblom (1965) identifies a direct relationship between 
participation and the effectiveness of governance. He argues that effective governance is 
generated by participation. Citizens‘ involvement alone may not guarantee the 
effectiveness of governance; however, it is essential for the system‘s efficiency (Haus et 
al., 2005). The effectiveness of local governments has been shaped by a variety of 
factors such as financial autonomy, delivery of services, proficiency of local bodies and 
also through interaction between citizens and local institutions. According to Manor 
(1999), financial and administrative decentralised policy has practical consequences on 
improving the effectiveness and accountability of local governance. Furthermore, to 
progress effectiveness at local level, local government must be prepared to formulate 
basic budgeting and management services in addition to scrutinizing and watching over 
their legitimate third-sectors. The UN approach to assessing the effectiveness of urban 





governance, summarised in Table 2.7, depends on local government income and 
transfer, investment budgeting, tax collection, publication of local government 
performance, customer satisfaction assessment and existence of a vision statement (UN 
Habitat, 2004:3). It is clear from the UN Framework that funding and financial 
independence play an important role in developing the level and quality of 
effectiveness. At the same time, transparency has a key role in shaping effectiveness.  
In the developing countries local government performance in delivering urban services 
has a valuable role in measuring effectiveness. To run effectively, urban services require 
significant financial resources, sound management and adequate human resources, 
requirements which many local bodies in developing cities are struggling to cope with 
in delivering services. Generally, the concept of ―effectiveness‖ at the local scale refers 
to efficiency and quality of local administration, the delivery of public services, the 
value of local public policy, and decision-making processes.     









            Source: UNDP, Global Campaign on good urban governance, 2002:23. 
 
Turning to the dimension of efficiency, according to the global campaign on good urban 
governance (2002), to be efficient, cities are required to be fiscally fit and worthwhile in 
the administration of their income, resources and expenses. Meanwhile, the 
management and delivery of services depends on the competence of the government, 
NGOs and the indirect participation of the public in generating urban wealth. In 
addition, increasing the effectiveness of local governments cuts into the power and 
 Adopt clear objectives and targets for the provision of public services, which maximise the  
contributions all sectors of society can make to urban economic development; encouraging 
voluntarism. 
 Delivery and regulation of public services through partnerships with the private and civil  
society sectors;  
 Promote equitable user-pay principles for municipal services and infrastructure;  
 Encourage municipal departments to find innovative means of delivering public goods and  
Services through management contracts;  
 Promote integrated, inter-sectoral planning and management;  
 Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of local revenue collection;  
 Removing unnecessary barriers to secure tenure and to the supply of finance;  
 Developing and implementing fair and predictable legal and regulatory frameworks  
that encourage commerce and investment, minimize transaction costs, and legitimize the 
informal sector.  





profits of many powerful vested interests and generally requires an intimate knowledge 
of local context and constant local support (Satterthwaite, 2001: 13). 
2.4.4 Equity 
The context of ―equity‖ is complex and can be considered from a variety of aspects and 
views. On issues of local fairness, equity and efficiency are regularly balanced against 
each other; and values of equity function as a tool for public services to deal with local 
fairness issues when effectiveness alone is not able to offer a determining outcome 
(Young, 1994). Equity literally means ―treating equal cases alike‖. An explanation 
gathered from the administration of service delivery to citizens indicates that equity in 
terms of public consumption of services is frequently infringed (McGeary et al., 1988). 
In order to establish whether each individual receives a fair distribution of all there is to 
obtain, class and group need to be identified. Harvey (1989) identifies sexual categories, 
ethnic backgrounds, class and even way of life as foundations for distinctions. Lefebvre 
(1996: 174) believes that in considering the concept of equity in the city, the rights of 
age, gender, state of employment, instruction, learning, ethnicity, vacation, wellbeing 
and accommodation are essential. For Lefebvre ―the right to the city‖ manifests itself as 
a superior form of rights: right to freedom, to individualisation and socialisation, to 
habitation; and to the inhabitants, the right to the city signifies citizens‘ rights 
(Lefebvre, 1996: 173 and 194). 
According to the UN-Habitat (2004: 21) the context of  
Equity implies inclusiveness with unbiased access (be it for economically weaker 
sections, women, children or elderly, religious or ethnic minorities or the 
physically disabled) to basic necessities (nutrition, education, employment and 
livelihood, health care, shelter, safe drinking water, sanitation and others) of urban 
life, with institutional priorities focusing on pro-poor policies and an established 
mechanism for responding to the basic services (UGI: 2004: 21).  
The UN framework emphasizes principles of citizenship, rights to access basic services, 
percentage of female councillors, capacity of women in key positions, pricing policy for 
low income citizens, street trade, equity of access to decision-making processes and the 
basic necessities of urban life (UGI, 2004). It seems the main categories of equity 
framed by the UN emphasise social equity, particularly gender equity in the urban 





decision-making process. UN Habitat has been playing an important role in addressing 
gender issues in urban regions through raising awareness of the need to link gender 
equity with development projects. In parallel to the UN-Governance approach, the 
Millennium Project (2004) set up a scheme of proposals and suggestions to further 
gender equality and women‘s power and concentrate on women as principal 
determinants of success. The project focused on a power-sharing strategy based on the 
idea that the distribution of power would result in equity of accessibility and resource 
utilisation. Thus, gender balance and women‘s participation become necessary in all 
processes of urban policymaking, prioritizing schemes and resource distribution. The 
inclusive city (Table 2.8) as a model provides every individual − including the 
economically deprived, adolescent or elderly citizens, different ethnic communities and 
the physically disabled − with fair access to food and drinking water, instruction, work 
and income, wellbeing, housing and hygiene (Global Campaign on Urban Governance, 
2002). 
 Table 2.8 Principles, Objectives and Practical Measures for the Inclusive City 
Principles Objectives Practical Measures 
Equity Resource 
allocation 
 Establishing equitable principles for prioritizing 
infrastructure  
infrastructure development and pricing urban services; 
 
 Establishing investment incentives for targeted sectors and 
geographic areas; 
 
 Removing unnecessary barriers to secure tenure and to the 
supply of finance; 
 
 Creating a fair and predictable regulatory framework; 
 
Empowerment   Ensuring that women and men have equal access to decision-
making processes, resources and basic services and that 
this access is measured through gender disaggregated 
data; 
 
 Establish quotas for women representatives in local 
authorities and encourage their promotion to higher 
management positions within municipalities; 
 
 Ensure by-laws and economic development policies 
support  
the informal sector; 
 
 Promote equal inheritance rights for land and property. 
 
           Source: UNDP, The Global Campaign on Urban Governance (2002:  27-30). 





Urban governance needs to be gender-aware if it is to be unbiased, sustainable and 
efficient in addressing the objectives of governing cities. On the other hand, a gender 
perspective refers not to voters or contributors but to the practice of urban decision-
making, development, management and organization. In fact, highlighting gender in 
governance aims to increase women‘s participation not merely in politics but also in 
civic society processes and to build up gender sensitivity and competence. The gender 
proposition in urban governance equity is linked to the acknowledgment of and 
awareness to the diverse position and functions of women and men in human life and 
the social relationships between them (Beall, 1996). However, the level and quality of 
women‘s demands differ between cities and within a city. The expectations and 
demands of women are also differentiated between different areas and spaces. Holston 
(1998) states that for the deprived and for women with lower-socio-economic status, 
survival and common living issues may be the most important aspects, while women 
with higher status may focus on democratic participation or equity. Formalising 
women‘s demands, needs and rights to be included in the decision making process has 
been reliant on urban regimes and schemas (Isin, 2000). 
2.5 Approaches in Governance Assessment 
The question that might be raised at this point is: why assess local governance? 
According to the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (2009) the assessment of governance 
can be conducted for four reasons:  
1. Pathologic: the main purpose of undertaking the assessment is to perceive and 
understand concerns and their extent and scale.  
2. Scrutinising:  measurement is carried out on a routine and scheduled basis to monitor    
and observe the achievement or malfunction of the governance agenda and schemes.  
3. Weighing up: this assessment answers the question of whether schemes or 
programmes have gained their initial scheduled objectives.  
4. Discourse: this assessment aims to involve citizens and residents in well-informed 
dialogues and debates about local issues.  
Different studies of governance have measured governance from a multiplicity of 
perspectives and angles. While it is not the aim of this research to discuss them all, this 





section will review governance assessments which have made contributions in line with 
the research aim. 
The UNDP, tracking its early initiatives on local governance, notes the development of 
a regional scheme for Latin America entitled ―Methodological guidelines for local 
governance analysis‖ which determined to assess, persuade and advance the level of 
governance at the local level. These guidelines are based on six domains of good local 
governance: a ―strategic vision for the city, legitimacy and leadership, active and 
positive relationships between actors, appropriate institutional capacity, citizen 
participation, and a focus on human development‖ (UNDP, 2004). As well as collecting 
data through public surveys and citizens‘ interviews, official reports and codes are 
mined for information with regard to local affairs. The efficiency of the scheme is 
shown in its capacity to design an initiative proposal suitable for local citizens which, 
on one hand, enables them to measure governance processes, and on the other hand is 
designed to enhance and encourage the quality of governance at the local level.   
The assessment tool known as the UGI (Urban Governance Index) was established by 
UN-Habitat and focuses on four main Urban Governance features: Effectiveness, 
Equity, Participation and Accountability, which are subsequently divided into 25 sub-
indexes. According to UN-Habitat, the purposes of UGI are twofold: at a 
comprehensive level the UGI intends ―to demonstrate the importance of good urban 
governance in achieving broad development objectives‖, while at a local scale ―the 
index is expected to catalyze local action to improve the quality of urban governance by 
developing indicators that respond directly to their unique contexts and needs‖ (UN-
HABITAT, 2004b:11). 
CIVICUS measures governance through the Civil Society Index, which is initiated and 
implemented by and for civil society organisations (Heinrich, 2007). Basically, this 
method has integrated a participatory research approach by involving key stakeholders 
including government, donors, scholars and the community, based on 74 indicators that 
aim to achieve strength and sustainability for civil society. The survey‘s questions 
interrogate structure − civil society‘s circumstances in terms of its social, economic and 
organisational state; environment − legal and political space offered to citizens; values − 
the dimension covers a broad range of issues in governance (transparency, democracy, 
non-violence and gender equity); and finally impact − emphasising civil society‘s 





contributions. On a practical level the survey has been implemented in Asia, Latin 
America, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, Post-communist Europe and Eurasia, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Europe − overall in nine countries. The report on this 
implementation process concludes that citizen participation in civil activities is 
somewhat low, even in Latin American countries, where although citizen involvement 
increases where there is a political and social dispute, it is also more likely to decline 
promptly to stabilize a political situation (CIVICUS, 2006). The result excludes 
Western Europe, where citizen participation is said to be at an appropriate level and 
stable (ibid., 2006). A similar scenario to that found in the assessment of participation 
emerges for transparency and accountability mechanisms, which have been practiced 
poorly in every region except for Western Europe. However, the findings on 
participation, particularly in Western Europe, emphasise citizen involvement in civic 
organisations and do not observe any noteworthy degree of citizen political 
participation, which even in Western European countries is relatively low. However, an 
issue that might be raised here is the extent to which the methods and generated data are 
competent for cross-country governance assessments and comparisons, and the extent to 
which they are capable of measuring governance at the small and local scales. 
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) initiated an 
independent index in 2000 to measure local governance and the state of democracy 
around the world. Early research focuses on representative democracy and participatory 
democracy, aiming to discover the strengths and weaknesses of local governance in 
Southern and East Africa (IDEA, 2003). Using data integrated through a questionnaire, 
the index assesses elections, political parties, elected officials, civic engagement and 
community based organisation in selected cities. As noted, one constructive part of the 
approach is that both participatory governance and representative governance indicators 
were included in this approach, and covered through a wide range of themes. The IDEA 
concludes by confirming the need to enhance service delivery, citizen participation and 
conflict management in the selected cities (ibid., 2003). The IDEA approach is a scheme 
to assess local governance and its quality of democracy via seven key governance areas 
including: Citizen Participation; Authorisation; Representation; Accountability; 
Transparency; Responsiveness; Solidarity (Landman, 2008). Recently the method has 
been developed universally and practiced in 20 countries including: Bangladesh, El 
Salvador, Italy, Kenya, Malawi, Peru, New Zealand and South Korea, through a 





democracy building approach (ibid.). The method tends to emphasise public perceptions 
as being key elements in the democracy building process and participatory research.  
Good Governance for Local Development (GOFORGOLD) develops a scheme to assess 
governance at sub-national, regional, municipal and local levels (Wilde et al., 2008). 
Differing from the most existing methods of assessing governance which place more 
stress on macro-level and cross-country appraisal, the method productively underlines 
governance measurement from the sub-national level towards the local level. Despite 
the conceptual design of the index that has been made to conform to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), since it is promoted by UN-Habitat, it actually has 
similarities with the Urban Governance Index in terms of function and practice. All 
types of data, such as population, budgets, and regulations are transformed into 
quantitative data under two categories: single numbers that are articulated by standards, 
means, ratios, fractions; and dual indications stated via 0/1. The index is composed of 
seven main aspects and 25 indicators (Table 2.9). 
 Table 2.9 Principles and indicators for the GOFORGOLD Index 
Representat- 
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Source: UNDP Oslo Governance Centre: A Users‘ Guide to Measuring Local Governance, 2008: 167. 
In spite of this the index has been seeking to uncover a broad range of issues that are 
directly associated with governance. The major issue in this regard is that the index 
merely stands on governmental or municipal reports, which puts the credibility of the 





outcome somewhat at risk. As an example, when the index was implemented in 
Afghanistan, there was an issue about the extent to which the data produced through 
official reports in a country such as Afghanistan (which has a non-transparent and 
embattled government with a high level of corruption) are consistent and reliable. 
Hence, a solitary emphasis on such objective data could be risky.  
The Local Government Barometer has proven itself in practice to be a useful tool to 
address governance issues at local level in South Africa as it translates complex 
governance concepts into locally contextualized and relevant issues (The Impact 
Alliance, 2008: 2). 
The Local Governance Barometer (LGB) is an example of a universal model of 
governance assessment. It was initiated in 2005 and revised in 2007 to analyse local 
governance circumstances and to augment the capacity of local governance. The index 
was characterised by five main governance aspects: effectiveness; accountability; rule 
of law; participation and civic engagement; and finally equity (The Impact Alliance, 
2007). The scheme arrives at quantitative data based on multiple data sources, including 
governmental data, interviews and surveys and citizen‘s views, principally through 
random sampling. The method mixes qualitative and quantitative approaches on the one 
hand, and on the other hand the index stands on both objective and subjective sources of 
data; thus it is more likely to arrive at a reliable product. Additionally, another dynamic 
function of the approach is summarised in its applicability across triple scales: national, 
provincial and city. The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Ideas) concludes that 
in those countries where the method has been implemented, including Botswana, South 
Africa, Cameroon, Ecuador, Ghana, Madagascar and Tanzania, most municipalities 
have not succeeded in dialoguing with citizens with regard to their vision for city 
development, and in most municipal councils the lack of an efficient form of leadership 
is in place. Furthermore, the study acknowledges that poor transparency, accountability 
and information flow in budgetary and planning functions are endemic (ibid., 2008). 
In another approach the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI), 
in   cooperation with the Tocqueville Research Centre (T-RC), develops the tool: 
Indicators of Local Democratic Governance, to measure and explicate local governance. 
The index addresses the creation of primary survey data and specifies the circumstances 
of local governance in Central and Eastern Europe through public survey, municipal and 





elected council survey. The index design is based on political, legislative and socio-
economic dynamics, based on five main indicators (Wilde et al., 2008: 74):  
1- Policy-Making Performance: Informed and Coordinated Decisions;  
2- Democratic Performance: Openness and Fairness;  
3- Policy Implementation: Effectiveness;  
4- Responsive Performance: Satisfaction and Goal Congruence;  
5- The Level of Service Provision as a Performance Measurement.  
 
Each indicator is evaluated through a number of dimensions. For example, the 
―democratic performance: openness and fairness indicator‖ is assessed by several sub-
indexes consisting of transparency in budget; public accessibility to local governance 
documents, state of the public forum and citizen‘s voice; information flow; and 
communications of local government with citizens (Soos, 2001). Generally, in spite of 
the generation of a set of primary data, the major difficulty regarding the method can be 
summarised in the over-complexity of the assessment process, which requires a highly-
informed technical body to administer the method. 
 
In several studies the World Bank research groups measure governance from a public 
administration and service delivery point of view (Ritva, and Svensson, 2002a; 2002b). 
In terms of its construction, the method was designed and developed through a 
participatory approach by involving key service delivery decision-makers, including 
governmental bodies, service providers, NGOs and the private sector in its design. The 
resulting approach, the Quantitative Services Delivery Survey (QSDS), assesses service 
delivery through six main variables: a) Facility features and characteristics, consisting 
of size, ownership, ease of access; b) Input, which includes financial value and capacity; 
c) Output; d) Quality, such as employees performance in a particular service; e) 
Financing, meaning fiscal resources; f) Organisational mechanisms and responsibilities 
(Dehn et al., 2002). The survey questions reflect issues conveyed in terms of incentives, 
service suppliers (government, NGO and private sector) performance, expenditure 
effectiveness, and quality of service. Overall, the method focuses on the efficiency of 
public spending and on both the quality and quantity of delivering services. Dehn et al. 
(2002) believe that the method is valuable as a tool to position and measure ―polit ical 
and bureaucratic capture, leakage of funds‖ (ibid.: 10-16). Also it can be beneficial for 





assessing and developing financial and fiscal transparency and quantifying the quality 
of interaction between donors, executives and service consumers.  
 
The Council of Europe in 2005 initiated a methodological guideline named ―Concerted 
development of social cohesion indicators‖ meant to design indicators for and with 
citizens to address wellbeing. The five dimensions of governance included: 
―Institutional relations with citizens, non-discrimination in rights, rule of law, social 
services; and civic dialogue and public consultation‖, with a scoring scheme banded 
between 0-5 (Council of Europe, 2005: 17). The productive part of this method is the 
involvement of broad citizen groups, including adolescents, senior citizens, 
marginalised and low-income people; entrepreneurs, civil employees and the Institutes 
representative. However, the major concern noted is the citizen‘s perceptions of the 
credibility and accuracy of the key data sources.         
 
Parallel to international organisations, at the national scale governance assessments 
have been accomplished by a number of country-level organisations. The Kemitraan 
Partnership (2008) is an independent Indonesian research initiative that has developed a 
comprehensive governance assessment index to measure governance through the 
interaction of government, bureaucracy, civil and economic societies (Partnership 
Governance Index, 2008). In another national example, the Indian Public Affairs Centre 
(PAC), in partnership with the Asian Development Bank, has developed a Citizen 
Report Card, which assesses the quality of service delivery from a citizen‘s perspective. 
The CRC tackles the quality of services delivery in terms of consistency, accountability, 
standards, citizen‘s rights, expenditure and budgeting policies (Asian Development 
Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute, 2007). Despite the simplicity of its tools 
and its sole focus on quantitative measurement, the CRC method has succeeded to some 
extent in capturing good governance principles with regard to service delivery. 
Furthermore, the Swiss Foundation for Development, along with CARE in Bangladesh, 
have launched the Local Governance Self-Assessment (LGSA) schedule in 2006, which 
aims to assess the local governance situation and to boost participatory and accountable 
governance in Bangladesh (Swiss Foundation for Development; International 
Cooperation and SHARIQUE, 2009). The LGSA method is largely based on a bottom-
up approach, building social capital by enhancing public awareness and education at the 





neighbourhood scale on local governance issues. However, the index is totally reliant on 
public perceptions as a source of input and this might affect the reliability of the final 
product.  
 
What has emerged from the above discussion about governance assessment approaches 
suggests that measurements of local governance present significant facts about specific 
concerns at the local level, such as decentralization and participation strategies and local 
accountability procedures (UNDP Oslo Centre, 2009). A governance measuring tool is 
an appraisal that expresses the extent of development in the existing conditions of 
governance on one hand and its prospects appointed situation on the other hand (ibid, 
2009).     
 
Although having a number of constructive characteristics, the existing tools are not 
without their deficiencies. Generally the issues fall into two categories: theoretical and 
operational. In terms of theoretical issues, some tackled the state of democracy in spite 
of an ostensible focus on governance processes. It could be argued that the lack of clear 
distinction within governance indicators and the complex nature of the governance 
exacerbate this ambiguity. To some extent, governance indicators have been faced with 
questionable boundaries and overlapping spheres. Furthermore, some of the concepts 
envisaged by these instruments are insufficiently realised through the quantitative 
approach or objective data used for their measurement. In terms of operational concerns, 
some require well-trained experts in methodology and highly-experienced in analysis. 
Time and cost are other issues that the assessments have been faced with.  
 
It may be understood that despite the significant efforts made recently in this regard, the 
challenges of selecting a tool for a comprehensive governance assessment are 
undeniable. For example, Court et al. (2002: 4) highlight the absence of a ―holistic‖ 
approach to measuring governance. Others underline the need for progress in 
developing a survey on an international scale based on perceptions of governance, as 
well as in designing precise country in-depth indicative governance assessment 
(Kaufmann et al., 1999). In a wider context, the basic issue of governance assessment is 
the massive creation of measuring mechanisms among multi-dimensional 
establishments (UNDP, 2005).    





In terms of type and nature, the local governance assessment indicators can potentially 
be categorised as ―input‖; ―process‖; ―output‖; ―perception‖; and ―outcome‖ indicators 
(UNDP, 2007). While process indicators signify the manner in which the outcomes or 
performance are accomplished, performance or outcome indicators underline 
governance achievements and goals in a typical dimension such as level of fraud (Court 
et al., 2002). Disregarding any of the above indicator categories in designing 
governance measurement can put the precision and accuracy of the method at risk. 
Combining and linking these indicators together can notably enhance the effectiveness 
of governance assessment. However, Kaufmann et al. (1999) suggest that the tendency 
to aggregate measures by merging indicators from various bases does not improve the 
precision of the assessment.   
 
The evaluation of good urban governance not only necessitates precise ―indicators‖, but 
also a set of ―standards‖ by which the elements are measured (Stewart, 2006: 200). After 
cautiously considering the variety of governance assessments conducted by diverse 
institutions, this research will employ the UN-Habitat approach (Urban Governance 
Index) as an assessment scheme to measure the urban governance mechanism in 
Tehran. As noted earlier, this focuses on four main Urban Governance features: 
Effectiveness, Equity, Participation and Accountability. The UN-Habitat approach fits 
well with existing research on these issues, as it embraces ideological features as well as 
theoretical values and principles of governance. Moreover, the global implications of 
this method and its origination and introduction by one of the best acknowledged 
international bodies further justify the selection of this method. However, the methods 
that attempt to measure complex phenomena in simplified numerical forms have their 
limitations. This is one of the reasons why the application of the UN-Habitat approach 
will be followed by qualitative research for understanding the contexts, motivations and 
problems involved, which would be essential in analysing and evaluating urban 
governance in Iran. The method will be explained in more detail in the methodology 












This chapter has considered the contemporary body of literature related to the topic of 
study. It has provided a review of governance, including its definitions, values and 
principles. The body of literature has highlighted that the governance definition must 
take into account the values and principles of governance. Basically, governance is 
driven forward through the interaction of values and principles, whereby issues of 
citizen participation and state accountability are taken into account. This chapter has 
shown that in recent years governance has been defined and shaped by a variety of 
international organizations, regional agencies and scholars, according to their 
understanding and interests. The three major bodies, namely the UNDP, the World 
Bank and UN-Habitat governance, have had an influential role in shaping the definition 
of the features of good governance. According to their approaches, citizen participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and equity are the common features of urban governance. 
The multi-dimensional and complex nature of governance has been discussed under five 
fundamental dimensions which are: 1) political, 2) contextual, 3) constitutional, 4) legal 
and 5) administrative. The enhancement of accountability and transparency; and the 
empowerment of citizens in the decision-making process are the main benefits that can 
be offered by a good conduct of governance. 
 
Parallel to its conceptualization, governance assessment has been mainly delivered by 
international bodies such as the United Nations and World Bank. The current dominant 
mode of governance measurement is based on institutionally-originated schemes which 
principally stress good urban governance characteristics. In governance assessment, 
there is a danger in placing too much focus on any one aspect of governance, as the 
governance features are robustly associated in an intertwined manner and cannot be 
clearly distinguished. Thus in governance assessment and implementation, it is crucial 
to view urban governance from an integrated perspective, taking into account several 
key aspects. The next chapter will consider the research methodology that is needed to 











1 http://www.unesco.org/most/most2.htm (Accessed on 12/04/2009). 
 
2 
(TUGI) The Urban Governance Initiative is a regional project of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) that began in 1998. 
3 Operational efficiency refers to the provision of services at reasonable quality and cost (see Asian 
Development Bank, 2005). 
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        3.0 Introduction  
 
As stated, the research explores the dynamic features of, and interactions between, the 
elements that influence governance practice in Tehran. Due to the multifarious nature of 
governance, which brings in various areas such as social science, political science, 
management and planning, selecting a proper method needs cautious reflection. In line 
with the research questions and aims, the research applies both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to explore urban governance in Tehran. This chapter presents the 
research methodology and the qualitative and quantitative approaches used in this 
research. Furthermore, it presents the implementation of the UN-Habitat governance 
assessment in this study (Urban Governance Index), and how its results led to the 
recognition of a need for a more in-depth exploration of the issue of participation in 
Tehran‘s urban governance. This is followed by a presentation of the rationale of the 
interview as a technique for primary data collection for the in-depth exploration of 
participation issues. The final sections of this chapter explore ethical dimensions, the 
limitations of the methodological approach and reflections on the research processes. 
 
3. 1 Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research aspires to discover an interaction between variables, while 
qualitative research aims to explore a particular social concern or fact (Creswell, 1998). 
Cornford and Smithson (1996) suggest that quantitative research is a type of research 
that attempts to develop measures and figures that can be presented and manipulated to 
express the event (things and correlations) in an investigation. In contrast, qualitative 
research generates data that has not been processed and prepared through numerical 
approaches (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).     
The use of both qualitative and quantitative methods is common among researchers in 
the governance field. As discussed in Chapter 2, several international organisations such 
as the World Bank (2008), UN-Habitat (2004a) and International Transparency (2004) 
use quantitative approaches in governance assessment. On the other hand, Gissendanner 
(2003) suggests that the inductive features of governance studies are better suited to 
qualitative methods, as they allow a critical interpretation of the multiple aspects of 





governance. This may imply that quantitative methods, as an unintegrated method, are 
incapable of covering the multifarious aspects of governance. In any approach to 
investigating governance one basic point needs, however, to be taken into consideration: 
governance is about understanding ―how things are done‖ and not ―what the result is‖ 
(UGI, 2004a: 16). According to Creswell (1998), questions and issues that start with 
―how‖ or ―what‖ are likely to be addressed through a qualitative research account. As 
stated in the literature review, the nature of governance is complex. In this respect, 
following Yin (1994) qualitative research offers an enhanced selection of tools to 
investigate and analyse a complex fact, and should therefore be recommended. As 
discussed in the introductory chapter, urban governance is a relatively new subject in 
Iran, and the issue is not yet well-defined. Accordingly, a qualitative approach is 
considered appropriate, as it is suitable for circumstances where the information on a 
subject or issues is limited and the issue has not been deeply explored (Creswell, 2005).         
 
Many researchers (e.g. Berry, 1993; Irazabal, 2005; Giersig, 2008; and Nyseth, 2008) in 
the urban politics and governance field have employed qualitative methods to explore 
urban governance procedures. However, employing qualitative methods alone is not 
sufficient to penetrate all aspects of the research questions and goals. In this respect, 
using either a qualitative or quantitative approach has to date, been considered a 
deficiency in governance studies (UNDP, Oslo Governance Centre, 2009). In this study, 
due to the relatively new and underexplored nature of urban governance in Iran, it was 
suitable to start out by mapping the field through a quantitative method (the UN-UGI 
assessment instrument). This method revealed areas of particular concern for urban 
governance in Tehran, that could then be investigated through targeted qualitative 
interviews, which made up the main body of the data gathered. Thus, in order to address 
the research objectives and enhance the credibility of the study‘s account of  urban 
governance, the methodology that was chosen for this project was mainly qualitative but  
the questions for the qualitative part of the study were developed based on a quantitative 
research approach. Both quantitative and qualitative strands of the study relied on both 









3.2 Data Collection Approach 
There are ―a range of social situations in research in which particular 
researcher/researched relationships signal different kinds of social construction of data‖ 
(Cloke et al., 2004: 127). The first category of social situations is labelled as ―robotic‖, 
wherein there is no communication between the researcher and the researched. The 
second type is ―remote‖, where there is no direct or face-to-face interaction. The third 
category, named as ―interactive‖, is where data are established through the interactions 
of the researcher and researched. The issue here is about owning, shaping and leading 
questions and answers. The fourth type is ―involved‖, where questions are swapped by 
dialogue (ibid., 129). This study in particular, benefited from various data collection 
approaches at different stages of the research. The research exercised the second type in 
its early stages and developed further via the third and fourth types.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the purpose of the research was to investigate and assess the 
state of, and issues around, urban governance in Tehran following Iran‘s urban 
governance transformation. In order to gain a clear vision of Tehran governance and 
identify its positions, in the first stage of research, the researcher employed the UN-
Habitat methodology to assess urban governance in Tehran. More in detail, the UN-
Habitat assessment addressed the first and second research questions, defining the 
characteristics of urban governance in Tehran as well as identifying its failing areas (see 
Table 3.1). Arising from the UN-Habitat governance assessment result, the third main 
question and (and later, arising from this, four subsidiary questions) were designed. To 
answer third question and these sub-questions, in this phase the priority areas were 
critically deepened, mainly through the qualitative method, in the form of interviews 
with urban actors, policy-makers and stakeholders. It is noticeable that early research on 
urban governance  
 
focused on basic dimensions of network discrepancy such as size, hierarchy 
structures, sectoral representation, and contact frequency with other reputedly 
influential individuals, and gathering data on the most influential people 
(Gissendanner, 2003: 672).  
 





Accordingly, primary data is obtained through a two-tier interview strategy first, with 
urban stakeholders and decision-makers in governance and policy making practice, and 
then, with actors involved in urban governance mechanisms.  
 



















Sunders et al. (2003: 137) suggest that ―many of the secondary data sets available from 
governments and data archives are of higher quality than you could ever collect 
yourself‖. This research used qualitative data and non-statistical sources including 
newspapers, policy documents, first-person accounts and biographical materials. The 
quantitative statistical sources used include national surveys conducted by the Iran 
Statistics Centre, as well as Tehran surveys carried out by the Tehran municipality 
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records collected by governmental and non-governmental institutions and organizations 
were considered as well. Archival materials such as the municipality‘s and Islamic city 
council‘s financial records and reports were also considered. Additionally, records from 
specialised magazines such as Shahrdariha (Municipalities) / Modiriat-e- shahri (Urban 
Management) and newspapers, for instance Hamshahri (Fellow – citizen)  were used.  
 
The steps outlined below summarise the methods adopted in the research to source the 
data: 
1- Application of the UN methodology for governance assessment;  
2- Derivation from the results of the UN assessment of areas of concern for urban 
governance in Tehran, to be further researched through qualitative interviews; 
3- Interviews with urban decision makers and urban authorities (municipality and city 
council authorities); 
4- Analysis of secondary data, including the series of surveys conducted by central 
institutions and organisations such as the electoral participation censuses produced by 
the Iran Statistics Centre and the Interior Ministry; and civic statistics generated by 
Tehran‘s City Research Centre and Tehran‘s Neighbourhood Statistics Services; 
5- Survey of documentary sources including local press and publications, administrative 
records as well as personal papers and interviews.  
6- Contextualisation of official and unofficial information, including surveys and 
assessments of unpublished reports on unofficial bodies, independent institutions and 
individuals. In the same manner, data was extracted from government and municipal 
reports, speeches and papers; 
7- Analysis of online secondary data from civic association and neighbourhood council 
websites. Here, data provided by governmental and non-governmental institutions were 
considered; 
8- Analysis of international secondary data, for instance the transparency and 
accountability projects conducted by the UNDP; and the UN reports on different aspect 
of the city. 
 
3.2.1 The UN Urban Governance Approach  
International bodies such as UN-Habitat, World Bank, UNDP and Global Campaign on 
Urban Governance have contributed to formulating indicators for urban governance 





assessment. As indicated earlier, this research employed the UN-Habitat methodology 
(Urban Governance Index) as a method for assessing urban governance in Tehran. It is 
based on four main Urban Governance features: Effectiveness, Equity, Participation and 












































































The UGI has a double purpose: at a global level it aims ‗to demonstrate the importance of 
good urban governance in achieving broad development objectives‘, while at the local 
level ‗the index is expected to catalyze local action to improve the quality of urban 
governance by developing indicators that respond directly to their unique contexts and 
needs‘.  
2. Focus  
 
The UGI intends to measure urban governance by focusing on ‗mechanisms, processes 
and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their 
legal rights, meets their obligations and mediate their differences‘. In particular, it gives 
‗emphasis on the quality of relationships and processes between key stakeholders at the 
local level‘.  
3. Principles  
 
The initial five principles chosen as the framework of the Urban Governance Index have 
been based on the five measures of freedom of Amartya Sen, linking Effectiveness with 
Economic Facilities, Equity with Social Opportunities, Participation with Political 
Freedom, Accountability with Transparency Guarantees and Security with Protective 
Security. Eventually, the security principle was not recommended as part of the Index 
because of its weak representation with regard to the selected evaluation criteria.  
     4. Indicators  
 
Urban Governance Indicators have been chosen according to the four basic principles 
listed above. The final set of UGI indicators consists of 25 indicators – including the core 
set of 18 indicators – chosen on the criteria of ease of collection, universality, relevance 
and credibility. These indicators have been selected through UN expert group meetings 
and are characterised by the following features (UN-HABITT, 2004a; Narang, 2005): 
  
- UGI indicators focus on the process of decision-making (e.g. involvement of civil 
society in a formal participatory planning and budgeting process before undertaking 
investment in basic services) rather than on inputs, outputs or outcomes of these 
processes.  
 
- They intend to be credible and robust in order to properly measure the quality of 
governance and to be sufficiently universal to enable comparison. 
  
- They try to tackle both the issues of universality and contextualisation. According to this 
purpose, UN-Habitat proposes as a useful approach identifying ‗core‘ indicators relevant 
across different countries and contexts and ‗satellite‘ indicators specifically suited to each 
country‘s particular context. 
  
- Indicators should allow stakeholder participation and local ownership in the data 
collection process and in the following application of these indicators to the decision-
making process.  
 
- UGI indicators focus on quantitative data collected at the city level, even if qualitative 
information is considered important to complement the core set of quantitative indicators. 
  
- In addition, UGI indicators have been selected in line with the aim of disaggregating 
national/sub-national indicators from the local ones. This has been done in order to take 
into account urban governance issues at national level but also at the local level, which is 
closest to citizens.  
Source: UN-HABITAT, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Narang, 2005 and Moretto, 2007. 





According to the UN-Habitat, the purposes of UGI are: ―to demonstrate the importance 
of good urban governance in achieving broad development objectives‖ at a 
comprehensive level; and at the local level: ―to catalyze local action to improve the 
quality of urban governance by developing indicators that respond directly to their 
unique contexts and needs‖ (UN-HABITAT, 2004b:11). The UGI method has been 
created ―to enable cities to objectively measure the quality of local governance‖ 
(Narang, 2005:1). In brief, the underlying rationale for selecting the UN methodology 
can be summarised as the global applicability of this method. After the standardisation 
of the indicators‘ credibility through the development of comprehensive implementation 
methods, in 2004 this methodology was applied in 24 cities in both developing and 
developed countries. The methodology was integrated by international bodies such as 
UN-HABITAT, UNDP, UCLG and GUO through a comprehensive formula of 
selecting, standardizing and granting loadings to the different variables (Table 3.3). 
After allocating loadings to the indicators through advanced statistical techniques such 
as principal component analyses (PCA), the UGI designed formulae for each main 
indicator.  
Additionally, since the UN seeks to measure good urban governance worldwide, its 
urban governance index design is expected to be globally relevant and applicable. The 
existence of a clear normative framework for the methodology consisting of the 
following principles ―a) Ease of collection; b) Universality; c) Relevance, and d) 
Credibility‖, facilitates its application (UN- Habitat, 2004: 12). Furthermore, in contrast 
to existing measures, the Urban Governance Index steers clear of firmly underlining 
economic indicators and focuses, instead, on a set of tools to tackle the issues of 
citizens‘ inclusion and participation (Moretto, 2007). Furthermore, its application 
represents that the UGI does not simply rely upon quantitative data gathering; it may 
also, equally, be applied to qualitative data (ibid., 2007). To conclude, the UN-UGI 
methodology was chosen because it employs a multi-disciplinary approach; it is 
globally relevant and its framework is flexible at the point of use to evaluating urban 
governance in different contexts. Furthermore, due to its multi-level functions, the 
method is capable of endorsing application at international, state and city levels.  
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However, the UN approach has its limitations (see sections 4.4 and 9.1). For instance, 
there is not enough room in this methodology to debate all the normative potentials in 
multifaceted urban governance. On this basis, to critically analyse the complex nature of 
urban governance processes in Tehran, the research needed to go beyond the UN-Index 
methodology, in terms of both method and content. Thus, in terms of method, the 
research collected primary data and subjective data through interviews. The 
investigation through interviews focused on the ―mechanism‖ and ―processes‖ of urban 
governance in Tehran. In terms of content, two issues particularly raised by the results 
of the UN-UGI exercise were investigated in the qualitative interviews. These were: the 
dynamic nature of urban governance and participation in Tehran. In particular, five 
indicators of participation were selected for the study: elected council, voter turnout, 
selection of mayor, public forum and civic association. Exploring these areas also 
inclusively and explicitly identified the governance gaps in the Iranian context; and the 
measures which needed to be taken into account to enhance urban governance in 
Tehran.  
 
3.2.2 The interview as a method 
Primary research was necessary since this research is the first of its kind in Iran. The 
interview was the selected approach for primary data collection in the study. 
Gissendanner (2003) claims that all practical governance investigation is premeditated 
with the target of collecting data from three main elements: the people who have 
dominant power in the decision-making process; the qualities and circumstances of the 
institutional assets which individuals dispose of to manipulate systems; and the value of 
performances or strategies taken in a particular era. This research used semi-structured 
interviews to address the data collection. The literature on the strong points and 
limitations of the semi-structured interviewing style is broad (Atkinson, 1990; Coffey 
and Atkinson, 1996; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Gilbert, 1993; Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995; Warren, 2002). The semi structured interview is a qualitative data 
collecting approach, intended to gain data about an individual‘s views, ideas, beliefs and 
experiences (Arksey and Knight, 1999). In other words, semi-structured interviews are 
discussions in which the researcher has identified what he/she want to uncover and 
consequently has a series of preformulated questions and a good idea of what themes 
and issues will be faced. By contrast, structured interviews deliver programmed 





questions that are closed for every respondent – there is a choice of answers from which 
the interviewee cannot deviate. But semi-structured interviews allow for dialogue and 
engaging the respondents in order to the tackle issues to be addressed (Miles and 
Gilbert, 2005). Moreover, the semi structured interview is also very important as it 
provides up-to-date and precise data compared to other secondary data collection 
techniques (Davis and Cosenza, 1993). The ―Interviewer will use pronouncement and 
decree to improvise, [they are] partially interviewer-led, partly informant-led and also 
the validity [is] to some extent reliant on schedule, and partly on interview dynamics‖ 
(Arksey and Knight, 1999: 22).  
 
The motivation for using this method was its flexibility, which permits the discovery of 
potential agendas whilst enabling the researcher to ensure all essential matters are 
included. At the same time, it allows the participant to introduce issues they regard as 
important. In this research, interviews were used to explore the practical advantages and 
limitations of the urban democratic shift in Tehran and to investigate the engagement at 
local or neighbourhood level of the innovatory urban administration formation. 
Furthermore, the interviews are intended to support appraisal of the urban governance 
system in Iran. A number of major urban stakeholders were involved in the research 
project as interview participants. 
 
3.3 Selection of Respondents and Application of Interview  
 
Baxter and Eyles (1998: 521) suggest that ―researchers need to be more explicit about 
the research process including the rationale(s) for, among other things, respondent 
selection, key changes in research direction and analytical procedures‖. The research 
employed purposive sampling, which is a non-probability sampling approach. The 
method is common for qualitative studies where the quantity of interviewees is not a 
fundamental issue. However, the core significance of this technique is the measure and 
criteria that are applied to decide on target groups or individuals.   
 
Since the research investigation is about governance, the initial step for choosing 
participants was to identify the main stakeholders and decision-makers who are/should 
be involved in the practice of governance in Tehran. Following the identification of 





central governance actors based on literature and research frameworks, a set of criteria 
were selected to ensure the sampling process. The criteria for the selection process 
were: 
 
i)  Target respondents should include all potential and practical governance 
stakeholders. 
ii) The sample should include three levels and spheres of stakeholders: central state        
officials; local government officials; and the public. 
iii) The sample should include urban experts and NGOs 
iv) The sample should include male and female as well as three age categories.     
  
Based on these criteria, the interviews focused on eight groups of institutions and 
sectors which are believed to have the most influence on urban governance tasks and 
participation mechanisms. A total of 60 interviewees were interviewed from the 
following eight groups (Figure 3.2). The first group represented Tehran‟s 
Municipality, executing mayoral responsibilities; and the second group, the Islamic 
City Council (ICC) in Tehran, which has representative responsibilities parallel to the 
executive role of the municipality. Interviewing the major urban policy-makers at the 
urban level, such as officers from the Islamic City Council (ICC) and municipality as 
the key urban actors, can be considered as an efficient way of recruiting interesting 
accounts from their representatives. The third group included the Interior Ministry, as 
the main state level headquarters for urban associations with regard to governance and 
participation issues. The fourth group was represented by NGOs and civic 
associations; and the fifth group by Neighbourhood Councils (Anjomanhaye 
Showrayari) as the lowest tier of the urban hierarchy which includes citizens‘ 
representatives at the neighbourhood scale. The sixth group included urban academics 
and experts (well informed-persons) in order to investigate their beliefs and 
perspectives on recent urban governance activities and the circumstances connected 
with the governance shift. The seventh group included representatives from the private 
sector. For these seven groups, five individuals were selected and interviewed from 
each group. However, according to the research framework and objectives, ignoring 
citizens and failing to take their views and perceptions into account could to some 
extent jeopardize the accuracy and quality of the research. In this context, to minimize 





the inaccuracy of the research, ordinary citizens which hold no executive power in the 
decision-making process, were also interviewed. From this eighth group, 25 randomly 
selected individuals resident in Tehran were interviewed. 
 













       
 
          Figure 3.2 Interviews Key Informants through Purposive Sampling 
 
  The interviews were semi-structured and conducted face to face in different venues. 
The decision-maker interviews were all conducted in the respondents‘ office. In fact, 
one advantage of interviewing elites is that they are generally able to offer an 
appropriate space for the interviewing process (Stephens, 2007). However, the 
restricted accessibility of urban elites in some cases led the researcher to consider the 
possibility of telephone interviewing. The number of interviews conducted was limited 
to a total of 60 interviewees (35 urban actors and stakeholders; 25 ordinary citizens) 
which was the number of participants prepared for. Although the researcher had aimed 
to expand the number of participants if accessibility became much easier, in practice, it 
turned out that accessibility issues limited the participants to 60. As mentioned, the 
interviewees were drawn from three main groups. Firstly, urban executives, 
representatives and administrators (urban decision-makers) who have a responsibility 






















municipality, city council and state ministry. Secondly, members of non-governmental 
organisations and urban experts including academic staff, scholars and urban 
professionals who are working in academic environments and thirdly, ordinary 
citizens selected for the interview process. These groupings are appropriate because 
the opinions of urban scholars, NGOs and citizens are often divergent and in some 
cases are at odds with current urban government policies in regard to governance. This 
helped to enhance understanding of the urban governance procedures and practices 
associated with the participation process in Tehran. Each interview was introduced 
with a brief letter explaining its purpose, measures to safeguard confidentiality and the 
importance of the research to the respondents (Appendix, 1). Since the study covered 
Tehran, the data collection as well as the process of analysing the results was a costly 
and lengthy process for the researcher. The interview questionnaire per respondent 
took on average about 45-60 minutes to be completed and discussed. Despite prior 
arrangement and permission gained for using a tape recorder to record the interviews, 
in the event, the device was rejected respectfully.    
 
The interview questions were based on the main aspects of good urban governance and 
participation (Appendix, 2). The extent of representative and participatory urban 
governance and its processes were taken into account. In particular the research 
examined the effectiveness of the Islamic council and the neighbourhood council with 
regard to participation, with the following questions. Does the existence of the Islamic 
City Council contribute towards strengthening public participation in urban decision 
making? What are the main policies and programmes of local government that 
encourage citizen participation and governance values and principles? To what extent 
are these policies and programmes for involving citizens applied in the governance 
process? At which scale have citizens participated and become involved in urban 
matters? This question covered aspects relating to the process of selecting and electing 
a mayor, urban and local council representatives at the city and local levels; and the 
debates on the participation of community based organisations and civic associations 
in the decision-making process. Also discussed were the autonomy of local 
governance, the performance of elected politicians; and the extent to which decisions 
and policies made by local government have been affected by council representatives. 
The intensity of cooperation between the ICC and municipality and its effectiveness 





were also broached. The relationships within the central government and local bodies 
in terms of participation and its mechanisms were considered. In fact this research 
explored both, the ―breadth‖ of public participation, which includes the extent of 
citizen participation in the governance process; and the ―depth‖ of citizen participation 
which includes influence and meaningfulness of citizen engagement in decision-
making.  
It is important to acknowledge that semi-structured interviews do not come without 
problems. A major difficulty that can be encountered is the lack of any check on the 
effectiveness of the communication. In order to reduce the challenges, the 
questionnaire was carried out face-to-face, which is accompanied by a certain 
reduction in the convenience and openness of the interview. 
3.4 Data Analysis Approach 
The research used an analysis process based on the nature of the data gathered. Thus, 
the interview analysis was conducted manually. The first section presents the UN- 
Habitat (UGI) analysis approaches and the second section discusses the analysis 
approaches used for the interviews.  
3.4.1 Urban Governance Index  
The purpose of analysing the UGI data is not merely to view the performance of urban 
governance through a quantitative approach. Rather, it is to explore the particular 
aspects of the UGI that characterise urban governance and participation practices in 
Tehran. Two general approaches have been suggested by the UN-UGI methodology:  
 
 Alternative 1 included only indicators that obtained a high ranking through the 
design    and loading processes of the methodology.  
 Alternative 2 included indicators that received both a high and a moderate ranking 
(Table: 3.3).  




              Table 3.3 Urban Governance Index, selected indicators for two alternatives  
   




1. Local government revenue per  
capita 
2. Local Government transfers 
3. Ratio of mandates to actual tax 
collection 
4. Published performance standards 
1. Local government revenue per capita 
2. Ratio of actual recurrent and capital 
budget 
3. Local Government transfers 
4. Ratio of mandates to actual tax  
collection 
5. Predictability of transfers 
6. Published performance standards  
7. Customer satisfaction survey 
8. Vision statement 
Equity  
sub-index 
5. Citizens charter 
6. Proportion of women councillors 
7. Proportion of women in key  
positions 
8. Pro-poor pricing policy 
9. Citizens charter 
10. Proportion of women councillors  
11. Proportion of women in key positions 
12. Pro-poor pricing policy 
13. Street vending 
Participation 
sub-index 
9. Elected council 
10. Election of Mayor 
11. Voter turnout 
12. People‘s Forum 
13. Civic Associations (per 10,000)  
14. Elected council 
15. Election of Mayor 
16. Voter turnout 
17. People‘s Forum 
18. Civic Associations (per 10,000)  
Accountability 
sub-index 
14. Formal publication of contracts, 
tenders, budget and accounts 
15. Control by higher levels of 
government 
16. Anti-corruption commission 
17. Disclosure of personal income and 
assets 
18. Regular independent audit 
19. Formal publication of contracts, 
tenders, budget and accounts 
20. Control by higher levels of 
government 
21. Codes of conduct 
22. Facility to receive complaints 
23. Anti-corruption commission 
24. Disclosure of personal income and 
assets 
25. Regular independent audit 
                  Source: UN-Habitat, 2004a: 6. 
 
To tackle the complexity of the issues at stake and to uncover a broader range of 
critical issues in the fieldwork, the Alternative 2 was preferred in this research. On this 
basis, 25 indicators for assessment were considered and split into 9 quantitative 
indicators and 17 qualitative indicators. All indicators and criteria were addressed 
through the secondary (manipulated) data, in which each indicator is given a score 
(weight) according to the rank of the indicator, its significance to the policy objective 
and distribution of weight. For instance, in Alternative Two the following weights are 
assigned to the Effectiveness, Equity, Participation and Accountability sub-indicators 
(see table, 3.4). The indicator score is expressed in values ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 
means excellent performance and 0 means poor performance. Also the binary response 
in ‗Yes‘ or ‗No‘ will transform to 0 or 1. For instance, is there currently a signed 
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published statement (charter) from the local authority which acknowledges citizens‘ 
rights of access to a basic service? ‗NO‘= 0 and ‗Yes‘ =1. All information is then 
converted into quantitative data of two types: single numbers (expressed by averages, 
means, ratios, percentages), and binary variables ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘, respectively expressed 
as ‗0‘ and ‗1‘ assessments. The final calculations for each sub-indicator are conducted 
through formulae which are detailed in Appendices 5 and 6 of the thesis. In fact in 
order to formulate and then to establish the UN- UGI approach this research aimed to 
use publicly existing data: national and city statistics and regulations; and available 
administrative data on population, budgets and procedures (Figure, 3.3). With the 
exception of a small number of sub-indicators, such as sub-indicator number 13, the 
information has been gathered quite straightforwardly. Due to the nature of the data, 
the gathering process involved directly a number of local and national institutions. The 
researcher consulted the official Tehran Municipality Statistical Centre, the Islamic 
City Council, the Interior Ministry, and the National Statistical Centre; complemented 
by access to the official websites active in urban governance and administration 
practice.    
 




0.25*LG Revenue per capita + 0.10*Ratio of recurrent to capital budget  + 0.10*LG 
revenue in transfer + 0.10*Tax collection + 0.10*Predictability of transfer + 
0.15*Published performance standards + 0.10*Consumer satisfaction survey + 
0.10*Vision Statement = 1 
Equity 
 
0.20*Citizens Charter + 0.20*Women councillors + 0.10*Women in key positions + 0.15* 
household water connection + 0.10*Pro-poor policy + 0.10* Water price + 0.15*Street 
vending restrictions = 1 
 
Participation  0.15*Elected Council + 0.15* Mayor Selection + 0.25*Voter Participation + 0.20*Peoples 
Forum + 0.25*Civic associations = 1 
Accountability  0.20*Formal publication: contracts, tenders budget and accounts + 0.15*Control by higher 
levels of government + 0.10*Codes of Conduct + 0.10*Facilities to receive complaints + 
0.15*Anti-corruption commission + 0.15*Disclosure of personal/family income and assets 




(Effectiveness sub-index + Equity sub-index + Participation sub-index + 
Accountability sub-index = 4) 
                 Source: UN-Habitat, 2004a: 49. 
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          Figure 3.3 Overview of the Index process 
 
3.4.2 Interview analysis 
Yin (2003: 112) recommends three basic schemes for analysing case study data. The 
first one consists of ―relying on theoretical propositions‖, where the researcher 
outlines a proposed assumption relating to the case study and applies it as a direction 
for case study investigation. The second scheme is ―thinking about rival explanations‖ 
which focuses on validating or challenging hypotheses. The third scheme is 
―developing a case description‖ to categorize the case study. Whilst it is beyond the 
scope of this research to use all three of these schemes, the research has to some 
degree benefitted from the first and second schemes. According to Merriam (1998), 
the appropriate method of analysing data that surfaces from qualitative research, is to 
undertake the analysis at the same time of the collection process. Thus, for this study, 
the initial steps of data analysis such as breakdown, further preparation and cleaning of 
the data began while the research was in the data collection stages.    
There is a palpable ambiguity about how accurately qualitative data needs to be 
analysed (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). Hence, this research used a thematic analysis 
approach, an approach that is well-defined (Creswell, 2003) and fits the aims and 
goals of this research. On this basis, categories and themes were used for the general 
UN- Urban Governance 
Framework  
 Governance Assessment and 
Analysis in Tehran 
Objective Data 
Local Governance Index and 
Scores for Tehran 
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issues about governance. This helped to make explicit the framing and illustration of 
the identified themes as well as generating deep insights and meaning. Moreover, the 
break-down, merging and articulation of collected data is facilitated through 
employing thematic analysis. In this analytical approach, a ‗theme‘ can be considered 
an account and a concept that essentially permeate the data. Accounts which are raised 
by small number of participants can also be referred to as themes; they should, 
however, embrace a significant concept that is related to aims and principles of the 
research. 
 
As the interviews were conducted in Persian, it is likely that part of the ―richness‖ and 
―validity‖ of the original discourse was lost in the translation process. This issue was 
consciously taken into account in reviewing the initial text to minimise risk and to 
avoid etiolation of the primary data. To reduce potential bias, each Persian and English 
interview was confirmed in terms of validity and reliability of the translation, by three 
Iranian PhD students based at Leicester and Durham universities. Following the 
translation, data were transcribed and then coded based on the issues under 
investigation, by identifying accounts and stories relevant to the research aims. For 
example, with regard to the selection of a mayor, the participants‘ responses were 
focused around three key themes: a) selection of a mayor through direct citizen 
participation; b) selection of a mayor by the Islamic City Council (ICC); and c) the 
selection of a mayor by the Ministry of State. Thus, the views and concepts emerging 
from the interviews were redefined and grouped into three sets accordingly (see Table 
3.5).  
 
As indicated in Table 3.5, the manner in which the selection of mayor can take place 
was suggested by the interviewees. This type of analysis helps to identify the 
consistency, variation and divergence of views emerging from the various 
stakeholders who participated in the interviews, allowing the researcher to highlight 
similarities and differences as well as echoing the significance of certain views or 
comments. Supporting this, Ryan and Bernard (2003: 85-86) noted the significance of 
thematic grouping analysis, as without this approach the ―researcher has nothing to 
explain, nothing to compare, and nothing to describe‖. 
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              Table 3.5 Example of categorization of data gathered from the fieldwork 
Interview 
code 








Selection of mayor  
by the Ministry of 
 State 
(reason mentioned) 
M.E-01 Offering a fresh 
participatory space for 
citizens‘ engagement 
 




C.R-03  Situations where ICC voices 
are heard and respected will  
be diminished via the  
authorisation of direct 
participatory method 
 
L.C-02   The traditional method 
defined as a solid, integrated 
and steady form of urban 
management for which the 




In terms of its methodological aspect, secondary data analysis can be employed for 
triangulation purposes (Becker and Bryman, 2004). As discussed earlier, this research 
used the initial findings of international, national and municipal surveys connected 
with urban governance matters in order to support or to critique the quality of 
governance in Tehran. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), the literature can be 
used for the purpose of extension, amendment, modification and contrast with the 
primary data. For instance, this research analyses the statistics on a range of issues 
including the number of citizens participating in successive instances of council 
elections in the country as well as their participation in neighbourhood elections at the 
local scale; and the number of Civic Associations and their mechanisms with regard to 
citizen involvement, in order to build up information of primarily important theoretical 
relevance and for purposes of comparative overview. In fact in this research the UN-
assessment results which were derived from the secondary data, were first scrutinised 
on their own terms, and then compared with the primary data collected. 
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The concept of positionality focuses on the idea that the researcher-self is ―a 
transparently knowable agent whose motivations can be fully known‖ (Rose, 1997: 
30). From a feminist point of view, to take a well-known epistemology, the most 
important aspects that illuminate research practice are the perception of positionality 
and reflexivity (Harding, 1987; England, 1994; Rose, 1997; Aitken and Valentine, 
2006). England (1994) summarises positionality as how an individual‘s outlook on the 
globe derives principally from personal perspectives. How they are consecutively 
situated and countered by others is instead captured in reflexivity, an approach based 
on which the researcher‘s self-awareness mirrors their personal function in the 
research process and their relationships. Lewis-Beck and his colleagues point out that 
the responsibility of the surveyor − the affiliation between investigator and items 
investigated, and between the researcher and society studied − has been progressively 
eroded and challenged recently (Lewis-Beck et al., 2003). A key notion at this point is 
that the ―personal is the political‘‘ (Stanley and Wise, 1993: 65).  
     The issue of positionality is robustly linked with ethical matters. As indicated by 
Jorgensen (1971: 321), matters of ethical concern for those involved in social research 
take place in five major areas: 
 
(a) Relations with the people they study; 
(b) Professional relations with one another; 
(c) Relations with the institutions and foundations which support them; 
(d) Relations with the governments of the nations in which they conduct research; and 
(e) Relations with their own governments. 
Additionally, the researcher‘s positionality includes who the researcher is within the 
overall research process. What does the researcher bring in terms of roles, values, 
beliefs, and experiences? Is the researcher an insider or outsider to the research? 
Somewhere on this continuum lies the question of who the researcher is in terms of 
hierarchy and status. There is also the question of how these multiple positions impact 
the research design and process (Herr and Anderson, 2005). Also positionality occurs 
not only in terms of inside/outside, but also in terms of one‘s position within the 
organisational or social hierarchy, and one‘s position of power vis-à-vis other 
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stakeholders inside and outside the setting (ibid., 2005). In his role as a PhD student 
and academic researcher from an institution in the UK and based on his relationship to 
the research topic and participants, the researcher was considered an outsider. As a 
researcher, it was concerned with how the researcher positions himself within the 
research project. The researcher was involved for a number of years as a collaborator 
with an urban geography magazine during my BSc and MSc degrees in Tehran. To 
some extent the researcher was informed about a range of urban researchers and 
administrators in Tehran and up to a point, had established relationships with them. 
This led to building up better relationships through the PhD research project and 
helped to make progress quite straightforward. However, the multiple situations of the 
project and its links with urban hierarchies might have affected the project. Also, as 
stated in the ethical issue section, the researcher‘s identity as someone from abroad 
could be problematic in the fieldwork. Recently, a growing nervousness in Iran about 
researchers from Western institutions has arisen, in comparison with the 
overwhelming acceptance of local researchers working on similar subjects.  
 
    3.6 Ethical Issues and Reflections 
 
Regarding the research framework, normative ethics is more essential for this research 
than other types of ethics, such as metaethics.(1) Normative ethics present the ―moral 
norms which guide, or indicate what one should do or not do, in a particular situation‖ 
(Kimmel, 1988: 43). The key issue in normative ethics is ―how may or should we 
decide or determine what is morally right for a certain agent... to do, or what he /she 
morally ought to do, in a certain situation‖(Frankena, 1973: 12).  
 
An initial practical and ethical issue in any ―interview-based research as well as 
gaining access to the target population is the existence of imbalanced power 
relationships between interviewer and interviewee‖ (Winchester 1996: 122). Pile 
(1991) underlines the complexity of the power nexus in interviews and identifies that 
power structures arise during the process of the research. Accordingly, the researcher 
was aware this type of research, which contributes to political analysis in Iran, would 
be subject to the respondents‘ reservations. However, the researcher deployed various 
standard approaches to reducing these challenges. Additionally the cosmos of the 
research boundary could have contained all potential urban governance stakeholders in 
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Tehran, though the research approach; financial features; relationships between the 
interviewer and the interviewed are nevertheless complex and unstable (Pile, 1991: 
464).  
It has been argued that access to ―elite‖ groups is more complex than to other classes 
(e.g. Desmond, 2004; England, 2002; McDowell, 1998; and Sabot, 1999). However, 
an issue might arise concerning the criteria for identifying an ―elite‖ group. From a 
poststructural viewpoint the possibility of clarifying, labelling and recognising a 
specified group of people as ―elite‖ is a challenging task (Smith, 2006). This is 
particularly the case in the case study area, where there is a noticeable existence of 
power and decision-making influence in the informal sectors, hence distinguishing an 
elite cluster is more problematic. 
 
Generally, when seeking to interview urban elites in Iran, the researcher will be faced 
with two main issues: firstly, most urban authorities are inaccessible and unreachable. 
Access to powerful groups must regularly be tackled through formal and informal 
networks. Furthermore , due to the unequal relationships between interviewer and 
interviewee, power relations influence and manipulate both access to target groups and 
the structure and conduct of the interview. Secondly, these elites are not confident and 
positive regarding the interview outcome. Therefore the decision to interview high-
level urban managers and elites in Tehran was rather overoptimistic because they are 
not easily accessible. In cases where access was impossible, urban actors on a lower 
level of the hierarchy were therefore interviewed.  
 
In order to reduce the challenges, it was mandatory to describe the purpose of this 
research as clearly as possible. Participants were given an informed consent form (see 
Appendix 3) which lays out the way their confidentiality will be safeguarded, allowing 
them to withdraw from the research process at any time without explanation and 
giving them the opportunity to find out the results and outcomes of the research. A 
further ethical issue could be argued is that some secondary data may reflect the 
purposes and attitudes of a particular organisation, political group and party, which 
may perhaps lead to prejudice and misguide. Therefore, to reduce controversies, the 
study draws on a range of research projects which have been carried out by multiple 
institutions and organizations.  
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Additionally, because of recent political tensions, there is a high level of sensitivity 
and suspiciousness towards any researcher from outside the country, especially 
towards researchers affiliated to any British body or institution. Securing permits 
requires a process through different hierarchical establishments. To some extent this 
could affect the regularity and straightforwardness of the research process. It has to be 
stated explicitly that there are many obstacles that may impose physical and time 
limitations, making it compulsory to narrow the themes of the research to a certain 
aspect of urban governance.  
 
3.7 Constraints and Permissions 
 
From a theoretical and methodological point of view, there is a danger of an over-
dominance of deductive approaches, a lack of explicit methodological guidelines, and 
a less than rigorous application of what has become a multitude of overlapping 
theoretical concepts. This is due to the general problem that governance concepts and 
models have yet to merge into an overall theory of governance (Gissendannerô, 2003). 
In parallel to operating good urban governance, developing good urban governance 
indicators has faced challenges. Stewart (2006) considers that, in the theoretical 
context, developing good governance indicators faces four major challenges: concept 
definition, measure choice, sample choice and indicator evaluation. He believes that, 
while data collection and manipulation are often of primary concern, normative 
considerations are at least equally important insofar as they establish which indicators 
best represent ‗good‘ urban governance and the standards by which selected indicators 
should be judged. (Stewart, 2006:1).  
 
In general, the limitations of the research can be summarised in the following points: 
 
 Limitation of theoretical and applied resources in relation to Iran. There is a 
particular dearth of literature on Iran regarding urban governance: the most recent 
literature on urban governance follows Western criteria and disciplines, while Iranian 
urban governance is divergent in its methods and paradigms.  
 Lack of information and resources regarding public participation, supervision, 
NGOs,   and Civic Associations in the city. There is no focused publication regarding 
participation issues by national and local administrations and related organisations; 
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 The relatively wide range of the case study for which data collection is time 
consuming and costly; 
 The theoretical basics of the subject being unknown amongst urban governance 
stakeholders, actors and citizens. Generally the context of urban governance is a new 
phenomenon for Iranian society.  
 Limitations in access to urban managers and urban actors, as well as difficulties in 
accessing formal and informal data; the research had to employ a gatekeeper in order 
to reach a number of urban administrators and policy-makers (insiders).   
 Gap in the methodological narrative in relation to studying individuals in positions 
of influence and power (e.g. Bradshaw, 2001; Ostrander, 1995; Kezar, 2003; Puwar, 
1997; Parry, 1998; Hughes and Cormode, 1998). 
 Difficulties in carrying out enquiries on political issues in Iran, and the risks and 
challenges that this brings. The researcher aimed to create an honest relationship with 
administrators in order to reduce the sensitivity of the research topic.   
  Political transformations: political shifts and changes at governmental and local 
level may lead to a shift in urban actors. This might cause some difficulties in 
accessing information from urban administrators. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the research methodology that has been applied in this study. 
The methodology reflects the focus on qualitative approaches outlined in the research 
questions relating to urban governance practices. However, the quantitative approach 
is considered crucial for the preliminary stages of this research, both in terms of 
method and content. As a method, it is comparatively quick and straightforward to 
both collect quantitative data, and thus, in terms of content a comprehensive range of 
topics and issues may be covered. However, as highlighted, quantitative data gives at 
best a superficial and at worst a misleadingly decontextualised picture of the actual 
situation. Thus, the interview questionnaires have been described in their role as a 
secondary tool for developing the research in greater depth on particular issues of 
concern, as well as penetrating diverse aspects of urban governance and participation 
in a metropolitan city such as Tehran.  The participants were selected from eight 
diverse groups of stakeholders involved in governance because of their potential to 
uncover major urban governance challenges. The purposive sample includes the 
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executives and the administrators of the municipality, city council and neighbourhood 
councils. Interviews with academic experts and higher level legislative administrators 
were used to corroborate and complement the secondary data. Secondary data on the 
urban governance in Tehran were gathered and the potential implications and 
management strategies for governing the city (Tehran) associated with the practice of 
participation were assessed. The research project also used secondary sources of data, 
including urban literature, newspaper articles, official documents, and the views of 
academic experts. To conclude, the research employs a thematic and interpretative 
approach for purposes of data analysis. The next chapter discusses and presents the 
application of the UN-Habitat index that has been administered to assess urban 




















1‗Meta ethics‘ is concerned with the analysis or logic of moral concepts and involves exploration of the 
meaning, function, and justification of normative judgements (Jorgensen, 1971, p. 322). 
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This chapter mainly presents the analysis of the UN-Habitat Urban Governance Index 
for Tehran and presents an overall assessment of the circumstances of governance in 
Tehran based on four principles of good urban governance: Effectiveness, Equity, 
Accountability and Participation. Before arriving at an explanation of the 
implementation of the UN-index and to understand the existing circumstances of 
governance in Tehran, this chapter provides an introductory overview of Tehran. The 
chapter therefore consists of two main sections: 1) an introduction on governance in 
Tehran; and 2) an assessment of governance based on the UN-Habitat Index. The main 
aim of this chapter is to provide an integrated portrait of the Tehran governance with 
regard to the diverse set of 25 UN sub-indicators. This assessment allows for the 
clarification of Tehran governance situations and deficiencies, and points out further 
enhancements required for good governance. With regard to research methodology, this 
section outlines the results of the application of the UN-Habitat index in Tehran, 
followed by a brief general explanation of the sub-indicators themselves. However, this 
chapter does not attempt a critical qualitative analysis of the indicators nor does it 
provide an investigation of policy documents. It simply provides an overview of urban 
governance based on the UN perspective in order to lay the foundations for the next 
empirical chapters where the assessment of the indicators is critically deepened. In 
particular, the areas of governance that are shown to be weak in this general assessment 
will be selected for further investigation.  
 
4.1 Introduction on Governance in Tehran 
 
In order to understand the formation and circumstances of the existing urban machinery, 
this section provides an overview of governance in Tehran including first, a general 
description of Tehran; second, a portrait of urban governance and participation before 
the Islamic Revolution, presenting the chronological events that culminated in 
contemporary urban governance in Iran. Finally, it presents the key stakeholders 
concerned in governance.  
 




4.1.1 General description of Tehran  
After the Islamic revolution, rapid urbanization continued and intensified in Iran, 
directly affecting urban policy-making at the national and local scales. The growth of 
cities has led to the occurrence of issues with regard to housing, social welfare, security, 
health, marginalization, water supply and traffic jams. The eight-year war with Iraq 
further accelerated these dynamics (Abrahamian, 1998, Kohli, 1977). Urbanization 
trends have been subject to unprecedented increase in Iran over the past three decades, 
reaching 68.5% of the population living in urban areas in 2006 (PRB, 2006. The rapid 
expansion of urbanization, however, is viewed as a negative point for urban policy-
makers. During the first 40 years of the 20
th
 century, the population of Tehran grew by 
only 50,000 people, but from 1956 to 2006 its population rocketed by more than 500% 
(Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1).  
 
            Table 4.1 Population increase trend in Tehran City (in thousands) 




160 210 500 700 1512 4530 6042 2719 6759 7872 
 





        
  Figure 4.1The Trend of Population Increase in Tehran (in thousands) 
  Source:  SCI, Statistical Centre of Iran, various census data, 2006. 
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Mexico City and Manila (Brown, 1983). The records of the demographic processes in 
the Tehran Metropolitan Region (TMR) from 1966–2006 disclose that the population 
grew to 12.2 million over this period. Also across these years, the share of the Tehran 
City population in the TMR decreased from 87% to about 65.5% in 1996 and 63% in 
2006 (Table, 4.2). The table also shows that within 40 years the population of Tehran 
City grew 2.3 times, whereas the population of the rest of the TMR has grown 7.8 
times. ―The slowdown in the population growth of the city has been paralleled by the 
population explosion in the suburbs, which grew (1976–1986) at 10.28% annually‖ 
(Madanipour, 1999: 5). 
 
Table 4.2 Population increase in the Tehran Metropolitan Region, 1966–2006 (in thousands) 
 
Population Census 1966 1976 1986 1991 1996 2006 
Tehran  CITY 2719 4530 
 
6042 6475 6758 7797 
The rest of the TMR 417        715 1885 3506 3584 6571 
Total MRT 3137 5245 7927 9982 1034 1226 
 
           Source: SCI, Statistical Centre of Iran, various census data, 2006. 
 
 
4.1.2 Urban governance and participation before the Islamic Revolution  
A single-authority, totalitarian and centralized model was dominant in the Iranian 
historical-political structure (Abrahamiyan, 1982; Rahmani, 2000). Administrations had 
been built upon individual-led monarchies and empires, which in practice largely 
excluded the public from decision-making practices. On the contrary, ministers, 
officials and particularly the public were largely controlled and influenced by the ruler 
(Shamim, 1992). This condition was in operation up to the dawning of the constitutional 
revolution (Enghelaabe Mashroteh) in 1906. The revolution was thus a starting point 
for decentralisation and modernization (Saidnia, 2004). In fact the revolution sought to 
reduce central government influence and to intervene in local affairs (Abolhamd, 1970). 
The national legislation had been shaped and influenced by a number of European 
countries constitutions‘, particularly France and Belgium, which resulted in the 
introduction of urban management and administrative mechanisms of European origins 
(ibid.).With respect to the constitution, Iran‘s administrative system was transformed 
from an autocracy into a constitutional monarchy. From this point forward, local matters 
and related issues were governed by local assemblies (Anjomanhaye Iyalati and 
Velayati) which were constituted of representatives of the public (Vazirnia, 1972). 




However, by some accounts, these local assemblies actually operated as representatives 
of the central government and their duties were to monitor governmental officials and 
elections, and collect tax (Ettehadiye, 2002; and Khoobrooy-Pak, 1998). 
 
The first attempt to formulate urban institutions for Iranian cities goes back to 1907, 
with the passing of the first Municipal Act (Anjomanhaye Baladiyeh). This was a 
turning point, as for the first time the public‘s political rights were acknowledged. 
According to this Act, the management of cities was to be transferred to the elected City 
Institutions. However, four years later following the defeat of the constitutional 
revolution and the beginning of a new dictatorship, City Institutions were abolished. 
The new administration believed that with the introduction of the National Assembly 
(Majles Showraye melli), City Institutions had been rendered unnecessary (Abolhamd, 
1970). However, the fundamental outcome associated with the elimination of City 
Councils was central government-imposed totalitarianism and a climate of fear within 
civic institutions (Amir-Arjmand, 2005). 
 
In order to implement the totalitarian strategies, a new centralized form of city 
institution had been established in 1930, with the responsibility for the selection of 
mayor and for members of the new version of City Councils transferring to the interior 
ministry. Only three socio-economic classes − landlords, business-owners and 
syndicates − were able to participate in electing members of the City Councils. 
Although the head of the institution was appointed by the Interior Ministry, the Act 
nevertheless institutionalised a greater degree of respect for citizens‘ rights and 
participation in cities (Taheri, 1999). According to the 1930 Act, the position of the 
urban administration can be summarised as assimilating both centralised and 
decentralised arrangements, whereby local taxation for each city was applicable 
following the approval of both the Municipal Institution (Anjomane Baladi) and the 
ministerial board (Shakiba-Moghaddam, 1999).  
Matters of budgeting, city regulations, renovation and development projects were 
formalised through the authorisation of the Interior Ministry (ibid., 1999). 
Consequently, the independence of the Municipal Institution was questionable and 
except for the participation of a number of socio-economic groups, the general public 
was mainly excluded from participation. In fact over this period, City Councils were cut 




off from their initial democratic principles and priorities and were instead exploited as a 
tool by the central government (Shafiei, 2004).   
In 1949 in order to promote citizen‘s involvement, the third Municipality, City and 
Local Councils Act (Shahrdariha and Anjomane Shahr) was approved by the National 
Assembly, replacing the antecedent Act. Small, medium and large cities respectively 
appointed 16, 20 and 30 representatives who were to be directly elected through 
citizens‘ participation for a four year period. In comparison with the 1930 Act, a 
fundamental modification had been introduced with regard to the status of elected 
representatives and participants. Put simply, the 1949 Act not only gave landlords, 
traders and syndicates authorisation to participate in local elections but also offered the 
general public a chance to engage in local issues. According to the 1949 Act 1, Article 
3, item 5, eligibility to participate was conferred to a citizen by residence of no less than 
six months in the electoral neighbourhood (Alavi-Tabar, 2000). Furthermore, electoral 
candidates no longer needed to belong to a particular class or group, although they had 
to have resided in the electoral district for at least five years. The way in which the 
mayor was to be selected was another main aspect that differentiated the 1949 Act from 
its 1930 antecedent. According to the new act, the mayor was selected on the basis of 
three nominations by the City Council with the endorsement of the interior ministry. 
According to these arrangements, without appointment by the City Council (Anjomane 
Shahr), the mayor had no power to act; and at the same time, in the case of any 
disagreement, the City Council‘s decision was prioritized over the wishes of the 
municipality (ibid., 2000). Although the new Act had been improved in comparison 
with the 1930 version, the decision on mayoral selection was still not entirely governed 
by the City Councils.  
 
In 1952, a more far-reaching mechanism was introduced, whereby Tehran and other 
large cities were divided into neighbourhoods, and based on local populations each 
neighbourhood had the opportunity to send their representative to the City Council 
(Anjomane Shahr). This constructive phase of legislation was to some extent able to link 
City Councils representatives to citizens and to enhance the responsibility of City 
Councils members. According to the shift, face-to-face meetings and public forums 
could potentially take place, whereby on the one hand people were able to make more 
informed choices in electing their representatives, and on the other hand the 
representatives themselves had a clear vision about their local issues. However, in 




practice urban and local administration remained under the command of central 
government (Habibi, 2000). A new Municipality Act in 1955, following the 1953 coup 
d‘état which removed the elected councils, the democratic reform were scaled back.  
 
     The central reasons for the failure of the City Councils in Iran before the revolution can 
be summarised in two concerns. First, the interference of central governments in local 
associations‘ affairs, whereby the local councils were dominated and influenced by 
central authorities. Thus the locally elected government had no real power over 
decision-making and their autonomy was in doubt. Imani-Jajermi (1999) suggests that 
despite the authorisation of the Civic Councils in Iran since 1907, in practice it had no 
power in the decision-making process. Second, the socio-economic circumstances of the 
Iranian society could be the reasons for the lack of success (ibid., 1999). Basically, at 
that period, urbanization in Iran was very low, with only 20% of the total population 
residing in cities. Thus the modern forms of urban administration and management had 
not been understood and supported by people (Saidnia, 2004). The lack of political 
understanding and political culture with the urban population could be considered as a 
further contributory factor underlying the failure of City Councils.   
 
     It is clear, therefore, that the formation, function and nature of urban councils in Iran 
had been undergoing amendments and fluctuations under various administrations over 
time. From its starting point up to the contemporary administration, urban governance 
can be separated into six distinct periods (Table 4.3). 
 
            Table 4.3 The Historical Trend of Iranian Urban Associations 
 
1. Constitutional Revolution idealism (First Decentralisation movements)                                    1905 - 1925 
 
2. Erosion of Municipality Act ( Beginning of contemporary centralisation)                                 1925 - 1941 
 
3. Liberalism and democracy movements (Restore decentralisation and renovate constitutions)  1941 - 1953  
 
4. Strengthening of autocracy and defeat of civil councils defeat (Shift  to centralisation)           1953 – 1979 
 
5. The Islamic Revolution (Return to centralisation)                                                                      1979 - 1999 
 
6. Establishment of the city councils (Uncertain Progress to decentralisation)                              1999 -  present 
 
 
                 Source: Extracted from Imani-Jajermi, 1999 and Shane-Chi, 2000.     
 
   
 




4.1.3 Current key formal stakeholders in city governance 
The formation of urban governance in Tehran is built on a multi-phased relationship 
between institutions and organisations (see Figure 4.2). The position of bodies in 
governing practices is defined in technical and legitimacy-related terms. Governing 
bodies exist at levels and scales that vary from national to neighbourhood scope, with 
major actors including the Ministry of State and its sub-organisations, such as the 
country‘s Municipalities Organisations and the Council and Municipality Department in 
the Ministry of State. In addition, the Supreme Council for Urbanism and the Ministry 
of Housing and Urbanism have a role in technical contexts. Key roles in delivering city 
management tasks are held within the TMA (Tehran Metropolitan Area) by the 
governor of Tehran province; and at the city level by Tehran‘s Municipality and Islamic 
City Councils. Finally, at the local and neighbourhood level, the urban machinery is 
currently struggling to build up a new formation through neighbourhood councils 
(public forums) and community-based associations which could play a role in shaping 
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         Ministry of State and other governmental organisations  
The Ministry of State is known as an influential stakeholder and the central 
government‘s representative in urban affairs (Figure 4.3 and Table 4.4). Although there 
has been a reduction in the Ministry of State‘s influence in urban governance following 
the 1997 shift, the body still plays a significant role in monitoring local elections; in 
authorising a mayor subsequent to the ICC‘s selection of a mayor; in revoking the 
regulations authorised by the ICC; and in the terminating ICC associations in the city 
(Mansour, 2006). Currently, the legal responsibilities and tasks within the Ministry of 
State‘s remit include therefore those listed under Article 53 of the ICC Formation Act, 
whereby the Ministry of State is considered as a proxy for the ICC in any case of 
cancellation (Taheri, 2001). This causes the municipalities and the ICCs to be monitored 
by the Ministry of State and by its sub-administrations, such as the provincial and city 
governors.   
 
Due to the abolition of the Municipalities Associations following the Islamic Revolution 
in 1980, the necessity of forming a coordinator organisation led to an Organisation of 
National Municipalities to be established in 1986. Based on Article 62 of the 
Municipalities Act, the establishment of a sub-organisation of the Ministry of State took 
place years later in 2002. The main objectives for the organisation are summarised in 
the formulation of schemes intended for the improvement of the municipalities through 
education, management and supervision. Relationships between the municipalities, 
between the municipalities and state ministries, and between the municipalities and state 
organisations are among the organisation‘s responsibilities (Organization of 
Municipalities and Rural Administration, 2002). But when considering the 
organisations‘ responsibilities, a key concern is the insignificant volume of technical, 
legal and monitoring tasks that have been devolved by the Ministry of State to the 
organisation. Thus, key responsibilities such as monitoring the legal and institutional 
affairs of the municipalities and ICCs remain among the Ministry of State‘s duties, 









































            Figure 4.3 The Organisational Structure of the Ministry of State. 
 
 







































-Approval and consent regarding the municipality‘s  
 establishment 
- Abolition of the municipality 
- Authorisation of mayoral appointments1 
 
- Consent on the administrative formation of the municipality  
- - Authorisationof municipality sub-organisational  
constructions   
-  Providing and recommending employment regulations   
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- Approval of guidelines and strategies with regard to  
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- Monitoring budgeting and financial reports in municipalities 
- Collecting tax and its distribution among municipalities      
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Development 
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- Authorisation of development programmes in  
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-  Authorisation of catchment area and urban boundary 
- Addressing complaints with regard to municipalities and 
related consents    
- Scrutinizing municipalities‘ affairs  
- Appointing a representative to the Resolution Commission 
and Commission 100  
- Monitoring the implementation of technical codes,  












- Necessity of having Ministry of State ministerial and 
gubernatorial agreement with regards to appointment  
of mayors;  
-Influence of State minister and governors on mayors   
 
 
           Source: Extracted from the Centre for Urbanism and Architectural Researches and Studies, 1996.  
 
 




Another arm of central government which is engaged with city governance issues is the 
Ministry of Housing and Urbanism. The Ministry is responsible for technical 
monitoring and completion of urban programmes and the planning agenda, as well as 
the implementation of regulations and measures that have been authorised by the 
Supreme Council for Urbanism. The Ministry is also obliged to introduce, implement 
and monitor large scale development projects which maintain national finance in cities. 
Also among the Ministry‘s responsibilities is the duty of authorisation and 
announcement of indicators, standards, regulations and procedures with regard to 
urbanism. Furthermore, the Supreme Council for Urbanism which consists of 11 state 
Ministries is considered the highest association for policy-making and approval of 
macro-level guidelines and strategies (Kazemian and Saidi-Rezvani, 2002). This 
organisation is also responsible for authorisation and modification of the Master Plans 
in cities (ibid, 2002). Thus, based on its institutional framework, article 7 of the 
Municipality Act the municipalities and urban executives are obliged to work together 
in this association.       
 
It is apparent from the above discussions that the function of the Ministry of State is 
central to city governance and participation exercises. Thus, urban and participatory 
associations are largely influenced by the Ministry and in addition, issues around 
elections and their procedures in the city are controlled by the Ministry of State. 
  
Islamic City Council (ICC) 
The credibility of any association in Iran is highly dependent on its position within the 
ideological and legal frameworks. Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the 
formation of the city councils was highlighted as the main tool for establishing the new 
form of local legislation. Ideologically the establishment of urban councils was 
considered one of the main principles and objectives of the Islamic Revolution, thus in 
the revolution‘s early phases (24/09/1979) the first endorsement to activate local and 
urban councils was made by Imam Khomeini
2
 and Ayatollah Taaleghani
3
 (Imam 
Khomeini Publishing Association, 1999). This consequently led to their establishment 
and integration into the constitution. The Councils Act was taken into account in the 
new constitutional law, with articles 7 and 100-106 of the Constitution highlighting its 
significance. According to section 7 of the Constitution approved in 15/11/1979, the 
council was in theory considered to be the main locus of decision-making and 




administration, wherein the code 103 obliges governors, mayors and administrators to 
respect the council‘s decisions (Fakhroleslam, 2005). Furthermore, it could be argued 
that the establishment of the ICC was a practical step in line with Article 44
4
 of the 
Constitution.  
Despite its institutional design and ideological endorsements, the Islamic City Council 
only came into practical operation a few years after their introduction. Following their 
authorisation, Councils were introduced in 116 cities. However after two years the 
Council institutions were inactivated, coinciding with the first Act concerning the 
Islamic City Council in 1982; and subsequently underwent five sets of further 
amendments.  
 
A number of general issues delayed the launch of councils in Iran. Subsequent to the 
Islamic Revolution, political challenges and instability dominated in the country, which 
postponed the coming into effect of the Councils Act. In addition, after the revolution 
the war between Iran and Iraq to some extent prevented further political development 
and there was no sign of civic progression (Moqeemi, 2007). Thus there was no room to 
implement a scheme such as the councils‘ initiative. Furthermore, a centralized pattern 
of administration and totalitarianism did not tolerate confrontation with a new 
foundation. Moreover, socio-economic and cultural factors also played a significant role 
in hampering the implementation of the Councils Act. Due to the narrowed level of 
public understanding and knowledge with regard to civil associations, the value and 
significance of councils for society was basically unknown. Eventually after the 
revolution, society had no chance of building up social capital and shaping its actors and 
tools because the wider circumstances had led to a centralized mode of administration.  
 
The Islamic City Council (Showra) was set up to redefine urban governance and to 
develop a new arena for citizen involvement at the local scale. The Council has been 
implementing a bottom-up network as part of its agenda and has also been typified by a 
sub-elite participation, including highly educated people and political elites who were 
elected by direct citizen participation. 
 
The establishment of the Islamic City Council (ICC) was part of the reform, 
transformation and decentralisation of responsibilities, tasks and powers to local 
institutions and citizens. It was a spark that initiated the greater visibility of alternative 




perspectives and the practical involvement of the public in city matters. For the first 
time, the public had participated to elect a legislative body (in April 1998) for the 
Islamic City Council, whose members were offered the responsibility of selecting a 
mayor (before that point this was the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior). The 
council was endowed with legislative powers relating to the municipality‘s executive 
authority, thus this governance shift changed the method through which the 
municipality was being monitored.  
 
Up to this instance, the municipality had been overseen ―bureaucratically‖ by the 
Ministry of State. However, the municipality is now being monitored through a 
relatively ―democratic‖ structure, the Islamic City Council (Nikzaad-Larijani, 2002). 
The ICC is considered to be the major accountable and participatory urban institution, 
elected by direct citizen participation. The institution is responsible for electing and also 
for deposing (if necessary) the mayor. In addition to being able to offer a participatory 
space in the ICC elections, according to Article 71, Code 6, the council also has a 
responsibility to encourage people to participate in social, economic, constructional, 
cultural and educational affairs in the city
 
(Shafiei-Pour, 2010). The council is also 
responsible for approving plans for the city, including budgeting and other financial 
provisions of the municipality (Table 4.5).  
 
The City Council in Tehran is formed by fifteen elected representatives, and structured 
into three key commissions and 13 committees (Figure 4.4). The 13 committees are in 
charge of reviewing buildings and infrastructure plans, and setting regulations and 
proposals under five main headings: urban development; culture/society; urban 
environment; budget and planning (Hashemi, 1999). There are also two particular 
boards, one for by-law 38, working on disputes with regard to contracts and financial 











           Table 4.5 Selected Duties and Tasks of the Islamic City Councils 
 Electing mayor for four years; 
  Identifying social, cultural, educational, health, economic, and welfare shortages, needs, and 
insufficiencies of respective jurisdictions, formulating plans and corrective proposals as well as 
applied solutions in the above fields to facilitate planning by concerned officials; 
 Approving bills on levying or cancelling urban duties and changing their type and amount in line with 
general government policies, which will be announced by the Ministry of the Interior; 
  Supervising urban health affairs; 
  Passing regulations and supervising the installation of canals and paths in the city; 
 Overseeing implementation of plans related to the development of streets, avenues, squares, green 
spaces, and public facilities in the city according to the relevant regulations; 
 Approving the names of streets, squares, avenues, alleys and neighbourhoods in cities and changing 
those names; 
 Supervising the good management of municipalities and all organizations, institutes, and companies 
affiliated to the municipality; protecting capital assets, as well as public and private assets of 
municipalities; and supervising the expenses and costs of those entities by selecting official auditors, 
reporting violations to the municipality, and taking necessary legal action. 
           Source: Islamic City Council, 2009a. 
 
The advantages of the establishment of the Councils have been summarised as 
devolution and decentralisation, political and social development, enhancing equity and 
citizen rights; accelerating the urban development and scrutinizing and monitoring 
(Matani, 2003). Kamali, the head of the Social and Cultural Commission in the 
Provinces Supreme Councils, suggests that according to the council‘s importance and 
status in the constitution, they are an outstanding opportunity for decentralised policy-
making, power diffusion and participation (Provinces Supreme Councils, 2009).  
 
Despite these advantages, what has emerged from the literature about the general 
sentiment towards governance supports the view that it faces two major obstacles: 
firstly legal and legislative-oriented insufficiencies; and secondly technical and 
organisational hindrances that prevent the ICC from proactively supporting participation 













   
 
 
































    
   Figure 4.4: The Administrational and Functional Pattern of Tehran‟s City Council (Showra) 





























































Prior to the shift, the duty of the municipality as a sub-organisation could be 
summarised simply as delivering services in the city. Following the urban transition, as 
in many other public institutions, the municipality redefined its position in managerial 
and administrative structures that relate to the city (Table 4.6). In larger cities the 
municipality translated itself into a more complex and broader body (Mozayeni, 1998). 
With the new form of urban management, a new degree of financial and functional 
independency has emerged. This modification leads to municipalities being more 
independent structurally and practically and consequently having a greater role than just 
sub-organisations executing central government policy. Thus, the unprovoked and 
imbalanced hierarchical relationships between the municipality and the Ministry of 
State are significantly modified by the interactions taking place between the 
municipality and the ICC. 
   
Structurally in the municipality of Tehran:  
management was now formed of management boards for finance and administration, 
welfare, urban services, research units, traffic and planning, and also Tehran was 
divided from 12 into 20 independent municipalities as a result of an expansion of the 
city‘s boundaries (Madanipour, 1998: 70).  
 
The Tehran Municipality soon came to comprise eight departments, 22 mayoral districts 
and 21 co-bodies (Figure 4.5). The eight specific departments and assistants included: 
construction and technical; administrative and financial; planning and coordination; 
architectural and urbanism; district affairs; cultural and social affairs; urban services; 
and finally traffic and transportation assistance (Tehran Municipality, 2009). Despite 
having limited influence in Tehran, the mayor technically has the executive power and 
is accountable to the city, while the governors are held responsible for urban issues from 
different perspectives.  
 
The municipalities in Iran, as the main actors and elements in the city administrative 
system, are regarded as public associations and non-governmental bodies which 
technically depend on elected public representatives. Despite this, however, the 
municipalities in Iran have not benefited from complete legal autonomy but have been 
constantly influenced by the state authority (Amir-Arjmand, 2005) .Whereas in Tehran 




the municipality is not considered as the sole policy-making and decision-making 
organisation in the city, expectations from the municipality generally and mayor 
specifically extend much further than the ICC‘s legal responsibility (Madanipour, 
2009). In the international literature, five major aspects are used to draw a line between 
strong and weak mayoral powers: ―control over budget; control over policy; power of 
appointment of senior staff; direction of lines of authority and accountability; and 
existence of other elected officials‖ (Ross et al., 1991: 84-9; Hambleton, 1998: 3-5; 
Boddy and Parkinson, 2005: 354). These attributes of the mayor have actually been 
enhanced by the Iranian urban transformation, which brings to the fore the need for 
cautious analysis of the mayoral position and responsibilities in Tehran.   
 
Table 4.6 Mayor‟s Executive Power in the City 
                          
 
 
   
 
















1 - Legal, council and parliamentary affairs  
2 - Social and cultural  
3 - Traffic and transportation  
4 - Urban services  
5 - Planning and coordination  
6 - Financial and administrative  
7 - Urban planning and architecture  
8 – District affairs  
9 - Technology and development  





































Figure 4.5 Tehran‟s Municipality Organisation  










































































































Neighbourhood Councils (Public Forums) 
Following the transition based on Article 71 of the Council‘s codes and regulations, the 
Council was committed to launch the Neighbourhood Councils in 1999. In addition to 
this legal commitment the Neighbourhood Council was also aimed at integrating the 
bottom-most sphere of city governance and to provide a fresh participatory space at 
local level. Kazemian and Shadmanfar (2008) argue that the institutions‘ establishment 
was intended to enhance association and reduce the existing communication gaps 
between the ICC and the public. Thus, advisory tasks were offered to local forums to re-
establish a new form of interface and communication between citizens and decision-
makers. In fact the neighbourhood council aims to realize and implement ICC goals 
through the enhancement of citizens‘ participation in local affairs (Alavitabar, 2001). 
Additionally by the introduction of the institution, local responsibilities could be taken 
on by citizens to a greater degree, which could persuade citizens to be more responsive 
(ibid., 2008).    
 
In other words the Neighbourhood Council is a local institution which functions legally 
as the ICCs‘ sub-establishment in the city, which is defined as a non-governmental, not-
for-profit, voluntary and non-political body that takes advisory and monitoring roles in 
relation to city governance (Davoudi and Yahyapour, 2009). Yet legally and 
institutionally, the Neighbourhood Council is beyond the three key constitutional forces 
of the state (executive, legislative and juridical) and is basically considered to be a 
publicly-orientated institution formed through a local independent framework.   
  
In addition to its role in participatory democracy, the Neighbourhood Council provides a 
representative democratic space for citizens to elect and to be elected. Thus in its 
recently-implemented election about 12,000 candidates competed for a representative 
position in Local Forums. Subsequent to its first period which was based on a pilot 
experiment in a number of Tehran districts, the participation level for the second period 
was about 330,000 (Imani-Jajermi, 2009). Compared with the second period, 
participation was encouraging and constructive, thus almost half a million people were 
involved in the recent forum elections (ibid., 2009). In the existing system, 
approximately 3,700 representatives delivered local forum tasks across 22 districts and 
400 neighbourhoods in Tehran.    
 





Civic Associations  
 
The development and growth of public participation requires systematisation, 
institutionalisation and the creation of appropriate arrangements. In other words, 
participation cannot be formulated through the creation of organisations and 
associations alone. While these associations and establishments do give participation its 
particular character in each case, civic associations should potentially be valued as a 
dynamic mechanism for public participation and building correlations between people 
and states. According to the Ministry of State, the term ―civic association‖ refers to 
associations that have been established voluntarily by non-governmental individuals 
based on not-for-profit and non-political intentions (Ministry of State, 2005). The 
National Youth Organisation in Iran (2003) defined five factors and characteristics of 
civic associations: 1- Having an organisational framework, 2- Non-governmental, 3- 
Not-for-profit, 4-Voluntary and finally 5-Formulated to address social need. The areas 
in which civic associations are allowed to operate in Iran have been named as scientific, 
cultural, social, sports, arts and charitable trust, women, marginalized groups in the 
population, health and medication, rehabilitation, environment and reclamation 
(Ministry of State, 2005).   
 
Despite the growth of civic associations and non-governmental organisations in Iran, 
which has soared since the 1990s, this has not assured the effectiveness and efficacy of 
these associations on issues of participation (Saidi, 2003). Thus, the civic associations 
have been faced with a number of structural and organisational issues. As shown in 
Figure 1.3, the authorisation of civic associations and NGOs in Iran is among central 
government responsibilities, and the approval and establishment of these associations 
are linked to the Ministry of State. In addition, according to Waiver 5 of the instructions 
authorised by the state dated 28/07/2005, regardless of the responsibilities of the ICC 
and civic association representatives, the monitoring role regarding civic associations is 
handled mainly by the Ministry of State (ibid., 2005). In consequence, the existence and 
identity of these associations are linked to the state, initially and procedurally (ibid., 
2003). Thus, the perspectives through which these associations have been taken into 
consideration vary according to different ruling administrations. 
 
Ultimately, concerns regarding the establishment and authorisation of civic associations 




can be considered as the main hindrance for the civic associations in Iran (Kazemi, 1999 
and Namazi, 2002). The stability and continuity of these associations also is a matter of 
concern (Sadeghi-Ahangar and Mohebbi, 2009). Alavi (2004) considers the lack of a 
legal framework specifically designed for civic associations, the state‘s attitudes 
regarding civic associations; and cultural issues as the key barriers to civic associations 
in Iran. These issues affect the productivity of civic associations with regard to their 
participatory and governance objectives.      
  
4.2 Governance Assessment through UN-Habitat (UGI) 
As mentioned in the introduction, this section presents the governance assessment 
through the UN-Habitat Urban Governance Index in Tehran, based on four key indices:  
Effectiveness, Equity, Participation and Accountability. The UN survey is composed of 
25 main questions reflecting 25 indicators and the four abovementioned variables of 
governance (Appendix 4). These questions are answered following the methodology 
guidelines provided by the UN (see Appendix 5), and subsequently all answers are 
translated into quantitative data. The data is then processed through specific formulae 
that provided for each variable. Appendix 6 shows each result multiplied in line with the 
particular weight given to it, based on the methodology design. It also shows the total 
result for each of the four main indicators and 25 sub-indicators is presented as a 
quantity between 0-1. It is impossible to give a clearer textual explanation of the 
approach to transforming data for the purposes of analysis as they are too diverse: to 
gain an idea of the operations used, the reader must refer to the detailed presentations in 
Appendices 4, 5 and 6.    
 
4.2.1 Effectiveness 
As mentioned in the earlier part of the research, the evaluation of effectiveness through 
the UN approach places greater emphasis on financial aspects. This is because financial 
factors are hugely significant for cities. In particular, the process of assessment of local 
governance effectiveness is based on eight diverse components or indicators: Local 
government revenue per capita; Ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget; Local 
government revenue transfers, Ratio of mandated to actual tax collection; Predictability 




of transfers in local government; Existence of a vision statement; Published 
Performance delivery standard and Consumer satisfaction survey. 
 
Local government revenue per capita. In the pre 1997 urban governance system in Iran, 
local urban bodies such as the municipality depended on central government and on 
financial support from higher level administrations. However, following the shift in 
1997, the new approach towards urban management offered financial and functional 
independence. As a result, municipalities became more autonomous structurally, 
practically and functionally, and more than mere sub-organisations, pursuing central 
government policy. To some extent Tehran municipality turned into a key player in the 
distribution of revenue and in providing sufficient funding for the city. Despite two 
decades of the municipality‘s financial autonomy from central government and the 
enhancement of local government revenue, the quality of urban governance in Tehran 
has been affected by funding challenges. The main concern that the municipality 
currently faces is the allocation of sustained financial resources for purposes of city 
administration. Masoumi, a Tehran Municipality Civic and Architecture Assistant, 
claims that in 2008-2009 almost 80% of municipality income derived from the 
construction permission tariff (Communications and International Affairs of Tehran 
Municipality, 2009a). Furthermore, in 2009-2010 (1389) there was a similar revenue 
source scenario. This explains why the Tehran mayor believes that the municipality‘s 
income is shaped mainly by the construction sector and the municipality is unable to 
generate any new source of income for the city (Irna, 2010a).  
Generally municipal income is characterised by two types of resources. ‗Regular 
income‘ which includes renovation and project development tax, commercial 
registrations and sewerage charges; and  ‗Sporadic income‘ which consist of retailing 
density (high-rise building permissions), construction infringement levy, occupation 
tariff, building consent (Communications and International Affairs of Tehran 
Municipality, 2009 b). It follows that the financial flexibility of the municipality is 
undermined by constraints from a number of consistent resources. For example, due to 
the recession in the housing market and the decline in the numbers of requests for 
planning permission to construct, the municipality revenue began to decrease in the first 
part of 2005-2006. Consequently, the municipality was incapable of fulfilling its 
forecast agendas. Furthermore, the fact that construction tax and particularly retail 




density permissions are major fiscal sources for the municipality has negative effects on 
the city in terms of its economy and landscape. Even with its current population, Tehran 
has been struggling with a number of basic issues, such as the municipality‘s continuous 
offer of high-rise building permissions (retail density) which is exacerbating the 
expansion of residential areas and population in Tehran. With respect to this issue, 
Ebtekar, a member of Tehran‘s ICC, believes that in 2006-2007 (1386) the municipality 
sold 24million m
2
 of planning permissions, which led to the construction of 4 million 
m
2
 of new spaces, meaning that an extra 1.2 million people can settle in the erected 
spaces (Etemad, 2008). The issue here is whether in parallel to retailing density and the 
expansion of the population, the municipality is able to offer urban public spaces, green 
space, and public transportation.  
As noted, in Iran the metropolises have been relying on the construction levy as a major 
source of municipality income. In Tehran 75 to 80% of municipality revenue is supplied 
from retailing construction permissions, which is a form of value capture through 
negotiated development tax. It would seem, therefore, that urgent action is needed to 
generate reliable funding streams through formulating a regular taxation mechanism. To 
arrive at that point, the Municipality has been aiming to expand a portion of its regular 
sources of income by introducing a scheme which has boosted its regular income each 
year by 5% (International and Public Relationships, 2009 b). It is expected that by 2012 
this portion of regular revenue (from renovation and pasmand tax) will reach 40% of the 
total municipality income (Table 4.7).  
It has been argued that focusing on the potential of land value tax (LVT) in Tehran 
could help the municipality in reaching the appropriate quantity of revenue from 
sustained income sources. According to the statistical centre of Tehran municipality 
(2009), the area of Tehran is about 730 km
2
, which includes 33% residential land of 
which 15% is allocated to the service sector. In 2008-9 the average value for 1m
2
 
residential and service use respectively was 15 million and 30 million Rial
5
. If 0.5% of 
this value in LVT for residential units and 1.5 % in LVT for service and commercial 
units had been received annually from proprietors, then the municipality income from 
LVT would have exceeded earnings from construction and density permission by 70% 
(Centre of Technology Studies, 2009).  




However, the question that arises here is to what extent has the municipality succeeded 
in achieving its regular funding stream through the mechanism of taxation? It can be 
argued that due to central government economic policies which rely on enormous 
revenues from oil exportation, the central challenge is that of tackling taxation, because 
in spite of the existing encouragement policies, the culture of tax payment in Iran has 
not yet normalised among citizens who prefer to evade tax where possible. 
This may be caused by a lack of public understanding regarding tax implementation, tax 
authorizations and their indicators. To some extent it seems that the municipality has not 
succeeded in informing citizens regarding tax and tariff circumstances. In addition, 
limitations on the legal capacity of the municipality to authorize taxes were highlighted 
by disagreements with central government about the municipality‘s right to levy and 
formulate taxes, as well as other issues around attaining enduring income resources. 
 
In Iran municipalities have no role in levying taxes and central government is 
responsible for formulating and drawing the implications of taxation mechanisms and 
policies. According to regulation number 30, municipalities are allowed to receive 
levies, tariffs and service costs following the approval of their indicators and operating 
guidelines by the State Ministry (Mansour, 2009a). From a brief review of Tehran 
municipality revenues, it is clear that municipal revenue has increased sharply by almost 
seven times since 2005-2006 (Table 4.8).   
 
           Table 4.7 municipality income (sustained and sporadic income sources) 
Year  Sustained sources Sporadic sources  
2007 - 2008   12%   88% 
2008 - 2009   17%    83% 
2009 - 2010   25%   75% 
2012 - 2013  estimated 40% 60% 
           Source: Communications and International Affairs of Tehran Municipality, 2009. 
           Table 4.8 Municipality income                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Year    Income    (Billion Rial) Income (US$) 
2005 - 2006   10,000  1,000,000,000 
2006 – 2007  19,760 2,000,000,000 
2007-  2008   23,407 2,600,000,000 
2008- 2009    47,000  5,200,000,000 
2009- 2010    74,000 8,200,000,000 
           Source:  Abstracted from the Financial Assistance of Tehran Municipality (2009-2010). 




Ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget. The Tehran municipality budget in 2005-
2006 was equivalent to 5% of the total government budget, twice as much as Tehran‘s 
provincial budget and 23% of the total budget of the country‘s provinces. By reviewing 
these figures, it might be realised that alongside its political significance, the Tehran 
municipality is one of the most wealthy and affluent centres in the country. The 
municipality‘s annual budget can be defined as an integrated financial scheme that 
includes all activities and services with forecast expenses and expenditure, applicable 
following Islamic city council approval (Poorsalim-Bonab, 2009). Comparable with the 
burgeoning of municipality income, in recent years local government total budget has 
been on the increase, mainly supplied through citizen contributions to tariff charges. 
Generally, local government budget reflects income from capital and recurrent 
resources (see table 4.9). There is a shift in the implementation of the municipality‘s 
budget, which means that municipality‘s income has been targeted at the further 
development of projects, rather than on customary expenditures. For instance, in the 
planned budget for 2010-2011(1389) approximately only 15% of budget has been 
allocated for continuum and maintenance projects, while the remaining is being 
assigned to new and prospective projects. 
           Table 4.9 Municipality Budget Income (Billion  Rial)                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Year    Total Budget   Recurrent Budget (R)  Capital Budget    (C) 
2005 - 2006 14,000 ----------- ----------- 
2006 - 2007 23,400  ----------- ----------- 
2007 - 2008  34,000 ----------- ----------- 
2008 - 2009 65,000 36,500 27,000 
2009 - 2010 70,600 40,600 30,000 
2010 - 2011 06,470    40,000 34,580 
           Source: Tehran municipality statistic centre, 2009. 
 
Local government revenue transfers. This UGI indicator is mainly aimed at assessing 
the independence of local government in terms of its fiscal aspects. In recent years, 
fiscal management in Tehran has been based on internal resources and has not relied on 
transfers from higher levels of government and other external sources. With regard to 
central government support for Tehran municipality, the role of transfers is insignificant 
for the municipality‘s budget (Table 4.10). Despite increasing central government 
financial support and finance, in the year 2009-2010 just over 12% of the total local 
revenue was derived from central government distribution and finance transfers, 




consisting principally in public transport support, in terms of central government aid for 
developing metro networks and subsidies on public transportation ticketing. 
           Table 4.10 Revenue Transfers from central government and finance (Billion  Rial) 
Sector/ year 2007- 2008 2008- 2009 2009 -2010 
Developing metro networks 860 2,900 2,300 
Subsides on Bus and metro 
Ticketing 
130 390 130 
Finance  ---------------------- 3,000 7,000 
            Source: IRNA, 2009. 
 
Ratio of mandated to actual tax collection. In recent years the municipality has largely 
succeeded in obtaining its annual mandated tax collection. For instance, according to tax 
collection trends, in 2009-2010 the municipality was able to successfully collect a large 
proportion of its mandated tariff. The head of the city council budget commission 
believes that the municipality is able to gain almost 95% of its planned tax income 
(Islamic city council, 2010). According to the research calculation which took place 
nearly three months ahead of the end of annual tax collection time, the municipality‘s 
estimate is not far off. At this time (mid February 2010) the result demonstrated that 
nearly 76 % of municipality mandated tax had been collected, further affecting the 
flexibility of decision-making in the municipality. Generally in Iran, to avoid being 
fined and increases in the charges, people prefer to pay their levies and taxes before the 
beginning of the Iranian New Year (end of March) which causes municipalities‘ income 
to increase sharply by the end of the year. As a result, it is predicted that municipal 
income by this time will have reached the mandated level.  
Predictability of transfers in local government budget. This factor emphasises the 
quality of local governments in relation to their prospective financial planning. In other 
words the forecasts that enable institutions to predict their resource transfer budgets two 
or three years in advance (UN-Habitat, 2004). In Iran it is hard to forecast local 
government resources deriving from central government transfers in advance. The issue 
is not the lack of regulations or edicts that allow the precise sum of transfers to be 
anticipated; rather, the concern is about the implementation for such regulations being 
absent or unpredictable. For example, according to the fourth development schema for 
2009-2010, almost 40,000 Billion Rials were allocated for metro development projects 
in Tehran and other large cities. Yet in practice government expenditure was just over a 




quarter of this amount (Fars, 2009). The allocation of 10,000 Billion Rials to projects 
for the renovation of old urban areas, based on clause D and H (code one in the 
budgeting agenda), has not been assured in practice (ibid., 2009).  
Published performance delivery standards (PPS)
6
. This UGI indicator is measured 
based on the existence or absence of formal publications about basic services and their 
quantity. In Iran the delivery of all basic services including water supply, electricity, 
sanitation, health and education is beyond the remit of local government. The 
responsibility for delivering these key services and their characteristics is determined by 
central government and its ministries. Thus, currently there is no publication of 
standards by local government. Solid waste management is the only service which has 
been handled through local government procedures and it is among the Tehran 
municipality‘s duties to administer this.  
 
Consumer Satisfaction survey. Basically this sub-indicator enquires the existence or 
absence of consumer satisfaction mechanisms within local government priorities. The 
establishment of mechanisms that address consumer satisfaction and accountability 
concerns is one of the constructive achievements of the existing local government in 
Tehran. In parallel to the operation of its mechanisms (i.e. 1888), the municipality has 
implemented regular consumer satisfaction surveys with regard to urban services, 
including public transports, green spaces, traffic and waste management.
 7 
 
Existence of vision statement. A new version of the comprehensive plan for Tehran, as a 
guideline for the urban planning of Tehran over the next 20 years, was articulated and 
approved by the authorities in 2006. 
 
 
                                                                 
The new principles for Tehran‘s long-term development (Architecture and Civic 
Supreme Council, 2007) are focused on:   
-Tehran as a creative city with an Iranian /Islamic identity. 
-Tehran as a knowledgeable, ingenious and global city. 
-Tehran as a sustainable city with a suitable structure for residence, activity and 
pleasure. 
-Green, beautiful, inviting, lively and with various and extensive public spaces.  




-Tehran as an affluent city providing public welfare and appropriate infrastructures 
through reducing inequality and delivering citizens rights equally to all.  
-Tehran as a safe city with resilience against harms, hazards and disasters. 
-Tehran as a metropolis with national and global functions, with a developed economy 
and centralizing cultural affairs, standing as one of the three primary cities in the south 
west region of Asia. Development guidelines for Tehran have been envisaged in terms 
of the following factors (Table 4.11). 
 
            Table 4.11 Tehran Development Guidelines 
 
 
- Organize and protect the region, prevent any extension of city. 
- Organize and protect the urban expanse. 
- Enhance the function and position of Tehran on the international, national and provincial  
stages. 
- Social development and coordination of the settlement of population. 
- Economic development and fostering the flourishing of Tehran‘s metropolitan activities. 
- Improving the conditions of connection networks and transportation and traffic systems. 
- Protecting the environment.  
- Securitising and providing resistance against environmental disasters (earthquake, floods). 
- Improving strategic management systems  
- Supply water needs, develop and provide water construction and urban sewerage, organize 
riverbeds and riverbanks. 
- Improve and enhance conditions, organize Tehran‘s physical structures (urban spatial  
organization). 
- Enhance the quality of effective urban environment with zoning to include land use and arrange 
      construction and build. 
- Regeneration and dynamic protection of the natural, historical and cultural inheritances of  
Tehran. 
- Organize and improve the image (vision) identity and urban view in order to regenerate Iranian  
      and Islamic architecture and urbanism. 
- Develop green, public, promenade and tourism spaces. 
- Supply requirements and organize urban services. 
- Renewal, sanitation and regeneration of obsolescent urban fabrics. 




The equity index covers a wide range of issues. The indicators include ‗Citizens 
Charter‘ and ‗Proportion of women councillors and women in key positions‘. They are 
jointly intended to tackle organizational accountability by presenting citizens‘ rights of 
access to basic services and gender equity in urban decision-making. The other 
indicators addressed by the Equity index are ‗Percentage of households with water 
connection‘; ‗pro-poor pricing policy‘ and ‗water price‘; they mostly focus on 
institutional policies and processes by providing public access to water. The final 




indicator is ‗incentives for informal business‘ which tackles local government 
endorsement of measures to stimulate informal businesses.    
Citizens Charter: right of access to basic services. As discussed in the section on the 
delivery standard indicator, in Iran the responsibility for delivering basic services is 
within the central government‘s remit and in practice the local authority takes no part in 
the decision-making process, in spite of the existence of general directives that address 
citizens‘ rights to access basic services. Notwithstanding this, there are no formal 
publications of standards that tackle citizens‘ right of access to basic services. 
Legislation is limited to provider issues. For example, according to code three of the 
national constitution, central government is accountable for delivering free education 
services (Fakhroleslam, 2005). In such a context, the lack of an authorised charter from 
local government that grants public rights of access to basic services is comprehensible.  
Women councillors. The indicator “Percentage of women councilors‖ addresses the 
extent of women‘s participation in the decision making process and deals with gender 
equity. In fact, to some extent the establishment of urban councils in Iran was an 
evolutionary mechanism for including women in the urban decision-making process. In 
the most recent election, from a total of almost 1,200 nominees 78 women were 
nominated to stand for urban council elections in Tehran (Sedigh-Sarvestani et al., 
2006). The ultimate number of women elected as councillors in Tehran in the last 
council election, reached three out of 15 representatives, making one fifth of total urban 
councillors women.  
Percentage of Women councillors in key urban positions. Each ICC representatives 
serves a 4-year term, during which, they cannot be employed in a certain number of 
governmental departments and sub-departments, such as electoral bodies or military 
posts. Furthermore, it is impracticable for any member of the ICC to hold any key 
executive position in the city in addition to the position of councillor.
8
  
Pro-poor pricing policies for water. Particularly after the Islamic Revolution, Tehran is 
by its own acknowledgement a bipolar and unbalanced metropolis (Shakoii, 1992; 
Madanipour, 1999). Social and economic gaps have been embedded and enforced by 
geographical boundaries. Although Tehran‘s district boundaries are not defined and set 
in stone, from a socio-economic perspective Tehran can be divided into three parts. The 
north which provides high-quality neighbourhoods for well-off citizens; the centre can 




be described as a location for the middle-class, and the south for the deprived citizens. 
There are numerous characteristics that distinguish these districts from each other, such 
as quality of life, employment, level of income, crime and immigration. 
The value of properties and the cost of rent in Tehran can be used as a basis for 
classifying the city into different socio-economic classes, setting social and economic 
boundaries. The average retail price in Tehran for a square metre property was 
approximately 21,000,000 Rials in 2008 (Statistical Centre of Iran, 2009). Of the 22 
administrative districts, district one in the north is the most highly-priced area at roughly 
47,000,000 Rials/m
2 
and district twenty in the south is the lowest at a value of 
10,000,000 Rials/m
2
; district six, which is a central district, is considered a middle-class 
spot with an approximate value of 27,000,000 Rials/m
2
 (ibid., 2009) (Figure 4.6). It 
follows  that district one has the highest rental fee, district six has an average price, and 
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 Figure 4.6 Price comparison for a square metre of residential unit across Tehran (numbered)         
Districts in 2008 (thousands of Rials).  
            Source: SCI, Statistical Centre of Iran, various census data, 2008. 




By considering the water tariff across different municipal districts, it is apparent that the 
water pricing policy in Tehran could provide an appropriate measure of equity, and that 
prices follow the correspondence between location and socio-economic characteristics 
(Table 4.12). The classifications of water price for different districts of Tehran were set 
according to socio-economic circumstances and by controlling water prices. This 
reveals that water prices have not changed noticeably from 2004, due to government 
subsidy strategies which set a water price policy that adheres to the principle of 
supporting poorer consumers. According to statistical data, the cost to central 
government of generating 1m
3 
water is approximately 4,000 Rials, while the price for 
consumers is about 800-850m
3
 Rial, suggesting that the strategies for water prices are 
based on the principle of consumer support (Econews, 2010). 
The water tariff for the households in Tehran, as for many cities in the world, depends 
on the level of consumption and type of land use. The water tariff for customers who 
use more than the average consumption and up to twice as much as the average 
consumption, is multiplied by 10%. For the consumers who exceed this level by more 
than twice, the water tariff is multiplied by 50% (Tehran Province Water and 
Wastewater, 2008). Furthermore, the prices set for the business and industrial sectors 
are differentiated from those that apply to household consumption. Thus, to some 
extent, the categorization of water prices according to districts and consumption 
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Figure 4.7 Rent comparison between Tehran‟s (numbered) Districts for a square metre for the year 
2008 (In thousands of Rials).   
Source: SCI, Statistical Centre of Iran, various census data, 2008. 
 
            Table 4.12 Water branch costs for households in Tehran  
 Districts  Water branch cost for residential households( Rials) 
1, 2, 3 6,000,000 
4,5,6,8,9,10,22 4,500,000 
7, 11,12,13, 14 3,500,000 
15, 16,17,18,19,20, 21 2,500,000 
                Source: Tehran Province Water & Wastewater, 2008. 
 
Incentives for informal businesses. There is an enormous amount of international 
literature on the motivations of the informal business sector and its functions in the 
economy (Lubell, 1991; Yamada, 1996; Galli and Kucera, 2003). However, the 
circumstances of this research preclude a detailed critical discussion of informal business 
and its circumstances. Informal businesses are considered both, a concern and solution 
for developing countries (Portes and Schauffler, 1993).





Generally speaking, in Iran, due to rapid urbanization and population growth, economic 
and social inequity, and unfairness in distribution of wealth and resources, the informal 
economic sector plays an inevitable role, with 28% of total employment being in this 
sector. In his research on informal business in Tehran, Jomepour (2000) argues that there 
is a direct relationship between immigration and informal business. Surprisingly he found 
that 33% of his respondents were paying part of their daily earnings to the municipality 
and named the municipality as their entrepreneur and employer (ibid., 2000).  While the 
remit of informal business affairs is outside the duty of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, it is handled by the Municipality and the city services department of the 
municipality.  
In Tehran there is evidence of a chronic issue with particular residential areas in the 
centre of the city, such as the Moulavi crossroad and the Seadkhandan Bridge. They are 
occupied by informal businesses that cause many issues in terms of security, health and 
congestion. Consequently, in recent years the municipality has formulated a number of 
restrictions and regulations on informal street vending, and more recently it has planned 
to allocate informal businesses to particular areas. As an example, shifting the traditional 
informal bird market from the Moulavi (district 12) residential area to a standardized built 
environment in the Azadegan highway (district 18) at the outer route of the city, can be an 
example of an appropriate action for the future of informal businesses (online network, 
2010).  
4.2.3 Participation  
 
In general five indicators support the participation index. The initial indicator is elected 
council; voter turnout and selection of mayor, which measures the level of direct public 
participation and urban democracy. Public forum and civic association indicator assesses 
the opportunities to express views publicly and the existence of civil society institutional 
bodies in the city.  
    
Elected council. As mentioned above, the ICC in Tehran is composed of 15 
representatives elected directly.
9
 To qualify for election as a councillor, a candidate must 
be an Iranian citizen and, on the day of registration, 25 years of age or older and able to 





read and write; as well as having resided in the related constituency for not less than 1 




Selection of mayor. This sub-indicator measures how the mayor is selected. Mayors can 
be directly elected by voters, elected from among the councillors or appointed. According 
to code fifty of the municipality regulations and guidelines, the city council can nominate 
to become mayor a candidate who is not a member of the council, provided that the 
council approves (Mansour, 2009a). The selection of mayor is conducted through a secret 
ballot and the winning candidate must be selected by the majority (two-thirds) of the 
representatives, and is then formally appointed to the position by the Ministry of State. 
As can be seen, despite the existence of a voting system for the selection of a mayor by 
elected councillors, the final mayoral appointment requires the approval of the Ministry 
of State.  
 
Voter turnout. This indicator measures the percentage of total voter turnout (both male 
and female) in the last election. In democratic theory, citizen participation has to do with 
quantity, thus how many people are involved (Pateman, 1970). Generally after the shift, 
Tehran has experienced three City Council elections. In order to elect the first-ever set of 
Islamic city council representatives, the first local elections were held on March 8, 1999 
and the city council was legitimately able to begin its work on May 29, 1999, with 15 
representatives. The second and third elections occurred in 2002 and 2006 respectively. 
The key issue with regard to voter turnout is that generally in Iran the level of 
participation in urban council elections is not as great as in presidential and parliamentary 
elections (see Figure 4.8).    
 
 






Figure 4.8 Voting Turnout in Presidential and ICC Elections, Average for three recent periods         
(Percent) 
Source: Extracted from Election Results, Secretary of State, 2006. 
 
While the average participation of citizens in ICC elections across the country reached 
64.42% in the first period, in the second and third periods it only reached 49.96% and 
60.75% percent respectively (Figure 4.9). However, in Tehran the situation is even worse, 
in that the level of voter turnout is actually lower than the country‘s average. Despite its 
maturing performance and functioning as an establishment, particularly in recent years, the 
level of electoral participation in Tehran is comparatively low. As an example, citizen 
participation in the first period of the ICC elections in Tehran reached just over 39%, 
representing 24% less than the country‘s overall average participation in ICC elections. In 
the second period, the result was poorer than in the previous election, with only 23.87% of 
the constituent population participating in the local election, thus 26% lower than the 
country‘s average. In the third Islamic City Council elections, in spite of an apparent 
increase in turnout shown in the previous election, citizens‘ participation reached just over 
35% of the constituent population (Figures 4.10 and 4.11). While the total population able 
to vote had been estimated at almost 5,300,000, the actual number of voters was only 
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Figure 4.9 Voting Turnout in ICC Elections in Iran (Percent) 




                      Figure 4.10 Voter Turnouts in ICC Elections in Tehran (Percent) 
                      Source: Extracted from the Election Results, Secretary of State, 2006. 
 




















First Period Second Period Third Period 






                    Figure 4.11 Voting Turnout in ICCs‟ Elections in Iran and Tehran, 
 
                    Source: Extracted from the Election Results, Secretary of State, 2006. 
 
Public forum. According to the UN-index, the existence of any neighbourhood council, 
town association, district consultative board or local meeting is classified as a public forum 
(UN-index, 2003). Recently in Tehran, Neighbourhood Councils have been introduced to 
further engage citizens in the decision-making process. The Neighbourhood Council 
representatives (Anomie Showrayariha) are elected by direct participation of the local 
people and function as a link point between citizens and local government. According to 
codes one and two of the internal local council regulations, each Neighbourhood Council 
has seven main representatives and three substitutes (Alkajbaf, 2008). The number of local 
meetings depends on the representatives‘ decisions as well as local priorities. However, 
according to code six of the internal local council regulations, such institutions are obliged 
to systematically schedule a minimum of two meetings a month (ibid.).   
Civic Association per 10,000 population. In recent years civic associations are increasingly 
penetrating Iranian society (Saidi, 2002). According to the State ministry, which is the 
organization responsible for civic association affairs, the number of formally registered 
NGOs in Tehran is about 510 (Ministry of the State, 2009). A brief comparison between 
the Tehran population and the number of civic associations suggests that the number of 
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Besides focusing on accountability features, this indicator targeted the transparency, 
responsiveness and autonomy of local governments. It addresses seven sub-indicators 
including: the Formal Publication of contracts/tenders, budgets and accounts; Control by 
higher levels of Government; Codes of conduct, Facilities for citizen complaints; Anti-
corruption Commission, Disclosure of income / assets; and Independent audit.  
                                                                                             
Formal Publication of contracts/tenders budgets and accounts. One constructive aspect 
associated with the operating of the recent urban administration system in Tehran is that it 
publicises its contracts and budgets. Recently, as part of its financial transparency 
enhancement agenda, the municipality has initiated publication of its financial plans and 
contracts, which has been presented as a turning point in the urban governance process in 
Iran. Code seventy one from the municipality and council regulations obliged the 
municipality to publicise its financial activities inclusively every six months (Poorsalim-
Bonab, 2009). On a practical level, the mass publication of budgets, statements and tenders 
can be accessed by the public through the municipality statistical centre.  
 
Control by higher levels of Government. This indicator measures the extent of central 
government influence in relation to local government. Following the governance 
transformation in 1997, the influence of central government was somewhat reduced and 
local bodies became empowered by supportive regulations. The issue raised here by the 
UN-index is whether or not a higher level of government can close down a local 
government body or remove individual councillors. According to the council and municipal 
formations (Functions and Elections Regulations, code seventy six, article four), the 
mayor‘s term of office can be prematurely terminated under four conditions: first, a printed 
offer of resignation with council approval; second, dismissal by the city council through 
formal proceeding; third, suspension under the conditions specified in the formal 
regulations; and fourth, deficiency in any of the conditions that are considered essential to 
the role of mayor by the council‘s authorization (Mansour, 2009a). Furthermore, according 
to Article 106, the disbanding of an Iranian city council requires the resolution to be 
proposed by a committee and approved by the central supreme commission, which consists 





of three representatives, including one from the supreme judicial commission; the supreme 
provincial commission and the interior ministry (Poorsalim-Bonab, 2008). Moreover, the 
sacking of any member of the council necessitates the proposal of three quarters of the total 
number of council representatives and the endorsement of the judicial system. Thus, in 
contrast with the old urban administration system, the suspension and removal of local 
government (council and municipality) in Iran/Tehran, is not in the command of the higher 
level of government and requires formal procedures.    
 
Another aspect addressed by the UN-index is the fiscal independence of local government, 
taking into account whether local governments, without permission from higher 
government, can set local tax levels and set user charges for services, borrow funds and 
choose contractors for projects. According to Article 26 on the establishment of the council 
and Article 1 on tax implementation in cities, the city council is responsible for generating 
an accepted service charge and tariff mechanisms for the city (Alekajbaf, 2008). As 
mentioned earlier, the municipality is unable to independently and fully operate taxation 
mechanisms and functions because these are among central government responsibilities. 
With regard to municipality‘s independence in accepting contractors for the project, Article 
6 of the municipality financial regulations clarifies that the responsibility for selecting 
contractors and offering tenders is controlled by the municipality (Mansour, 2009a). 
Moreover, according to Article 40 any loan or borrowing by the municipality requires the 
consent of the city council (ibid., 2009a).   
 
Codes of conduct. This criterion aimed to address the existence/absence of a signed 
published statement of the standards of conduct for elected officials and local government 
staff. According to the Islamic City Council Establishment Act, Article 71, Clause 2, as 
public representatives, members of the city council are accountable and responsible for 
addressing limitations and social inadequacies in their electoral quarter (Alekajbaf, 2008). 
As part of their accountability and equity enhancement programme, the municipality 
publishes complex signed standards of conduct at the state level that determine ―people‘s 
rights from the municipality‖; ―the rights of citizenships‖ and ―rules and regulations of the 





Islamic council and municipalities in Iran‖. These standards offer citizens basic knowledge 
and familiarity to their citizenship rights with regard to their municipality and council.  
 
Facility for citizen complaints. This indicator addresses the existence/lack of a facility for 
citizen complaints for receiving complaints and information on corruption. The 
municipality of Tehran has formulated mechanism 1888, to ensure effectiveness and 
organizational transparency; tackle the public‘s grievances; and enhance the culture of 
responsibility and accountability (Information Centre and Public Supervisions of the 
Tehran Municipality, 2009). Statistical mechanism 1888 (Samaneh) has been productive in 
creating supportive relationships between local governments and citizens. Samaneh 1888 
can be considered as a multifunction mechanism based on public observation for 
monitoring the quality of services rendered by urban management (Mahmoudi, 2008). The 
Mayor of Tehran describes the mechanism (Samaneh 1888) as an efficient tool for the 
transparency of Tehran‘s administrative system that removes the chronic negative view of 
the municipality, which has been a feature of its public image for a long time (Hamshahri, 
2009). He believes that these arrangements should be endorsed and observed by the public.   
 
Anti-Corruption Commission. This sub-indicator aims to address the existence of a local 
agency to investigate and report cases of corruption. The responsibility for investigating 
and reporting cases of corruption in the municipality has been tackled by the municipal 
audit organization (Sazmane Bazresi-e Shahrdari). In fact this body has aimed to monitor 
and address corruption; accomplish investigations by all municipality units; control the 
quality of service delivery in the municipality and scrutinize staff positions and functions 
(Audit Organization of Tehran Municipality, 2008).   
 
Disclosure of income/assets. This issue deals with the existence of a public mechanism that 
discloses locally elected officials‘ income and assets prior to taking office. There is no 
body of rules or regulations that obliges urban councillors to publicize their incomes and 
assets. The single rule associated with income and assets control in Iran arises from Article 
142 of the constitutional law, which is linked to higher level government office-holders, 
including the president and vice president; ministries and their families, who are obliged to 





declare their income, positions and assets prior to and after taking office by the head of the 
justice department (Fakhroleslam, 2005). As a result this section has received no points.  
Independent audit. According to the Islamic City Council Establishment Act, Article 71, 
Clauses 12, 15 and 30, reviewed in 28/ 9/ 2003, monitoring and auditing the financial 
records and accounts of the municipality, are among the city council‘s main priorities 
(Alekajbaf, 2008). At least once a year, the urban council is responsible for carrying out an 
independent audit with regard to the municipality‘s financial and fiscal affairs. Also, by 
considering code seventy one, the municipality is obliged to present a comprehensive 
account of its financial activities to the Ministry of the State every six months (Mansour, 
2009b). Parallel to the council‘s regular auditing role, an organizational audit body at the 
state level that occasionally takes on the oversight of municipal financial affairs also exists. 
The National Audit Organization (Sazman-e Bazresi-e Keshavr) and the Supreme Audit 
Court (Sazman-e Hesabresi-e Keshvar) are responsible for the application of auditing 
programmes in organizations that employ public or governmental budgets. 
 
4.3 Tehran Governance International Ranking 
 
According to the research design and methodology, the comparative approach is not one of 
the priorities of this research. However, in order to roughly classify the Tehran Governance 
position against other cities, it might be worth taking the UN-Index results into account. 
One constructive part of employing the UN approach to measure urban governance has 
been its applicability in cross-country comparisons based on a standard mechanism. 
Following the research calculation and results procedure, the place of governance in 
Tehran in comparison with selected cities where the UN approach was applied can be 
defined. This comparative overview nevertheless provides recognition of Tehran‘s position 
among 24 selected cities from both the global south and north.  
Overall, Tehran Governance is situated in 12th place, alongside cities such as Ismailia and 
Bayamo (Figure 4.12). Tehran‘s best result was achieved in the ‗accountability‘ index, 
which placed it among the five best cities in this regard (Figure 4.13). Conversely, in terms 
of ‗participation‘ Tehran is positioned among the four worst cities (Figure 4.14). Finally, 














            Figure 4.12 Tehran‟s Governance Position Among Selected Cities 
                 Source: Extracted from the UN-Index (2004) (modified by the author). 
 
 
           Figure 4.13 Accountability sub-index  
                 Source: Extracted from the UN-Index (2004) (modified by the author). 
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  Figure 4.14 Participation sub-index 




 Figure 4.15 Equity sub-index 










































































































































































                  Figure 4.16 Effectiveness sub-index 
                  Source: Extracted from the UN-Index (2004) (modified by the author). 
 
 4.4 Assessing Governance in Tehran  
 
The governance assessment in Tehran employed the UN approach to analyse urban 
governance conditions in terms of 25 sub-indexes based on four main features: 
Effectiveness, Equity, Participation and Accountability (Figure 4.17 and Appendix 6). The 
methodology involved assessing it against a number of indicators with equal weights, each 
of them having a value between 0 and 1. The outcome of the assessment indicates the pre-
eminence of ‗accountability‘ above the rest of the city‘s scores for the various indices, 
while ‗participation‘ receives the lowest indicator score. The overall governance score for 
Tehran, based on the UN Governance Index (UGI), is 0. 681.
12
 In terms of the four features 
that compose the UGI, Tehran attains top performance for ‗accountability‘ (0.897) 
followed correspondingly by ‗equity‘ (0.695), ‗effectiveness‘ (0.638), and ‗participation‘ 
(0.497) (Figures 4.18 and 4.19). The high score achieved for accountability might reflect 
the progress that has been made recently by local government in enhancing accountability 
and transparency mechanisms in terms of their design and practice. The lowest outcome 
achieved by the participation index may be the result of a lack of a directly elected mayor; 
poor voter turnout in the last election; and relatively low number of civic associations in 
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As discussed in section 2.8, the evaluation of good urban governance not only necessitates 
of precise ―indicators‖, but also of ―standards‖, which supply the dimensions to be 
measured (Stewart, 2006: 200). This research used the standards derived from the UN-
Habitat Urban Governance Index (UGI) to generate an account of city governance in 
Tehran, based on which, the most vulnerable theme in Teheran city governance appeared to 
be ―participation‖. The UN method includes structured sets of indicators that provide a 
primary assessment tool aimed at systematizing information and data regarding city 
governance in Tehran. The assessment offers a foundation and a general picture of existing 
governance and allows a comparison of outcomes, which was presented in chapter 4. This 
method, however, does not come without deficiencies and the implementation of the UGI 
for assessing governance issues in Tehran highlighted some critical challenges. Whereas 
governance can be defined as the result of interactions, relationships and networks linking 
different stakeholders involved in governance (Wilde et al., 2008); the issue of how the 
UGI can inclusively measure these interactions for the entire body of stakeholders who are 
supposed to participate in governance in Tehran, still remains. Similarly, a question arises 
about the extent to which the UN approach can provide an insight into, and deepen our 
understanding of governance in Tehran.  
 
One major issue is that there is insufficient scope in this methodology to debate all of the 
normative potentials of multifaceted urban governance. For example, an indicator such as 
‗Voter Turnout‘ in the UGI assessment simply presents a figure, without yielding any 
information on the procedures and circumstances which greatly affect the electoral 
outcome, such as  the electoral process, procedure, legislative Act(s) and norms, and 
political processes. Playing a significant role in measuring governance are attempts to 
establish ‗who‘ has power, ‗when‘ and ‗how‘ (ibid, 2008); yet, features including the 
electoral codes and the manner of conduct of elections are entirely missing from the UGI 
assessment. It follows that the indicator ‗Voter Turnout‘ is unable to include and illustrate 
the design of the electoral system, the legal framework within which the electoral process 
is carried out, and the decision-makers and government institutions that are involved in the 
electoral process. The nomination process, electoral malpractice and misconduct issues 
prior to and throughout the elections are also not taken into consideration. What this means, 





is that qualifying or disqualifying criteria and procedures that aim to ensure fair and free 
elections and credible measures are not considered. This means that the ‗Voter Turnout‘ 
indicator reflects a partial and superficial account of electoral procedures.  
Similarly, with regard to the ―Consumer Satisfaction Survey‖ indicator, beyond assessing 
the existence of this feature, the indicator gives no measure of the effectiveness and depth 
of consumer satisfaction surveys that have been accomplished by the local government in 
Tehran.  
Furthermore, from a methodological perspective, using secondary data as a single source to 
spot gaps and constants in local governance can also be a risky approach for governance 
assessments. As the UN-Index is entirely based on using only objective data based on 
administrative documents and statistics, this method was not fully capable of expressing 
the sophistication of governance in Tehran, which largely materialised through the 
interview findings. The UN-method was able to cover therefore only ‗soft‘ dimensions.  
 
Within this context, while the UN approach is thoughtful in its development of principles 
and indicators, its application reveals limitations. Its implementation can show a basic 
picture of governance in any particular city, but cannot capture the nuances, describe the 
context and explain the obstacles and conflicts that cluster around different issues. This is 
why it needs to be complemented by a deeper level of analysis and insight, which can be 
made available through qualitative research. Therefore, this research uses the qualitative 
interview as a tool to deepen the study‘s evaluation of governance in all its complexity.  
Based on the implementation of the UN-Index in Tehran ‗participation‘ has scored the 
‗lowest‘ factor. The result demonstrates the limitations and deficiencies in current urban 
participatory mechanisms both in terms of their designs and practices. Thus, based on the 
research design and objectives, this research will explore further the issues of 
‗participation‘ in governance, its tools and its circumstances, as the main priority for 
arriving at good governance in Tehran. Subsequently, using the participation sub-indicators 
as a framework, Chapters 5-8 will analyse and discuss participation in the city, based on 
the following five criteria: elected council, level of voter turnout, selection of mayor, civic 





associations and public forums. Accordingly, to achieve this, the subsidiary research 
questions are: 
SQ1: How is the Islamic City Council (ICC) functioning in Tehran? 
 
SQ2: Why is the voter turnout in local elections insufficient? 
 
SQ3: Based on existing governance circumstances, what is the most appropriate method for 
mayoral selection in Tehran?  
  




The result of the evaluation shows the pre-eminence of ‗accountability‘ above the rest of 
the city‘s scores for the various indices, while ‗participation‘ receives the lowest indicator 
score. The overall governance score for Tehran, based on the UN Governance Index (UGI), 
is 0. 681. In terms of the four features that compose the UGI, Tehran attains top 
performance for ‗accountability‘ (0.897) followed correspondingly by ‗equity‘ (0.695), 



















1. The authorization of mayoral appointment in cities of more than 200,000 population is carried out by the 
Ministry of State while in cities with less than 200,000, the task is delivered by the provincial governors‘.   
 
2. The Islamic Revolution Supreme Leader in 1979. 
 
3. One of the key actors and leaders throughout the Islamic Revolution in 1979.  
 
4. Article 44 of the Constitution is considered as the essential decentralisation manifesto in the country, 
aiming   to reduce central government authorities and roles through the devolution of powers and 
responsibilities to people and the private sector.   
 
5. The Rial is the Iranian currency and currently 10,000 Rial is approximately equal to one US dollar. 
6. Water, solid waste management, electricity, sanitation, health and education should be considered as key 
services for which performance delivery standards should be present. 
 
7. A draft of the consumer satisfaction survey was submitted to the researcher (see Appendix 7).      
 
8.  Sections one and two, Article 26, of the Formation of the ICC ACT. 
9. Sections one and two, Article 26, of the Formation of the ICC ACT. 
10. 
Full details of how a numerical value and rank was derived for the various UGI dimensions are presented 
in    Appendix 4, 5 and 6. 
11.  Average of Urban Governance Index = (Effectiveness sub-index + Equity sub-index + Participation sub-
index + Accountability sub-index) = (0.638 + 0.695 + 0.492 + 0.897) / 4 = 0. 680.
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5.0 Introduction  
 
As stated in Chapter 3, the aim of this research is to investigate the dynamic nature of 
urban governance and participation through identifying the features that influence local 
governance practices in Tehran. The Islamic City Council (ICC) is considered a key 
constituent in representative city governance and the main product of the urban 
governance shift in Iran. This chapter focuses on the ICC and on its role in governance 
practices and procedures. This is based on a presentation of the findings from interviews 
with representatives from each of the eight stakeholder groups.   
Overall, the interview findings from the different stakeholder groups reveal a certain 
degree of variation in responses; this may be attributed to differences in roles, status and 
administrative positions fulfilled by the interviewees. For example, the findings suggest 
that the citizens‘ opinion of the city‘s executives and of the ICC is tied to the way in which 
governance practices are viewed in the city. Moreover, that the local council‘s viewpoint, 
due to its contributions to decision-making processes, is shaped and formed by the way in 
which it interacts with the ICC and with the municipality. Subsequently, these variations 
and the different stakeholders‘ perspectives on the ICC are discussed, and presented in 
terms of two categories: 
 
1-   Role of the ICC as perceived by different stakeholders. This category presents the 
ICC‘s impacts on the existing governance machinery, looking particularly at local 
government autonomy, accountability and at women‘s contributions to decision-making; 
 
2- Barriers and challenges in the ICC as perceived by different stakeholders. This 
category provides an overview of the issues related to the ICC‘s current limitations and 
constraints, looking at political, technical and institutional concerns, and at the challenges 
that lie ahead. 
 





5.1 Role of the ICC  
Generally speaking, the findings indicate that the shift that took place in 1997, and in 
particular the establishment of the ICC, have had an effect on three governance areas: local 
autonomy, accountability, and women‘s contributions to city governance.    
 
5.1.1 Decentralisation and local autonomy 
One of the issues that emerged from the interviews  with municipality officials and local 
councillors and with some interviewees from the experts group is that of decentralisation 
of, and ―bottom-up‖ approaches to, the ICC. More in detail, three members of the 
municipality office highlighted how prior to the shift and following a ―top-down‖ 
rationale, central government was the main and dominant policy-maker in the city. 
However, the post-1997 strategy appears to be limiting the influence of central government 
in Iran‘s cities, initiating by contrast, a mechanism that follows ―bottom-up‖ rationales. 
This is further reflected in the comments of one municipality executive official: 
 
―The decline of the state‘s authority and the consequent division of power and 
influences in the city accomplished by the shift modified the mechanism from top-
down into a bottom-up approach.‖ [ME-02, Interview: 18 February 2010]. 
 
Three urban experts and members of an academic society viewed this as a transition 
towards a ―decentralized strategy‖ of decision-making. They asserted that the state‘s 
authority has been conferred on its citizens, ensuring an identification and characterisation 
of the public‘s rights. Whilst it may be too early to talk about devolution in a wider context 
due to inefficient coordination of processes; the delegation of policies and services from 
central government to local government is nevertheless viewed by the experts as a direct 
consequence of the shift. This is based on the suggestion that the decentralisation of 
service delivery, of competencies and of tasks from central to municipal level continues to 
be mainly implemented through support supplied by the ICC.    
 
Two members of the experts group, however, were sceptical about using the term 





―decentralisation‖ within the context of the government shift. According to their view, 
decentralisation has three dimensions: political, administrative and fiscal, and none of 
these features has been fully addressed, either in the shift or in the attempts undertaken 
towards decentralisation. Doubts were also put forward by members of the civic 
association and local councillors groups, who suggested that the accomplishment of 
decentralisation does not definitely enhance governance principles and values. For one 
interviewee here the problem was attributed to the bottom-up accountability mechanisms 
in the city which are undermined by the decentralisation practices delivered in the city. A 
sense of scepticism also emerged from the citizens, particularly with reference to issues 
around ―equity‖. Two citizens stated that decentralisation does not necessarily ensure 
equity in the city, in terms of the distribution and allocation of resources and accessibility 
to funds for those living in the more disadvantaged areas. By contrast, other two 
representatives of the citizen group argued that prior to the shift, pro-poor and equity 
agendas were already in place. 
 
The municipality officials supplemented the comments made by experts and civic 
associations according to which decentralisation can enhance governance principles. 
According to their view the ICC, as a decentralised institution, contributes towards the 
political decentralisation through which power, authority and influence are somehow 
transferred from the centre to the public. In addition, while decentralisation brings 
decision-makers closer to citizens and improves the responsiveness and transparency of 
decision-making processes, the autonomy of local bodies‘ decision-making is respected by 
the higher and central level government bodies. The municipality officials pointed out that 
as a key representative and electoral institution, the ICC is at the heart of these 
enhancements. Supporting the arguments of the municipality officials, the local councillors 
suggested that to a certain extent the decentralisation to local governments has enhanced 
the quality and distribution of both public services and public servants.  
  
         Representatives from the state, the municipality, the ICC and the local council argued that 
the new decentralising mechanisms introduced by the shift (i.e. electoral process and 
selection of mayor) contrast with Iran‘s centralised mode of decision-making. For the 





citizens, civic associations and private sector groups, however, the shift is said to have 
created controversial and contentious spaces within central and local government, where 
the friction between the state and local governments is increasing to the disadvantage of 
citizens. This is further reflected in the comment of a member of the civic association 
group, suggesting that the shift is ―not reducing the challenges, but is rather increasing the 
tensions between stakeholders in the city‖. [CA-05, Interview: 6 March 2010]. Similarly, a 
small-business owner asserted that the issues and challenges in the city will not be resolved 
through the creation of new organisations and the accumulation of associations, but rather 
through thoughtful experiments and wise decisions. One of the academic experts argued 
that the establishment of the ICC has had negative effects on integrative and cohesive 
forms of urban decision-making. Furthermore, an expert and a member of the Urban 
Research Centre asserted that currently city governance has been facing a ―messy 
duplication of urban management‖. Thus the contested understanding of city governance 
and its ―messiness‖ appears to be what best characterises the interaction of four major 
governance driving forces: the state, the municipality, the ICC and the general public.  
 
Despite the concerns mentioned above, almost half of the interviewed citizens, civic 
associations, and private sector interviewees thought that the ICC has had a constructive 
effect on decentralisation procedures in the city. For example, fiscal decentralisation is 
viewed by the civic associations and by the private sector respondents as a significant step 
towards local autonomy. They stated that it signifies an attempt to support urban 
government as a key and independent player in the urban decision-making landscape. As a 
legal body, the local authority manages its property and financial assets autonomously 
through an authorized legal framework. Furthermore, to a large extent the processes of 
revenue-raising and spending are devolved, and the system of taxation intended to supply 
resources for urban use have also been reformed with the intent of making it more efficient 
and coherent. Half of the citizens, civic associations, and private sector interviewees 
argued that when taking such reforms into account, the local authority‘s dependence on 
higher level government has been largely reduced. The citizens in particular indicated that 
overall the ICC had had a positive role, asserting that prior to the introduction of the ICC 
the executive powers were a joint duty of the municipality and of the state. They viewed 





the municipality as having been at that time entirely dependent on central government. 
When referring to the existing financial constraints that are faced by local government, 
three academic experts and private sector interviewees suggested that decentralisation and 
fiscal autonomy may perhaps be accompanied by risk. They stated that given their 
unsteady and limited state of finances and revenue capacity, local governments are unable 
to develop key transport networks. This proves the necessity for financial transfers from 
central government, which has so far undermined the extent of decentralization.     
 
5.1.2 Accountability and Transparency  
When it comes to accountability and transparency, all interviewees agreed that the lack of 
a cohesive and integrated pattern of governance has been a challenging issue for cities in 
Iran. This is reflected in their concerns about the urban administration‘s responsibility for 
delivering a number of services, including monitoring urban projects and development. A 
range of tasks such as those that relate to the provision of health, welfare, policing, water, 
electricity and gas are carried out by central government. The interviewees suggested that 
delivering governance in the city through different decision-makers and organisations 
affects vertical accountability in the city. Ten interviewees in particular, including 
representatives from the citizens, private sector and civic associations groups, said that it is 
hard to distinguish who is running the city. It appears that the ICC‘s function and position 
may be undermined by this form of task distribution, whereby the ICC is responsible for 
the municipality‘s performance but not for the entire city‘s functioning.   
The issue of accountability of the ICC to the higher level represented by the Divergence 
Resolution Board (DRB) was mentioned by a selection of interviewees concerned about 
the attendant ―political interests‖. In all, 22 interviewees, including experts, members of 
civic associations and state and municipality officials, confirmed that the ICC is 
accountable to the DRB, as the body designated to inspect and monitor the ICC. They 
argued that the ICC is recognised as an accountable association, proactive in soliciting 
input from higher level scrutinising bodies, such as the DRB and sub-governors.  
Generally, a range of interviewees, including citizens, civic associations, private sector, 
local councillors and expert groups, supported the role of the ICC in improving 





governance accountability and transparency in the city. According to the findings, the 
recent enhancements in accountability and transparency can be structured into three main 
themes: monitoring, flow of information and strengthening relationships. Tables 5.1 
and 5.2 show a summary of the state of accountability in the city, with an emphasis on the 
ICC‘s impact on shaping such matters, as perceived by different stakeholder groups. 









                   Table 5.2 The ICC‟s limitations in contribution to accountability based on groups‟ views 
 Lack of integrated form of decision-making undermines accountability in the city.  
 Capacity of the ICC is insufficient for true accountability (the Council is mainly accountable for 
the municipality‘s actions and performance but is not accountable with regards to the entire 
city) 
 Ambiguity in distinguishing who is responsible and accountable for city affairs (state or  
municipality) 
 The ICC legislative and institutional restrictions affect accountability in the city 
 Municipal districts‘ and local councils‘ websites are faced with the lack of a programme for 
keeping them up to date 
 The ICC does not hold enough public hearings and organise discussion with civic associations, 







 Prevents fraud and embezzlement practices in decision-making 
 Reduces the municipality‘s risk of financial failure through implementation of 
auditing responsibilities 
 Enhancement of E-government at the local level  
 Gradually enhances the mechanisms for disseminating information which 
have lead to trust-building in the city  
 
State officials 
 Efficiency in the ICC‘s accountability to the oversight of the Divergence 
Resolution Board and governors 




 Enhancing the accountability of the governors to the governed  
 The ICC as a reliable, self-directed and impartial monitoring entity 
 Enhancement of trust and confidence with regards to urban decision-makers 





           Monitoring  
According to all stakeholder groups, the ICC‘s role in promoting accountability through 
administrative practices which are mainly handled by the municipality, has had  a 
beneficial effect on fostering executive accountability in the city. A total of 40 
interviewees found that the ICC had a constructive role in fostering the municipality‘s 
accountability. It was believed that the simple existence of the ICC enhanced the 
accountability of the municipality in the city. Three interviewees from the expert group 
argued that, although the ICC has no remedy for the majority of the city‘s current 
problems, it has to some extent succeeded in making the municipality more accountable.  
When an urban researcher was asked whether the ICC has an impact on accountability, she 
responded: 
             ―Undoubtedly accountability and transparency have been augmented in the        
municipal organisation through the council‘s good offices.‖ [UE-02, 
Interview: 22 February 2010]. 
Representatives from the citizens group emphasised that since the character of the council 
depends on people‘s votes and participation, city representatives want to be considered 
accountable by the people. It was widely remarked that prior to the ICC‘s existence, the 
lack of a reliable monitoring establishment was understood to be an issue for the city 
government. Currently the ICC, as a self-directed institution, has taken on the mission of 
impartial scrutiny of city governance, affecting therefore the transparency and openness of 
city governance.  
The matter of confidence and trust was raised by three members of civic associations. In 
accordance with local representative‘s viewpoints, the ICC has to some extent succeeded 
in building confidence and trust in the city. This is further reflected in the comment of one 
executive member of a civic association, who stated that ―the trust and confidence that 
exists between the boards of executives and citizens is primarily a product of the shift‖. 
[CA-04, Interview: 10 March 2010]. All interviewees highlighted that prior to the 
establishment of the ICC, city management tasks had been faced with serious failure 





regarding ―transparency effects‖. In support of this argument, several citizen interviewees 
argued that, prior to the formation of the ICC, the municipality has on several occasions 
been accused of financial corruption and lack of transparency. A university student and 
member of a civic association described the pre-ICC governance approach as ―intractable 
and unbridled‖. A number of citizens and private sector interviewees viewed the fraud 
allegations in the municipality prior to the ICC‘s existence as politically motivated 
accusations. However, in general, the citizens, civic association and private sector 
interviewees largely indicated that the city suffered from a series of financial and 
administrative ambiguities. Furthermore, there was a lack of accountability, reflected in 
the absence of any kind of independent regulator. It follows that the municipality had ―no 
commitment‖ to be accountable for its decisions. The citizens argued that transparency and 
responsibility were enhanced when a key executive body (the municipality) was obliged 
by the local council representatives to be ―accountable and responsible‖ with regards to 
decision-making in the city. Two urban scholars also considered that monitoring budgeting 
and finance-related issues was a beneficial responsibility delivered by the ICC.  
The fact that prior to the establishment of the ICC, the three roles of policy-making, 
implementation and monitoring were under the authority of the state, and city mayors were 
accountable to the state alone (the Ministry of the State), was also highlighted by experts 
as a matter of concern. However, it was believed that the ICC as a third-party policy-maker 
and scrutiniser has been functioning as a major stakeholder capable of monitoring 
decision-making in the city. As an example here, the experts made reference to article one, 
paragraph two of the ICC Act, based on which the ICC representatives cannot belong to 
the city‘s executive boards. According to the experts, this condition supports the 
prevention of fraud and embezzlement practices, by separating the monitoring board and 
the executive bodies. Their view is based on the suggestion that municipality decision-
making in areas of particular concern, such as financial issues, is open to legislation and to 
ICC scrutiny. In support of this, the local representatives argued that to a large extent the 
council has succeeded in auditing the municipality‘s financial functions; thus, transparency 
and accountability concerns have been considerably diminished through the formation of 
the ICC.  





However, a doubt was put forward by three local councillors and civic associations. 
Because the Council has no authority over the other chief decision-makers and deputies in 
the municipality, the accountability of the key decision-makers in relation to the Council 
might be affected. Three interviewees from Council organisations mentioned that on 
several occasions the mayor‘s municipal deputies were unaccountable to the ICC‘s 
monitoring and investigations. In the same way, concerns over the accountability of the 
district mayors were also emphasised.   
Bureaucratic issues were viewed as a barrier to transparency and accountability by three 
citizens and local councillors. ―The bureaucracy has been reduced in governance processes 
by the ICC‖, stated a citizen belonging to a civic association in one of the interviews [CA-
03, Interview: 21 February]. According to their view, urban administrative tasks and city 
projects have previously been exercised with bureaucratic complexity and ambiguity. 
However, under the current structure and thanks to the procedural changes in the manner 
of conducting the city agenda, concerns about bureaucratic processes have been eased. 
Notwithstanding this, two citizens blamed the ICC for deferring the implementation of a 
number of city projects for bureaucratic reasons.  
Flow of information  
The ICC‘s recent performance in informing citizens by publicising its decisions and 
administrative activities has come to be considered as reliable. It is also seen as 
instrumental in communicating with and in enlightening the public regarding relevant city 
issues.  
A university student commented: 
―To consolidate the municipality‘s accountability, both the constructive and 
negative sides of its actions have been displayed to the public via the Council.‖  
[OC-02, Interview: 21 February, 2010]. 
Municipality officials considered the publication of contracts, tenders, budgets and 
accounts as an internal organisational practice taken up by the municipality following the 





shift. However, according to representatives from the experts, local councillors and civic 
associations groups, the ICC irrefutably has played a part in achieving such transparency. 
Access to public information and files is considered to have therefore improved 
considerably following the establishment of the ICC. The expert interviewees also 
suggested that E-government at the local level is proceeding well through the websites of 
Tehran municipality, its 22 municipal districts, and the ICC. They further suggested that 
the websites provide broad information on the municipal budget, balance and income; 
policies and regulations; investment agenda and strategies; real-estate property rights; 
thoroughness of information, and organisational staff (contact information, function and 
educational qualification). However, a concern raised by 11 citizens, private sector and 
civic association interviewees emphasised that, apart from the main websites (such as the 
municipality and the ICC websites) which are updated and revised regularly, the municipal 
districts‘ and the local councils‘ websites are often out of date. There was consensus 
amongst the experts that the information provided was insufficient. The websites lacked, 
for instance, reporting of public debates on the municipal budget drafting process, 
undermining the transparency of decision-making. Within this context, the experts 
suggested that holding public hearings and organising discussions with civic associations, 
local councillors and experts on the planned budget would be a constructive act for the 
enhancement of transparency.   
Strengthening relationships  
The view that the role of the ICC is to support relationships between the public and urban 
administrations is emphasised by ten interviewees representing civic associations, citizens 
and private sector groups. According to the civic associations in particular, the ICC 
strengthens relationships and interactions between citizens and urban executives. While 
prior to the shift citizens were isolated from urban actors and decision-making processes, 
the establishment of the ICC somehow creates a ―bridge‖ between the general public and 
the city‘s administration. In the same way a senior citizen stated that:  
―It cannot be fully concluded whether the ICC has a considerable effect on 
accountability, but with regard to building strong relationships between public 





and urban decision-makers, the ICC has achieved reasonable outcomes.‖ [OC-
05, Interview: 21 February, 2010]. 
Supporting this idea, three interviewees from the private sector mentioned the ICC‘s 
effective contribution in inviting citizens to share their concerns and how this would 
gradually nurture a better level of trust in the city.  
The public meetings set up by the councillors were considered by some experts and 
citizens as an appropriate method for dealing with citizens‘ concerns and for hearing their 
voices. Table 5.3 shows the interviewees‘ perceptions of public meetings. While citizens 
formerly had no access to decision-makers, under the new arrangement councillors 
supported the improved accessibility of urban decision-makers and administrative 
procedures. Supporting this viewpoint, a citizen working in civic services made the 
following comment:  
―Indeed the Council has enhanced the accessibility of urban administrators 
in order to hear the citizens‘ voice. Representatives have scheduled regular 
meetings with residents in the different municipal districts.‖ [OC-017, 
Interview: 20 April 2010].  
Similarly in another comment, the executive director of a civic association stated: 
―The public has had no opportunity for frequent contact with the city 
administrators and executives. Following the coming-into-being of the ICC 
any resident from any socio-economic background can attend city council 
public meetings and discuss any city matter with decision-makers.‖ [CA-02, 
Interview: 25 February 2010]. 
However, concerns over the efficiency of the public meetings resonated in the interviews. 
Seven interviewees representing the citizen, civic association and private sector groups, 
criticised the public meetings facilitated by the ICC representatives. A citizen working in 
the welfare sector commented: 





―The meetings are incomprehensive and incapable of boosting 
accountability. Thus there is doubt over the efficiency of their approach, 
due to a vast number of issues and their complexity in a city such as 
Tehran.‖ [OC-06, Interview: 26 February 2010]. 
A member of a civic association asserted that merely relying on the 15 ICC 
representatives‘ public meetings in a city with 12 million residents is an ―unrealistic‖ 
approach for endorsing accountability in a comprehensive way. Two interviewees 
representing small private sector businesses supported this view, stating that the approach 
to these meetings is based on a ―populist incentive‖ occasionally followed by ―publicity 
inspirations‖ and ―motivations‖ that prevent any practical interaction from taking place. 
The issue of irregularity and inconsistency of meetings was also raised by five citizen 
respondents. According to their view public meetings have not been operationalised in a 
systematic manner. The need for consistent, organised and open consultation with citizens 
regarding city matters was suggested by 21 interviewees including representatives of the 
citizens, private sector and civic association groups.       
Experts and local councillors said that the sessions of the ICC are open to all citizens 
without any restrictions. However, when asked to assert their opinion about the ICC 
sessions, almost 20 interviewees representing the citizen, civic association and private 
sector groups stated a lack of awareness regarding the schedule, place and time of the open 
sessions of the ICC. In effect, the way in which the sessions are announced to the public by 
the ICC was a matter of concern for the civic associations, citizens, private sector and local 
councillors. Furthermore, the way in which the municipality advertises the time of the 
meetings was a matter of dissatisfaction. According to the interviewees, the ICC‘s 
publicity and information mechanisms were only partly functioning, negatively impacting 
citizens‘ awareness with regard to public meetings. There is no sign of anything like a 
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           5.1.3 Gender Equality in City Governance  
It was widely believed by the interviewees that women‘s participation in urban decision-
making should be improved in order to enhance governance practices in cities. In this 
context, 26 interviewees from groups including civic associations, experts, state, local 
council and citizens, said that the ICC provides innovative pathways and means for women 
to participate and engage in city governance. As state officials argued, the initial space for 
women‘s participation in city governance was launched through the establishment of the 
ICC, which emphasised their role in local government. Similar views were echoed by three 
members of civic associations, who viewed the enhancement of women‘s contribution in 
city governance as constructive. In this context,  two experts compared the ICC with other 
associations at the state and city level, suggesting that from its establishment the ICC has 
been offering a good portion of its capacity to women, which have demonstrated their 





―capability and aptitude confidently‖, as they play a key role in decision-making in the 
city.  
Despite providing initial steps to involve women, their participation in the ICC is 
perceived as deficient by ten interviewees, including those from expert, local 
representatives and civic associations groups. This is partly due to the ICC being incapable 
of establishing sufficiently meaningful participation mechanisms for women. A member of 
the Council association commented: 
                       ―Women‘s participation in the most advanced sphere of city governance, as 
demonstrated in Council practices, shows technically and legally that the 
council is incapable of introducing an enhanced mechanism for women 
participating in the city.‖ [CR-02, Interview: 18 February, 2010]. 
         In this respect, the Councillors themselves highlight the fact that the ICC restricts women‘s 
input into city governance and decision-making, and that this can be simply tested by the 
small number of representative positions that women hold.  
Yet, the experts asserted that the ICC is not in a position to expand women‘s participation 
in urban decision-making, and is unable to recommend any employment policy to the 
municipality. However, the municipality as the executive board of the city does have 
sufficient ability to develop women‘s involvement in city matters. According to the 
experts‘ view, although the municipality has clearly allocated a portion of its workforce to 
women employees, up to this point it seems that the allocation has not been fully 
operationalised. It was claimed (although somewhat arguably) that the existing urban 
administration in the municipality employs a good number of women in its framework. 
However the concern highlighted here by the experts and citizens and civic associations is 
to what extent have key decision-making posts been offered to women. A female citizen 
formerly employed in the cultural sector stated: 
―In general, women‘s participation in urban decision-making in Tehran is 
insignificant; it seems that the municipality‘s executive board for the city 





largely excludes women from its key policy-making arrangements.‖  [OC-
01: Interview: 27 February 2010]. 
Similarly, when the interviewees were asked about the reasons behind the absence of any 
real contribution by women in governance decision-making, the responses varied. The 
responses can be classified into three types of views: socio-cultural, administrative and 
technical. These are summarised in Table 5.4.  
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             Social and cultural features  
Almost ten interviewees from various groups confirmed that equality between men and 
women in urban governance was undermined by the shift. It was widely understood 
throughout the interviews that it is hard to believe that within the existing system women 
and men have an equal chance to achieve a decision-making position in the city. In total 15 
interviewees from the expert and citizen groups referred to socio-cultural factors, public 
culture and tendencies with regard to women and their position in society, as barriers to the 
employment of women in city decision-making. Supporting this argument, four 
interviewees from the civic associations group argued that, although a tendency exists 
among higher level decision-makers to offer posts to women at a more advanced level, 
typically ―social‖ and ―cultural structures‖ and ―patterns‖ of the society have been 
functioning as a hindrance. Traditional thoughts, beliefs and attitudes are therefore 
considered significant factors influencing the participation and employability of women in 
city governance and related activities. The interviewees referred to the government 
decision to allocate a ministerial post to a woman for the first time following the Islamic 
Revolution (Minister of Health). This was faced with controversy and contentious 
discussion.  
The experts defined the Iranian society as strongly leaning towards a ―dominant 
patriarchy‖, in the context of which it is hard to expect women to be able to compete with 
men for any decision-making post. Thus, in practice such a tendency undermines women‘s 
position in the urban governance structure. Connected with this, official interviewees 
referred to statistics and figures at a national level where, quantitatively speaking, due to 
socio-economic and cultural factors, the majority of women are unemployed; and the 
majority of unemployed citizens are women. This is an additional factor affecting 
women‘s employability at city level. From a qualitative and social perspective, civic 
associations have argued that men are in a better position when compared to women with 
regard to obtaining senior administrative posts. The posts allocated to women are of a 
lower rank, class and status compared with the posts offered to men.  





Additionally seven interviewees from citizen and civic association groups referred to the 
degree of ‖public confidence‖ and ―trust‖ which can be higher for male executives‘ than 
for females. A citizen and executive member of civic associations argued that ―typically 
male decision-makers have been considered more appropriate for the city executive‘s tasks 
and positions‖. [CA-01, Interview: 3 March 2010]. 
Administrative and Technical features 
The issues around top-down approaches and their impact on local governance have been 
raised by three interviewees from the experts‘ group. Their view is based on the suggestion 
that the place of women in local government is affected by higher level circumstances. 
This is further reflected in the comment of one sociology scholar:  
         ―Due to the country‘s executive and administrative structures, the placement 
of women in macro-level of management has been narrowed. There is 
therefore an apprehension over allocating responsibilities to women in the 
local government decision-making structure.‖ [UE-03, Interview: 25 
February 2010]. 
The view that employing women in governmental decision making is summarised as being 
an insignificant consultative or ceremonial post resonated in the interviews. 
Correspondingly the act has not been regularised and contextualised at the city level, as 
suggested by two urban experts. An academic expert stated that the ―lack of contribution 
by women in macro level decision-making circles affects women‘s employability in the 
city governance structure‖. As a result, if women are distanced from the key circles of 
power at the higher level and have not been given a voice at the top level of decision-
making, then their position in the lower echelons will automatically be influenced. In 
addition, most of the higher ranking executives in the city who are men view women as 
rivals and challengers.  
Concerns over the lack of a scheme based on ―meritocracy‖ were expressed by six 
participants from the groups of experts, citizens and civic associations, as the selection of 
women executives is influenced by favouritism. A senior academic interviewee stated: ―for 





women, achieving a position in urban government is manipulated by lobbies, dealers and 
links, instead of a systematic set of arrangements.‖ The necessity of applying a transparent, 
impartial and comprehensive machinery to avoid such treatment was suggested.  
Concerns over the technical incompetence of women were raised mainly by four 
municipality senior officials. Executives from the municipality stated that since women‘s 
abilities are not guaranteed for most urban executives, offering a position of authority is 
considered a risky option for urban executive boards. According to a municipality official, 
women‘s (lack of) capabilities and abilities as individuals is what prevents them from 
contributing effectively to urban decision-making. Typically male and female capabilities 
have been considered different, because of unequal structures in society with men fulfilling 
the more technically enhanced positions. The level of education was also considered a 
significant aspect affecting the state of women‘s employability in city governance.  
Interviewees from the state and experts groups argued that the existing inadequacy in 
employing women in urban executive and administrative structures is associated with the 
lack of power distribution among the higher ranked urban managers. As the state officials 
asserted, since the municipal administration is entirely independent in its implementation 
of ―recruitment policies‖, the lack of women employed in key decision-making roles in the 
municipality is defined as an internal issue. They further criticised the idea that the 
technical insufficiency of women is a major weakness by referring to the recent testimony 
to women‘s abilities and aptitudes shown by their achievements in higher education, where 
female students have overtaken their male counterparts in attaining university places.  
5.2 Barriers and Challenges 
For most interviewees, the ICC‘s limitations and constraints have had a significant impact 
on the institutional capacity and weight of the organisation, raising some doubt over its 
competence. This view is based on the suggestion that the ICC has not been able to deeply 
influence governance practices due to its limitations. A representative of a local council 
commented:  





―Because of the complex nature of issues in Tehran, particularly the ICC‘s 
limitations, the ICC was unable to influence governance in Tehran.‖ [LC-
02, Interview: 25 February 2010].  
The ICC‘s limitations in a broader sense were emphasised by all interviewee groups. The 
limitations raised included the insufficient capacities and tools for enhancing governance 
and developing governance principles, which put the ICC‘s achievements at risk. 
According to the interviewees, the reliability of the ICC‘s current configurations has not 
succeeded in responding to public expectations. Based on the findings, the ICC‘s 
limitations can be ranked under three headings: political; structural and technical; 
institutional and legislative. These are subsequently discussed in more detail.  
5.2.1 Political limitations 
Concerns of a political nature were mentioned by 15 interviewees, particularly those 
representing civic association, citizen and expert groups. Citizens saw the political purpose 
of the ICC as a limitation, and would prefer if it had a more social foundation. This is 
because in their view and in accordance with its origins, framing the ICC as a social 
association would be helpful in limiting the politicisation of urban management, which 
they consider to have a negative influence on the quality of governance. A citizen 
employed in a private company made the following assertion: 
―Since it seems that the ICC devotes itself more to political and 
organisational issues rather than to management matters, the Councils have 
undermined their credibility with regard to governance practices in the 
city.‖ [PS-02, Interview: 25 February 2010].  
According to civic associations, despite the commitment of the ICC to be considered 
neither as a local government nor as a political establishment, its conduct and existing 
performances were viewed in a somewhat ―politicised‖ manner. Supporting such 
arguments, experts mentioned that the ICC was designed as a decentralised organisation 
run by publicly elected members. Furthermore, that the purpose behind the ICC was 
intended to be the exercise of public power and a move from a centralised government-





based structure towards a more decentralised local approach. A member of an academic 
society commented that: ―the ICC has been contextualised and then characterised 
misleadingly as a political power at city level in recent years.‖ [UE-05, Interview: 7 March 
2010]. 
According to the interviewed experts, the manner in which governance is effectively 
shaped and delivered is influenced by the manner in which the state and local associations, 
including the ICC, interact. However, these interactions and relationships were regarded as 
being shaped by political interests, rather than the result of systematic and efficient 
interactions. Two experts argued that the quality of the relationship between governance 
stakeholders (the central government, the ICC and the municipality) has depended on 
―political interests‖. One of the expert interviewees from an academic association 
mentioned the following with regards to second (2003-2007) and third (2007-2011) terms 
of office of the ICC: 
         ―Where governance stakeholders have somewhat comparable political 
interests and originated from identical political tendencies, the interactions 
and relationships have been strong, except in the cases where relationships 
are inconsistent.‖ [UE-01, Interview: 5 March 2010]. 
 
The municipality and Council staff interviewed viewed the role of political circumstances 
in shaping the quality of relationships between the stakeholders as ―irrelevant‖ and 
―impractical‖, in contrast to the views of the civic association, citizen and expert groups. A 
respondent from the civic associations group asserted that ―basically the interaction has 
been affirmative, except where different political propensities clash‖. He further 
emphasised the necessity of building relationships through ―regulative‖ and ―technical‖ 
frameworks, which would lead to reduced concerns.  
The influence and impact of the national and higher level agenda on local politics and the 
ICC was also a matter of concern for the experts. One issue in this respect is the existence 
of politicised tensions and challenges between governance stakeholders, which have 
intensified in the second and third periods of the ICC. The experts viewed such tensions as 





a major hindrance to the progress of governance. Thus, it appears that politicised conduct 
has led to governance stakeholders engaging in political competition, instead of 
contributing to the incremental enhancement of governance principles.    
When the interviewees were asked about the grounds behind the politicisation of the ICC, 
different responses were provided; these are summarised in Table 5.5. Three state officials 
referred to the ―political capacity‖ of the ICC in Tehran as the grounds for this 
politicisation. Thus in practice, the ICC has mutated into a site of political competition and 
a battlefield.  The interviewees argued that the political capacities and aptitudes of the 
ICC, particularly in Tehran, have an undeniable effect on its functions and performances, 
overshadowing the ICC‘s original position as a non-political institution. However six 
respondents, mainly from the civic associations and expert groups, viewed the 
politicisation of the ICC as related to the ―centralised‖ manner in which the power and 
influence have been distributed in the city. Civic associations stated that power is vested in 
three major stakeholders (the ICC, municipality, and state stakeholders), while grassroots 
organisations, civic associations and local foundations are in practice excluded from any 
kind of contribution. According to the experts, political parties and their local branches 
have a high influence on the ICC and consequently on city governance; while the impact 
of civic associations, CBOs, private sector and ordinary citizens is limited. In addition, two 
NGO participants to this research asserted that the lack of institutionalisation of the ICC 
can be considered as a basis for politicising the ICC. They argued that formulating ICC 
implementation through political tendencies and circumstances, rather than through social 
and public means, may put the ICC‘s legitimacy at risk.     
State officials indicated as a limitation the influential position of Tehran as the prime city 
of Iran, with political and socio-economic domination over the urban system. The way in 
which power is distributed among metropolises at the national scale was also highlighted. 
They argued that the ICC is not politicised in other major cities to the same extent that it is 
in Tehran.  
Arguably, the responses provided by two participants from the experts groups appeared to 
be tied up with ―election‖ issues. They argued that ―elections‖ themselves are viewed as 





politically motivated in line with the political circumstances in Iran. Since the formation of 
the ICC is entirely a product of electoral procedures, the involvement of the ICC in 
political contests is unavoidable.               
Some experts argued that ―elections‖ and their effects may lead to the politicisation of the 
ICC. However, according to five interviewees from the citizen and civic associations 
groups, the elections are perceived as a tool that prevents the ICC from becoming political 
fixtures. Since the nature of the ICC is deeply linked to direct public participation, the 
ICC‘s enhancement of the public‘s rights are said to have fully supported governance 
procedures for the city. Fifteen participants from different groups were sceptical about the 
potential of the ICC to augment political decision-making in the city. According to the 
citizens interviewed, prior to the implementation of the ICC, decision-making was largely 
under the influence of leading political collectives or individual figures. By contrast, the 
Councils put forward proposals based on ―public interest‖, instead of ―following political 
party lines‖. This is further reflected in a comment of one citizen employed in the 
education sector:  
        ―It could be realised that the key priority for every decision made by the ICC 
is in the public interest, not any political or influential categories.‖ [OC-07, 
Interview: 1 March 2010]. 
In support of this view, citizens further described the ICC as a very ground-level entity, 
whose credibility needs to be ensured through grassroots circles and not through the higher 
political organisations. Thus, the ICC representatives require people‘s votes, rather than 
endorsement from high-level organisations or figures. These interactions resulted in an 
unbiased and apolitical decision-making process in the city.   
Three members of the state administrators and the municipality senior officials groups 
emphasised the role of the ICC in supporting impartial decision-making. They stated that 
the ICC has been an impartial and neutral player in the city‘s courses of action. An 
administrator from the Organisation of National Municipalities put forward a view 
supportive of this commenting: 





         ―While formerly the city was operating subjectively and without regular 
guidelines; since the shift the ICC has been playing an effective role in 
systematising city governance practice.‖ [GO-02, Interview: 28 February 
2010]. 
In support of this, municipality staff commented that the ICC replaces hierarchical political 
frameworks with a structured and regularised pattern.  







- Lack of institutionalisation of the ICC in Iran 
 
- Centralised  power distribution in the city which concentrates on three 
stakeholders and excludes grassroots associations 
 
- Following political parties and interest group lines instead of public interest 
 
- ICC structure is mainly formed by  political actors 
Experts 
 
- Ignorance regarding technical features and functions 
 
- Influence of political parties and their local branches on the ICC, and 
consequently on city governance, is high 
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- The poor impact of civic associations, CBOs, private sector and ordinary 
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politics and the ICC 
 
- The ICC is a product of electoral procedures wherein the election itself is 
entirely viewed as a political process 
 
State official - Political capacity of the ICC 
 
- Political and socioeconomic position of Tehran as a prime city at the national 
level  
             5.2.2 Structural and Technical  
Throughout the interviews, the ICC structure has been at the centre of debates. It was 
understood that currently the number of the ICC representatives in Tehran and the other 
large cities is 15 and ten, respectively, which has been seen as too few by some. According 





to the experts interviewed, to address this issue a proposal to increase the number of  ICC 
members was formulated through parliament, suggesting  that in Tehran the number of 
representatives is  raised to 23 and in cities with more than two million inhabitants, the 
number of ICC representatives is to expand to fifteen. To date, this proposal remains 
unapproved and the number of representatives unchanged. For some this proposal is seen 
as likely to enhance the position and effectiveness of the ICC in Iran. However, those who 
opposed it argued that the proposal can lead to consequences of artificial modifications and 
increased bureaucracy within the ICC.  
With regards to the ICC‘s structure, the interviewees were asked to define whether the 
quantity and quality of the members composing the ICC‘s structure is appropriate for a 
metropolitan city such as Tehran (see Table 5.6).   





- The ICC‘s quantitative composition ( number of representatives) has not  been 








- Lack of technical and practical equality between the ICC and the municipality 
 
- Lack of a scrutinising mechanism to evaluate the competency and fitness of ICC 
representatives for their posts 
 
- Lack of a sufficient level of understanding among ICC representatives regarding 
urban issues 
 
- Lack of implementation of an inclusive approach to authorising potential candidates 







- Financial  and budgeting constraints 
 
- Limited use of professionals and persons of expertise as consultants in the ICC 
framework 
 





- Employability of experts and professionals within the ICC‘s framework 
 





What emerges from the interviews appears to be consistent with the view articulated in the 
literature, that the ICC‘s framework needs to be enhanced in terms of both structure and 
quality. Almost 30 respondents from different groups emphasised that the existing 
configuration is not appropriate for the city, and that urgent action is therefore needed. 
According to three experts, the structure of the ICC is not fit for purpose, particularly in 
cities that are faced with complex issues. ―Since cities such as Tehran have been faced 
with complex issues, the technical and structural features of the ICC need to be reviewed‖ 
said one of urban researchers interviewed [UE-02, Interview: 22 February]. Five 
representatives from the state and civic associations groups supported the experts‘ views. 
One of the state officials from the Provincial Governor‘s Office criticised the existing 
structure of the ICC stating that ―the number (quantity) of the ICC representatives is 
inadequate for Tehran and does not correspond to the volume of tasks.‖ [GO-03, 
Interview: 29 February 2010]. 
However, for other two respondents from the expert group, the existing number of 
representatives of the ICC is proportionate to the ICC‘s responsibilities, and there is no 
basic rationale for raising the number of ICC representatives. They went on to state that 
the amount of tasks and responsibilities delivered by the ICC are not ―massive and 
considerable‖ so the present structure is reasonably suitable for the association. An expert 
and member of an academic society asserted that ―if the ICC‘s responsibility and authority 
expands, it would be a constructive action to increase the number of ICC representatives‖.                                                                 
[UE-04, Interview: 6 March 2010] 
Members of civic associations, local citizens and experts suggested that rather than raising 
numbers of representatives in the ICC, there should be an increased focus on 
Neighbourhood Councils and further development of existing local forums. Shifting 
influence to such bodies was seen as having the potential to culminate in more centralised 
decision-making. In order to enhance the productivity and efficiency of the ICC, local 
councils in neighbourhoods should be expanded as an endorsed mechanism for governance 
in Tehran. A civic association executive further mentioned the ICC leader‘s viewpoint, 
which stated that “even three hundred representatives would be insufficient for Tehran” 
from a different angle. He supported his statement by saying:  





         ―If we want to find a practical solution for Tehran, the wisest way is, where 
possible, through implementing Neighbourhood Councils at the local level, 
creating a situation where there are more than three hundred representatives 
at local level. By accepting this, localisation can be boosted realistically.‖ 
[CA-01, Interview: 3 March 2010]. 
Despite the recognition of the functional and organisational distinction between the 
executive and legislative entities in the city, the issue of inconsistency between the 
municipality and the ICC in the allocation of supplies is mentioned by three members of 
local councils and civic associations. As well as highlighting the structural and technical 
gaps between the municipality and the ICC, this also underlines the limitations of the ICC. 
The interviewees further emphasised the existing gaps between the urban legislator and 
policy-making body (ICC) and the executor (municipality) in terms of technical and 
financial capacities. According to the interviewees from the local council, the municipality 
consists of several boards and assistants alongside its 22 district headquarters spread across 
the city. However, the ICC and its policy-making tasks are handled by a single board in a 
centralised manner. These limitations can also potentially result in the interference of the 
state level legislator and policy-makers in urban issues. They also imply that the ICC has 
insufficient weight to influence governance in the city.  
The employment of experts and professionals in the ICC was suggested as a limitation by 
three members of the state official group. They asserted that the issues arising with the 
ICC are due to the lack of competent individuals acting as representatives within the ICC‘s 
structure, rather than with the number of councillors. A state official from the Council and 
Municipality Office suggested that the ICC‘s structural limitations and technical 
deficiencies can be reduced by recruiting consultants and advisors to the ICC committees. 
A member of a local council supported this view commenting that ―the productivity of the 
ICC depends on the manner in which its professional actors have been configured. 
However, this does not stand on numbers and figures alone.‖ [LC-04, Interview: 8 March 
2010]. The present ICC structure was assessed by a member of the Urban Scholar‘s 
Society as follows:  





―Despite the existence of three main commissions and 13 committees in the 
ICC, based on the extent and nature of the issues, there still need to be more 
professional actors within the ICC‘s framework.‖ [UE-05, Interview: 7 
March 2010]. 
When the interviewees were asked about the possibility of using more professionals in the 
ICC, their responses once again highlighted the financial constraints under which the ICC 
operates, as the basic obstacle for employing further professional actors. The issue of 
financial constraints was echoed particularly in the interviews with the ICC officials. They 
argued that the issue largely derived from legislative and institutional limitations. In 
support of this argument, an interviewee from the Council pointed out that:  
         ―Financial and budget related issues count as the main barriers preventing 
the ICC from functioning in a deeper manner. Due to this, the ICC has no 
administrative staff, and administrative services for the ICC are supplied by 
the municipality.‖ [CR-04, Interview: 8 March 2010]. 
The issue of the competency and fitness of ICC representatives also resonated in the 
interviews with citizens, civic associations and experts. This will be further discussed in 
Chapter Six (Voter Turnout).   
5.2.3 Institutional and Legislative  
A basic concern expressed across all interviews appears to be institution-based limitations. 
With reference to the ICC‘s restrictions, over 15 interviewees emphasised the ICC‘s 
limited legislative capacity and the influence of political and structural factors over its 
functioning. Representatives from the citizens group considered structural and 
consequently technical issues as insignificant concerns. However, the ICC‘s institutional 
capacity and legal weight was viewed as a major challenge undermining its functions. 
Similarly, almost 20 council administrators referred to the allocation of power and weight 
to the main stakeholders in the city which has not been formulated to create a situation of 
balance.  





Basically, for almost all interviewees, the legislative and institutional limitations 
undermine the ICC‘s original position in the constitution. The gap between the ICC‘s 
theoretical frameworks on the one hand, and its driving practical circumstances on the 
other hand, was raised by participants in the professional groups. It follows that the most 
recently modified ICC regulations and guidelines are considered to be far removed from its 
constitutional roots and principles. From the experts‘ viewpoint, according to Code 103 of 
the constitutional law, the central government executives, including governors and 
managers in cities and at the provincial scale, ought to respect the Council‘s decisions. 
However, by referring to the latest ICC regulations, the governmental organisations or 
administrators can waive their obligation to respect the council‘s decisions and orders. 
According to the existing circumstances, it was believed by the experts that the ICC is at 
some distance from functioning as an ―urban parliament‖ or a ―city council‖. The experts 
suggested that the ―municipality‘s council‖ is a more realistic label for the present ICC 
system in Iran. Hence, based on current regulations and the existing governance system, 
the only organisation which is accountable to the ICC is the municipality. It was argued 
that the ICC‘s contemporary functions are in contrast with its constitutional arrangements. 
As an academic expert asserted, ―there has been a controversial gap between the ICC‘s 
position in the constitutional law and its actual performances.‖ [UE-02, Interview: 22 
February 2010]. 
Similarly, for the municipality administrators there are clear signs of incongruity between 
the ICC‘s responsibilities in the constitutional law and its existing authority. They consider 
the current legislative weight and power of the ICC insufficient, and exhibiting systematic 
malfunction with regards to the effective delivery and influence over governance 
procedures in the city. It was argued by municipal officials that the legislative and 
regulation-based concerns seem to be key grounds for the interference of the state in urban 
issues, which consequently affects the governance process. For the municipal 
administrators, the ICC would be able to have more influence over governance tasks, if it 
could reposition itself consistent with its meaning in the constitution. This enhancement 
would also institute a more balanced distribution of city governance contributions between 
key stakeholders (the state, the ICC and municipality).   





The lack of practical assurance and sanctions with regards to the implementation of the 
constitutional regulations was raised as an issue in the interviews with local councillors 
and civic associations. The motivation and driving force are devoid of practical 
mechanisms for realistically implementing the constitutional criteria with reference to the 
ICC. ―The lack of executive assurances to practice regulations is a further concern that 
causes fundamental deficiencies in delivering the ICC task‖, said one member of a local 
council [LC-03, Interview: 10 March 2010]. It was widely believed by local councillors 
that, despite the constitution offering an appropriate range of tasks for the ICC, in practice 
it has no power to implement the large reach of these authorities and influences. According 
to the local councillors, 23 monitoring missions are being offered to the ICC based on 
Article 71 of the ICC Act. However, theses duties are not defined clearly. For example, the 
ICC‘s position and monitoring duties with regard to health affairs in the city lack clear 
definition.  
In addition, the lack of willingness and determination among the higher-level decision-
makers to offer the ICC further institutional space and weight was identified as a limitation 
by interviewees from civic association and expert groups and by four well-informed 
citizens. They highlighted the indecisive position of the ICC, whereby throughout its 
existence progress has been characterised by a lack of assurance, political willingness and 
uncertainty. The state‘s attitudes towards the ICC has been considered as discouraging, 
insofar as they have persistently not been taken into account by successive administrations. 
In effect, an urban expert argued that ―A resistant tendency has been functioning as a 
barrier in Iran to granting further authority to the ICC‖, as [UE- 01, Interview: 5 March 
2010]. The hindrances due to the ICC‘s institutional capacity are summarised in Table 5.7.   
Furthermore, the representatives interviewed from the ICC highlighted the legislative 
barriers, by referring to Codes 100 and 101 of the constitutional law, according to which, 
the operation of the ICC at all levels of decision-making including neighbourhood, rural, 
county, city, and provincial scale is to be taken into consideration. Yet, this issue has not 
been taken into account entirely by the driving machinery of governance (the state-level 
policy makers and legislators) and is being equally disregarded. According to the ICC 
representatives, negligence over the implementation of a comprehensive hierarchical 





approach means for the ICC has continuously taken place. Thus, a lack of integration and 
association between the ICC institutions at different levels of decision-making exist.   
To conclude, the impact of the ICC‘s financial, technical and institutional limitations on 
the quality of governance was revealed by an expert. The way in which the financial 
auditors, who are ICC staff and monitor the municipality, interact with the municipality 
organisation was also a matter of concern. While the monitoring undertaken must be 
wholly delivered by the ICC, the auditors are officially employed and paid by the 
municipality. This undermines the ICC‘s autonomy and transparency with regard to 
financial oversight procedures, as it stresses the absence of a fully independent and 
transparent body.  
Table 5.7: Hindrances to the ICC‟s Institutional Capacity 
Views 
- Controversial gap between the ICCs position in the constitution and its institutional 
capabilities 
- Lack of clarification and explanation with regard to some duties meant for the ICC  
- The ineffectiveness of the ICC‘s present institutional weight and influence to support 
governance  
- The ICCs legislative motives are mixed up with political motives 
- The lack of state willingness and determination to offer more institutional weight to the ICC 
 
5.3 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the research findings with reference to the ICC and its role in the 
existing city governance of Tehran. In the first phase, the ICC‘s contribution to the quality 
of governance was identified. Its key positive features include decentralisation and local 
autonomy; accountability and transparency through monitoring and scrutinizing practices, 
communication of information, and the strengthening of relationships between urban 
decision-makers and citizens. In addition, the ICC supports to some extent gender equality 
through providing an initial space for women‘s participation as ICC representatives. 





However, various limitations and barriers with regards to the ICC were also identified. 
Political, technical, structural, legislative and institutional factors were considered as 
significant hindrances. It was conveyed that these limitations have negative impacts on 
delivering good governance in the city.       
Discussion of the Islamic City Council and its effects on governance can be summed up by 
the view expressed by a sociology scholar interviewee: despite the mechanisms initiated 
by the establishment of the ICC, it is incapable of assuring an enhanced governance 
mechanism. However, the existing mechanism is not to be considered as a retrograde step 
with regard to the governance principles it embodies. The shift that introduced the ICC can 
therefore still be considered as a foundation and initial step towards improved city 
governance. 





Chapter 6: Voter Turnout 
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        6.0 Introduction  
Based on the interview findings, the main idea behind the shift in urban governance was 
enhancement of citizen participation and public involvement in city affairs. However, in 
practice, greater public involvement has been mostly limited to electoral participation. It is 
within this context that the ICC‘s elections are considered a key feature for enhancing 
urban public participation, as well as a challenging prospect, particularly in Tehran. To 
explore the extent to which elections can be considered as a key participation activity 
within Iran‘s existing governance machinery, this chapter focuses on voter turnout. Two 
concepts, derived from the interview data appear to be key: 
1- Electoral participation in governance: which presents the role of electoral  
participation and its impacts on governance; 
 
2- Voter turnout in the ICC elections: which aims to explain voter turnout 
deficiencies in ICC elections. It addresses four key areas enhancing the level of 
participation in ICC elections. These are: 1) Combined elections, 2) Enhancing public trust 
and awareness, 3) A well-judged and fair selection of candidates, and 4) Enhancing the 
ICC‘s institutional position.  
 
Subsequently, the interview findings are presented using the two concepts suggested above 
as a framework. 
 
6.1 Electoral Participation in Governance   
 
Although the responses provided varied, 25 out of 60 participants to  the  interviews 
suggested that the ICC elections uphold general democratic principles at city level, as every 
citizen is offered equal rights to participate in city affairs. However, 14 interviewees, 
mostly consisting of representatives from the citizens, civic associations, private sector and 
urban experts groups were sceptical with regards to comprehensiveness of the ICC 
elections and their impact on urban governance. Their responses indicate that public 





participation and citizen engagement in decision-making has to some extent been 
―insufficient‖ in arriving at effective participatory governance. According to three urban 
experts, given that the  public‘s input into the post-governance shift system has been 
recognised through the ICC elections, the distinction between the current and previous 
system in terms of enhancement of participatory decision-making has been described 
(however unfair this might seem to a more informed observer) as ―negligible‖. They went 
on to suggest that the pre- and post-governance shift excluded the public from the practical 
aspect of sharing in decision-making procedures. Thus, according to the interviewees, the 
contemporary urban governance strategy ignores the public‘s input into decision-making 
because citizens‘ contributions are solely solicited through the city council elections every 
four years, with no attempt to go any deeper. 
 
With regard to introducing a deeper meaning and level of citizen contributions and 
involvement into decision-making, some enthusiastic and dedicated responses were 
expressed by the citizens, private sector and civic association interviewees. ―While, 
following the initiation of the ICC elections the citizens expected that deeper participation 
schemes such as participatory delivery of services in neighbourhoods, would be gradually 
introduced , decision-makers have yet to take any action‖, said a citizen working in the 
welfare sector. A university student interviewed stated  
 
―I would like to see a profound sense of participation in the city in which the 
meaning of the citizenry taking part in urban decision-making is not 
undermined by being focused on electoral processes alone.‖ [OC-09, 
Interview: 27 February 2010].   
   
Despite this deficit, the idea that the role of urban elections is to strengthen the position and 
participation of citizens was supported by interviewees across different stakeholder groups. 
For example, an administrator from the central government asserted that ―At least the 
benefit of the ICC elections is that for the first time citizens have been taken into account in 
city decision-making.‘‘ [GO-01, Interview 4 March 2010]. She argued that prior to the 





governance shift there was no mechanism through which citizens could have a say in any 
city matters. An optimistic perspective on power sharing and distribution also resonated in 
other interviews. A local councillor interviewee expressed his support for the urban 
elections by stating: ―Society should accept that the election distributes influence and 
power in the city, and that through it, citizens to some extent share in the decision-making 
processes.‖ [LC-05, Interview: 13 March 2010]. 
 
For three urban experts the electoral process has been intended to strengthen the notion of 
governance in the city, as the role of urban elections is to support the value and meaning of 
democracy. They stated that for the first time, the following have been recognised as 
essentials for urban democracy and that to some extent, are a feature of the ICC elections: 
citizens‘ contributions to urban affairs, the distribution of power and influence in the city, 
giving a voice to the public and the recognition of other opinions with regard to city issues. 
However, with regard to the extent to which the elections are efficient, urban experts 
identified the inadequacy of representative democracy to support entirely the exercise of 
governance functions. A member of an expert group commented: 
 
     ―While citizens‘ participation in the ICC elections can be implemented to 
strengthen representative democracy at city level; the functions necessary for 
good governance require the application of both representative and 
participatory democracy.‖ [UE-02, Interview: 22 February 2010]. 
 
It was widely asserted by interviewees that the achievement of governance is associated 
with the understanding and implementation of both representative and participatory 
governance. While urban experts pointed out that representative democracy offers a passive 
form of citizenship; participatory governance citizens are actively engaged throughout 
governance procedures.      
According to three representatives of the civic associations group, rather than lacking the 
capacity to contribute fully to governance, urban elections have had a concrete influence on 
the development of urban democracy in Iran. In general, civic associations agreed strongly 





with the impact of ICC elections in developing democracy at the city level, as they  offer 
opportunities for sharing the practice of governance with women, minorities, the young, the 
elderly and disabled citizens, thus, regardless of one‘s class and position. A member of a 
civic association put forward an optimistic view, stating that:  
 
―I believe that ordinary citizens from various socio-economic groups, who 
were previously excluded or ignored from contributing to the urban 
governance process, are now taken into account through their inputs to ICC 
elections.‖ [CA-03, Interview: 25 February 2010]. 
 
In addition to the civic association members, six interviewees from the private sector and 
local councillors groups also supported that statement. According to two small business 
employees before the establishment of the ICC elections, individualism was the dominant 
attitude in city decision-making, with power to influence concentrated in the hands of 
selected individuals. In the same way, local councillors suggested that monopolisation and 
segregation in the city were demolished by the introduction of the ICC elections. A senior 
member of the local council asserted 
―With the machinery of the past, the mayor, interior minister and other 
influential individuals were in a position to influence and shape the city 
along their own pathways.‖ [LC- 01, Interview: 17 March 2010]. 
 
However, he also recognised that thanks to the realisation of the election process, the city is 
now formed by a more ―shared and cooperative decision-making‖ approach.  
 
In addition, two interviewees from the Ministry of the Interior suggested that on the one 
hand, the election led to the engagement of ―new actors and ideas‖ [into city governance] 
through pluralism principles; and on the other hand, it put a stop to fashion-driven, single-
voiced and monopolistic decision-making in urban management. This offers ―legitimacy‖, 
―credibility‖ and ‗‗reliability‖ to the urban machinery. It was also suggested that city 
elections support the credibility and integrity of the city administration, which in turn, 





reflects credit on the manner in which the city is being run. However, concerns that a sole 
reliance on ICC elections might be misused to manipulate urban governance processes 
were echoed throughout the interviews with state officials. Primarily, it was thought that 
the ICC elections draw attention to the issue of participation in the city. However, since the 
electoral process was unable to deliver the entire value and meaning of participation and 
was not complemented by participatory practices, it has been incapable of strengthening 
participatory governance principles in the city. A senior state official in Iran‘s Organization 
of Municipalities Administration commented that:  
 
―Despite the accomplishment of three urban (ICC) elections, there is no sign 
that any significant modification in participatory city governance has taken 
place.‖ [GO-04, Interview: 7 April 2010].  
 
 He further stated that in general, the governance of the city has not been deeply influenced 
by the election, and that the city council has had limited influence.  
 
6.2 Voter Turnout in the ICC Election 
 
Whereas in Iran the level of participation in general elections (i.e. presidential elections) is 
high; at the city level (i.e. council elections) the level of participation is low (see figures 
4.10 and 4.11). In Tehran, the voter turnout in ICC elections appeared to be even lower than 
the voter turnout at national level and less than the country‘s average (see figures 4.12 and 
4.13). The insufficient and poor voter turnout in Tehran was validated by the responses 
provided by over 40 interviewees.   
 
Generally, the interviewees indicated that the implementation of urban councils and 
particularly the operation of urban elections in Iran is a new phenomenon, further 
emphasising the need to build experience and knowledge about these issues. For the urban 
experts, expectations about the level of participation in the new system should not be too 
high, as the changes to local governance are still at an initial stage of implementation and 





that improvements to the system will take place in a gradual manner. The same point was 
raised by the officials from government departments, which used a comparative approach 
to address the concerns over low participation in ICC elections. A state official suggested:  
 
―In countries where local authorities have been in existence for a long 
period, the level of participation in elections is comparable to the voting rate 
for the ICC. Therefore, there is a need to have realistic expectations about 
the new system in Iran.‖ [GO-03, Interview: 29 February 2010]. 
 
He further stated that practising democracy at the local level in Iran is a new phenomenon 
and that the achievement of local democracy needs to be ―gradual‖ and ―timely‖.      
 
Decision-makers with positive attitudes about the ICC elections were considered important, 
as they are able to influence the voter turnout in ICC elections. Thus, decision-makers are 
capable of influencing the public‘s outlook on ICC elections, as argued by two urban 
experts. These issues were reflected in the following statement:  
 
         ―The circumstances of the ICC elections, including the manner of selecting 
the potential representatives and the matter of publicity, have been largely 
shaped and influenced by leading decision-makers.‖ [UE-04, Interview: 6 
March 2010]. 
 
The momentum and drive with which the election processes were endowed by major actors 
was also highlighted as an influential aspect by two senior officials from the municipality. 
They stated that the manner in which organisations and decision-makers deal with the ICC 
elections would be an essential influence on voter turnout. Moreover, that in all presidential 
and parliamentary elections society has witnessed a ―collective momentum‖, whereby 
various associations including ―governmental‖ and ―non-governmental groups‖ are 
―besieged‖ with information and prompts about electoral procedures and issues, making 
society fully equipped for involvement in the election. However, this sort of ―willpower 





and driving-force‖ has not been applied to the ICC elections. This lack of momentum has 
greatly affected the way in which the ICC elections have been carried out, suggesting that 
for high-level executives the ICC elections may be considered less important than the 
presidential and parliamentary elections. Within this context, one of the private sector 
employees stated: 
 
―Since the effectiveness and value of the council compared with the state executive 
(president) and legislative machinery (parliament) is insignificant in the eyes of the 
public, the ICC elections have not been considered as a decisive turning point, for 
neither the citizens nor the city.‖ [PS-03, Interview: 8 April 2010]. 
 
Furthermore, the issue of institutionalisation of the elections was highlighted by civic 
associations. Despite a decade passing since the establishment of the ICC, the bond 
between the city councils and the society within which they function is still weak. Part of 
this is due to the fact that the ICC elections have not been highlighted in the attention of the 
general public, and thus it was suggested that the elections should be publicised more 
widely. The concern here is that the existing approaches introduced by key policy-makers 
were incapable of stimulating ―an interactive commitment‖ that could develop a bond 
between citizens and ICC elections. A member of a civic association asserted:  
 
―While citizens on the whole felt obliged to engage with presidential 
elections, the understanding of the nature of their duty and obligations 
towards ICC elections is weaker.‖ [CA-03, Interview 21 February 2010]. 
 
Table 6.1 summarises the reasons behind the low level of public participation in the ICC 
elections. Based on interview findings, to boost the level of voter turnout in the ICC 
elections, the following areas should be addressed: 1) Combined Elections, 2) Enhancing 
Public Trust and Awareness, 3) A well-judged and fair selection of candidates, and 4) 
Enhancing the ICC‘s institutional position. 
 
 










Urban experts  
- Lack of accurate awareness among the public with regards to the ICC‘s 
position and competences 
- Politicised and ambiguous process of candidate selection  
- Lack of an inclusive approach towards selecting potential nominees for 






- Lack of trust and confidence 
- Lack of a positive view based on previous ICC elections 
- Doubts over ICC candidates‘ promises during electoral campaigns        
- Concerns about candidates‘ competence and capability 
- Low level of publicity and advertising for elections 
 
Municipality   
- Insufficient awareness among citizens regarding their rights and status 
in the city (narrow public awareness ) 
- Lack of momentum and commitment contributed by higher level 
decision-makers to the success of the ICC elections 
- Lack of a collective commitment and driving-force among various 







- Institutional, legal and technical limitations of the ICC 




6.2.1 Combined elections 
 
Almost 20 respondents observed that the experience of combining elections has shown a 
constructive effect on the level of participation to ICC elections. The view is based on the 
suggestion that the recent integration of the ICC elections and of the Assembly of Experts 
of the Leadership
1
 election (Majles-e Khebregan-e Rahbari), showed a better result in 
terms of voter turnout, if compared with previous ICC elections.  However, ten 
representatives from the urban experts group argued that despite some progress, that 
integration did not achieve an appropriate outcome in terms of voter turnout. Their concern 





relates to what might be the best kind of election to combine with the ICC election.   
The view that in order to increase participation, the ICC elections need to take place 
simultaneously with national elections (i.e. presidential and parliamentary) was echoed by 
five civic association and urban expert interviewees (see table 6.2). From their point of 
view, since the ICC elections have mainly taken place as isolated events, timing them to 
coincide with presidential elections could have positive results in terms of increased levels 
of voter participation. Supporting this argument, one of the civic association representatives 
stated that: 
 
―Normally the level of participation in presidential elections is very high, so 
the combination of ICC with the presidential elections would be an effective 
mean for expanding the level of participation in the ICC elections.‖ [CA-05, 
Interview: 6 March 2010]. 
 
The view that combined elections would augment the level of participation in the ICC 
elections was further supported by the urban experts. They suggested that if combined, 
citizens will feel encouraged to get involved in the ICC election process as well as in the 
presidential elections, feeding on the electoral enthusiasm that already exists for the 
presidential elections. However, concern over the potential politicisation of the ICC 
elections and the change in significance which is likely to occur through the juxtaposition 
of the two different kinds of plebiscite was expressed by almost ten participants, in 
particular those representing state and urban expert interviewees. This view is based on the 
suggestion that, since the context and significance of presidential elections is entirely tied 
up with political circumstances, the combination of two elections would augment the risk of 
politicising the ICC elections. According to the state representatives, the ICC elections are 
supposed to be considered as apolitical processes. Yet the presidential elections are 
completely political in terms of what they involve and contribute to. Thus, according to the 
findings, the aforementioned combination would shift the ICC and its elections further into 
the realm of politics.   
 
Similarly, it was suggested by two municipality officials that ‗local‘ elections (i.e. the ICC) 





and ‗national‘ elections are devoid of any correlation, so it makes no sense to combine 
them. Their dissimilarity was also emphasised, with some considering a combination 
against the urban constitution. This is further reflected in the comment of one junior 
municipality official: 
―The elections are totally dissimilar to each other in principle, application, 
and implementation, and each one has its own independent administrative 
tools.‖ [ME-03, Interview: 16 March 2010]. 
 
Furthermore, if combined, the electoral arrangements will be complicated for both citizens 
and decision-makers.      
  
In addition to the above barriers, the interviews with state officials mentioned a technical 
concern about the combination of the ICC and presidential elections. According to existing 
fixtures, the presidential elections and the ICC elections do not follow the same timescale. 
Therefore, in order to synchronise the two elections, two suggestions were put forward by 
the respondents in support of combined ICC and presidential elections. The first suggestion 
was to expand the third term of office (2007-2011) of the ICC (i.e. the existing council) 
from four to six years. The second suggestion was to suspend the ICC for two years, 
subsequently ending its third period in time for the next presidential election. Yet, 
according to the interviewees, both proposals had controversial aspects. Officials from the 
Interior Ministry referred to the fact that council representatives are elected by the public 
for a fixed term of four years, and not for six years. An expansion of the council‘s duration 
would therefore be in contrast with the Constitution. On this particular issue, an urban 
expert and a legal consultant claimed that the duration of councils in seat is not precisely 
indicated; and that the national parliament could perhaps define the duration and extend it if 
needed. The second proposal, which suggested suspending the ICC for a period of two 
years, has been largely criticised by almost 20 interviewees. Their criticism is best 
explained through the comment of one interviewee from the council: 
 
                  ―A proposal that considers a suspension of the ICC largely reflects the 





unsteady position of the ICC in Iran, and the lack of sympathy and 
understanding of the significance of urban councils for society.‖ [CR, 03, 
Interview: 10 April 2010]. 
  
Similarly, the members of local councils mentioned that there is not ―enough sensitivity‖ 
concerning the existence of the ICC, with its position and value considered sometimes 
―unsustainable‖. Surprisingly, two urban experts and civic associations in support of the 
second proposal stated that the temporary suspension of the ICC after its third period for 
nearly two years would be an exceptional chance for the ICC to redefine and restructure 
itself according to the public‘s needs and desires. 
 
Instead of presidential elections, the combination of ICC elections with parliamentary 
elections was supported by almost 15 interviewees, representing in particular state and 
municipality interviewees. According to their view, since the parliamentary and ICC 
elections are both implemented at the local (city) level, their combination could be achieved 
in a more integrated way. Their view is based on the suggestion that if compared with the 
presidential elections, parliamentary elections have been accompanied by less tension and 
conflict. It follows that bringing parliamentary elections together with ICC elections could 
potentially keep the ICC free of politicised challenges. In support of this argument, two 
senior municipality executives emphasised that the ICC election is a local process with a 
local remit, which can be synchronised with other elections at the local level such as 
parliamentary elections. However, two urban experts were concerned about the voter 














           Table 6.2 The strengths and weaknesses of combining ICC elections with national elections 
 
Strengths  Weaknesses  
- Expands the level of participation in 
the ICC elections 
 
 
- Prevents the ICC elections from taking 
place in isolation  
 
 
- Increases electoral enthusiasm by 
building on the popularity of 
presidential elections  
- Politicisation of the ICC elections, 
consequently affecting the perceived 
significance of the resulting governance bodies 
 
- Lack of correlation and integration between 
urban and national elections in terms of 
identity, values and principles 
 
- Based on existing terms of office, presidential 




6.2.2 Enhancing public awareness and trust 
 
According to the interviewees, account needs to be taken of the relative unfamiliarity of 
local councils and elections of local councillors in Iranian society. While public perceptions 
can have a substantial impact on the level of participation, public perceptions and 
understanding of the ICC are to some degree restricted by this lack of familiarity. What 
surfaced from the data about public awareness supported the view that public understanding 
of the ICC and its election is insufficient. A lack of public awareness with regard to the role 
of citizens in local governance was also echoed in the interviews.  
 
For 23 participants the dearth of knowledge and understanding among citizens with regard 
to the ICC elections would potentially be an explanation of lower participation in the ICC 
elections. This resonated in the interviews with representatives from the municipality 
officials, local councillors, citizens, urban experts and civic association groups. According 
to their views, in Iran people have a clear view about executive bodies (i.e. government) 
and even the legislative body (i.e. parliament), but not about the function and position of 
the urban council. A local councillor asserted: ―After more than a decade from its first 
implementation, the majority of citizens are not really aware of the significance of the ICC 
election.‖ [LC-02, Interview: 25 February 2010]. Similarly, a senior municipality official 
commented that ―citizens have not been informed through the standard avenues with regard 
to ICC performance and activities.‖ [ME-01, Interview: 1 February 2010]. The ambiguity 





and lack of clarity over the role of the ICC also emerged from the interviews with citizens 
and with the professionals who spoke about them. The municipality representatives 
confirmed that based on their routine dealings with people, they‘ve noticed that citizens 
have insufficient awareness of their rights and status, as well as of the function and status of 
the ICC. Ten interviewees from the citizens‘ group mentioned that this lack of awareness is 
a fundamental limitation for the ICC and a hindrance to the progress of participation in the 
ICC. One senior citizen stated that ―the value, responsibilities and functions of the ICC are 
uncertain for the majority of the general public.‖ [OC-03, Interview: 6 March 2010]. 
Another citizen strengthened this view by stating that ―the ICC position and agenda have 
been missing in the city.‖ [OC-09, Interview:  17 March 2010].The lack of a clear 
distinctive sense of the division of duties between the ICC, the municipality and central 
government was also emphasised by the citizens interviewed. There should also be some 
consideration about clarifying to the public the breakdown of handling and delivery for city 
governance tasks between the municipality and the ICC.  
 
The issue of citizen awareness about the ICC was further highlighted by three interviewed 
urban experts. Due to fact that the ICC and local governance are still in their early stages of 
implementation, the experts also thought most citizens are unaware of the ICC‘s role and 
capacity and of the institutional position it occupies in the city. The urban experts stated 
that popular expectations of the ICC far exceed its actual capacities. Thus, according to 
experts, the dearth of meaningful participation in the ICC elections was largely affected by 
a lack of ―accurate awareness‖ among the public. They stated that limited public awareness 
regarding the ICC‘s applicability and productivity marginalised the contribution of the ICC 
elections in Iran. Supporting this view, an academic expert commented that: 
  
―If the public was really informed about the ICC‘s influence and authority, 
then their expectations would not be too idealistic and impractical.‖ [UE-01, 
Interview: 5 March 2010]. 
 
Furthermore, the urban experts suggested that citizens‘ expectations of the ICC do not 





correlate with the ICC‘s actual weight in the city, affecting the level of public participation 
in the second and third period of the ICC elections. The public‘s expectations of the ICC 
are normally high, but the ICC has not been successful in meeting public needs. For the 
urban experts, these high expectations about the ICC are largely due to the lack of clarity 
and transparency about the ICC‘s role in the city.   
 
Similarly, the state officials unanimously agreed that citizens wanted measures to be 
introduced to improve information about the ICC, through knowledge-building 
mechanisms at the neighbourhood scale. They stressed that public seminars and lectures in 
the short term and use of more current information technology in the long term regarding 
the ICC and participation issues would be effective measures to address awareness 
concerns. Training workshops to build knowledge and to strengthen the relationships 
between citizens and decision-makers would also be a helpful tool to boost public 
understanding of urban issues. The significance of neighbourhood councils (Public Forums) 
in the promotion of public understanding was highlighted by state officials. Seven 
representatives from the state and municipality recommended that information strategies 
should be re-established. Municipality executives stated that similarly to the municipality, 
the ICC should define its own innovative strategies in building public awareness. They 
argued that the responsibility for implementing information mechanisms in every detail 
falls on the municipality itself, but it should be complemented by the ICC. When these 
issues were discussed by the local councillors and urban experts, once again the issue of 
fiscal and technical limitations of the ICC emerged. The ICC‘s constraints were perceived 
as a major barrier that inhibits the ICC from developing its capacities in this regard.  
 
A large number of the interviewees, particularly those representing civic associations, the 
private sector and ordinary citizens, mentioned that the ICC website is the only option 
available for learning about the performance of the ICC. However, an IT specialist and an 
expert in the municipality were concerned that deficiencies in the IT infrastructure, ability 
to use and access the technology, suggests that citizens‘ had limited access and skills to the 
internet. According to the urban experts, use of the internet is not widespread in Iran, and 





based on this, in the short term the ICC should have more recourse to the conventional 
public press and local media. One interviewed urban researcher commented: 
 
         ―Since the municipality recently gained advantages from the implementation 
of its own newspaper, magazine and virtual space, the public are well-
informed with regard to municipality performance.‖  [UE-03, Interview: 25 
February 2010]. 
 
Despite the mentioned concerns, the need to make better use of information technology was 
expressed in the interviews with civic associations and citizens. Operating the ICC 
representatives‘ information websites as enhanced mechanisms to improve communications 
with citizens, increasing their awareness and confidence, was expressed by ten civic 
association and citizen representatives. According to their view, there is a necessity to 
advance the ICC website and individual councillors‘ websites with feedback, comments 
and facilities, allowing the exchange of opinions with citizens.   
 
On the matter of election, the issue of campaigning during the elections was raised by ten 
interviewees, particularly those representing citizens‘ and civic associations. Their view is 
based on the suggestion that in comparison with the presidential and parliamentary 
elections, publicity and communication in the ICC elections is inadequate, as potential 
candidates are not been appropriately presented to the public. Additionally, the main media 
do not offer adequate attention to the ICC elections, in contrast with their coverage of the 
national elections. This is further reflected in the comment of one citizen and member of a 
civic association: ―I am not convinced with the way in which the ICC elections are tackled 
by the main national media.‖ [CA-01, Interview: 3 March 2010]. However, the 
representatives from the state pointed out that, since the ICC elections do operate at city 
scale, it is impracticable for the national media to focus on the local agenda, thus on the 
ICC elections. For one state official the local media (i.e. Tehran TV Channel) could play a 
more meaningful role in this regard. Citizens who support this view criticised the existing 
information mechanisms which rely on conventional methods as opposed to comprehensive 





informing mechanisms. One young citizen who has not yet voted in an ICC election said  
 
―Personally in the three periods of the council elections I did not achieve the 
necessary level of understanding and information regarding individuals who 
were nominees in the ICC elections in Tehran.‖ [OC-10, Interview: 3 March 
2010]. 
 
In addition, the interviewed citizens suggested that since Tehran is not comparable with any 
other city in the country in terms of size and population, choosing a candidate based on the 
information provided through conventional methods (i.e. the distribution of candidates‘ 
posters around the city) is impracticable.    
 
With regard to the public‘s high expectations about the ICC, once again the matter of trust 
was suggested as an important factor by almost 20 interviewees. The civic associations‘ 
interviewees referred to how trust could increase citizens‘ respect for the election process. 
Many recommended that enhancing transparency in the ICC and its administrative 
undertakings in the city would also help. According to the citizens, trust in the ICC 
nominees is dependent on the faith given to the candidates‘ promises. One retired public 
sector employee stated that: 
 
         ―In their electoral campaigns, in order to accumulate more votes, candidates offer 
hollow promises based on unachievable and unrealistic pledges.‖ [OC-04, 
Interview: 4 March 2010]. 
 
Similarly, an interviewee in the private sector asserted that ―what the candidates claimed in 
the proceedings of the ICC elections was mostly absurd.‖ [PS- 01, Interview: 8 April 2010] 
According to citizens, experts and civic associations, unfeasible promises which go far 
beyond the ICC‘s capacities and powers, affect public trust and confidence, and function as 
grounds for pejorative opinions of the ICC.    
 





For the civic associations‘ representatives, citizens have not held a positive assessment of 
previous ICCs, particularly in Tehran. Thus the ICC‘s reputation is being challenged by its 
earlier unsatisfactory performances. A senior citizen and a member of a civic association 
supported this view by commenting that ―the lack of trust characterized by the previous 
ICC is a fundamental issue that prevents the public from participating in the ICC elections.‖ 
[CA-05, Interview:  6 March 2010]. 
 
6.2.3 Well-judged and fair selection of candidates 
According to the interview findings, the ICC election procedures are not fully inclusive. 
Concerns over the way in which the monitoring bureau screens the registered candidates for 
the ICC elections were raised by interviewees. In detail, they asked ―to what extent does the 
new form of urban governance include actors and stakeholders from a multiplicity of 
disciplines?‖ For some interviewees monitoring the capability of nominees through a 
political lens is rather risky and excludes a large number of applicants from a range of 
categories. This is further reflected in the comment from a representative from the council:  
―Measuring council election procedures through politicised scrutiny could negatively affect 
ICC objectives and principles‖. [CR-01, Interview: 9 April 2010]. Supporting this view, 
some citizens mentioned the lack of judgement in the selection of candidates for ICC 
elections as a discouraging fact that negatively affects participation in the election. 
According to the urban experts, whilst the ICC and its elections are supposed to represent 
local social networks and interrelationships, the composition of the ICC largely consists of 
political figures, politicising therefore the ICC operations. They mentioned that according 
to article 28 of the ICC regulations, government and legislative bodies are excluded from 
participating in ICC elections. It follows that individuals who are functioning in any 
governmental establishment and organisation, such as employees of a juridical 
establishment, the national media heads and assistants, provincial governors and military 
heads, are not legally allowed to hold a representative position in the ICC. The urban 
experts argue that placing such a requirement in the regulations is supposed to prevent the 
ICC from being converted into a political space. Given that the ICC was designed as a 





social and technical association, if it devotes a significant proportion of its capacity to 
influential political players, then the inclusiveness of the ICC in selecting competent 
candidates may be undermined, leading to the exclusion of some individuals from a range 
of backgrounds and professions. Two citizens who see the ICC as a technical body, 
expressed the unfair view that political figures must be excluded from participating in the 
ICC elections as nominees. However, two urban experts criticised this idea, viewing their 
exclusion as a ―controversial proposal‖ which would undermine the value and meaning of 
governance.  
 
According to the urban experts, employing political actors as influential voices is 
―beneficial‖ for political parties, as political ―motivations‖ and ―inspirations‖ are regarded 
as a foundation for using further political figures. When the interviewees were asked about 
the reasons for making considerable use of political actors, they collectively emphasised 
―electoral results‖. According to an expert and member of a research body:  
                   ―In order to augment their chances, political parties prefer to deploy political 
actors in their electoral campaigns in order to win more seats in the ICC 
election, an effort clearly not aimed at [increasing the quality of] governance 
and participation.‖ [UE-03, Interview: 25 February 2010]. 
The interviewees collectively expressed that the application of monitoring must be fair and 
independent. Thus, the manner of implementation must ensure the validity of monitoring 
tasks whereby rather than submitting to the influence of particular political interests, the 
process must be conducted in the public interest. The importance of impartial selection of 
individuals without discrimination and favouritism was further expressed in the comments 
made by senior urban decision-makers in the municipality. They said that ―to include 
further fresh and eager individuals into the decision-making circle, filtering methods need 
to be re-considered.‖  
Another concern put forward by the interviewees, particularly those representing citizens, 
civic associations and urban experts, is a lack of confidence in the candidates up for 





election. According to their view, some candidates‘ lack of competence for the 
representative position is clear. A young university student who has not been interested in 
voting in the ICC elections said: 
―Frankly I was not convinced of the ability of the candidates who were 
selected by the monitoring board for the final list. The list mainly consists of 
opinionated figures.‖........ ―I am not sure to what extent the nominees are fit 
for the position.‖ [OC-013, Interview:  6 March 2010]. 
In addition, it was emphasised that monitoring mechanisms should be enhanced in order to 
attract more professional actors. This is further reflected in the comment of one member of 
an academic society: 
―In terms of quality and value some representatives are unfit for this level of 
decision-making duties, thus the task is heavy for some of them.‘‘ [UE-05, 
Interview: 7 March 2010]. 
He further added:  
         ―In the first period of the council the arrangements were messy and 
immature, in the second and third periods the council has to some degree 
succeeded in magnetising a number of professionals from various 
disciplines.‖  
         In addition, concerns about an insufficient level of awareness with regard to urban issues 
among the ICC representatives were reflected in the interviews with members of the private 
sector: 
―Practically speaking, the members in charge of the ICC mostly lack 
sufficient understanding, knowledge and experience in urban policy-
making.‖ [PS-02, Interview: 9 April 2010]. 





Similarly, almost 15 urban experts, members of civic associations, municipality and state 
representatives, suggested that the way of assessing the competence of ICC representatives 
must be re-evaluated by the monitoring board. According to their responses, there is a 
strong preference for a mechanism that is based on guidelines and codes instead of narrow 
political interests. This should include the wherewithal to recruit a variety of individuals 
and disciplines for the purposes of election. These interviewees criticised the existing 
criteria, which are based on a number of general competences without more detailed 
requirements. According to their view, since the council handles various technical and legal 
responsibilities in the city and has consequently been confronted with matters from 
different areas of expertise such as transportation, planning, environment and health, there 
is a need for a detailed and comprehensive set of criteria for including more professional 
actors in the council‘s composition. They further argued that this would enhance the 
progress of governance.  
6.2.4 Enhancing the ICC‟s institutional position 
 
The findings in this section mainly reflect the technical and structural limitations of the 
ICC, which were broadly discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 5). Based on the 
interview findings, the ICC‘s legal and technical capability largely contributes to the level 
of electoral participation. In this respect, once again concerns over the ICC‘s ability and 
competence were put forward by the interviewees. What emerged from the data gathered 
suggests that to enhance the level of participation in the ICC elections, the meaning, role, 
influence and weight of the ICC needs to made clearer and perhaps upgraded. According to 
the responses provided by almost 30 participants, the existing deficiencies in the ICC‘s 
governance practices function as a barrier to public participation in the ICC.  As discussed 
in section 6.4.2, while some citizens‘ expectations far exceed the capacity of the ICC, other 
citizens harbour great scepticism with regard to the ICC‘s competence. This is based on the 
suggestion that citizens are not convinced of the competency and capabilities of the ICC in 
solving urban challenges. Citizens, civic associations, private sector and expert 
representatives confirmed the fact that as the ICC has limited weight and power in the city, 
it can present no answer to most concerns raised. A citizen employed in the education 





sector pointed out that: 
 
                  ―With the current arrangements, despite the councillors‘ aptitudes and 
tendencies to respond to the issues, the capacity of the council to deliver 
governance is insufficient.‖ [OC-07, Interview: 7 March 2010]. 
 
This view is further reflected in the comment by an academic expert: 
 
―The absence of effective voice, decision-making influence and weight 
exercised by urban associations and the ICC in particular on key issues in 
the city has an impact on the public‘s expectations. This shapes the public‘s 
beliefs regarding the worth and value of ICC elections.‖ [UE-04, Interview: 
6 March 2010]. 
 
Similar views on the public‘s lack of belief and confidence were supplied by citizen 
interviewees, who were asked to identify the reasons for the lack of engagement. A citizen 
commented ―I am not convinced about the seriousness of the ICC‖. Another citizen stated 
that since the ICC contribution is limited to some immaterial regulation-based functions, its 
meaning has been marginalized in cities and the association‘s credibility has therefore 
suffered: ―I would not like my vote to be wasted on an institution that is mostly 
insignificant across city management procedures‖ said one citizen, which also stressed the 
need to empower the ICC by offering it further responsibilities.  
It was also mentioned by civic association members that the ICC‘s value is undermined by 
the general public because of its inadequacies, given that the public does not respect a body 
with ―partially constrained‖ institutional power. One interviewed member of a civic 
association who works in the environment sector said: ―I am not convinced that the ICC 
affects city governance to a significant degree.‖ [CA-01, Interview: 3 March 2010]. 
Another member of a charity-orientated NGO stated:  
 
―Since Tehran is the centre of political and economic activities [in Iran, in 





that city] and the ICC‘s performance has been marginalised by high level 
decision-making, its independence has largely been destabilised by 
interference. In fact citizens do not view the ICC as a determining and 
influential association and the ICC‘s performance has been overshadowed 
by various higher level organisations.‖  [CA-01, Interview: 3 March 2010]. 
 
In the same way, another doubt expressed by three local councillors concerns the degree of 
effectiveness of the ICC in its contribution to governance. According to their view, since 
the ICC‘s performance has effectively contributed to reducing citizen‘s concerns, the 
public‘s experience about the ICC has induced a degree of scepticism. This view was based 
on the argument that the ICC is a deficient institution in the city, with a more ceremonial 
than practical position. This is because within the existing centralised pattern the ICC has 
not been offered voice in various city issues. Furthermore, because of its limitations the 
ICC is incapable of establishing an effective voice in the city, affecting the public‘s view on 




This chapter discussed and analysed the data collection by the study on voter turnout in the 
ICC elections. On the one hand, the chapter characterises the key issues with regard to 
voter turnout, and on the other hand it provides interviewees with explanations and 
solutions to overcome the existing dearth in voter turnout. It is clear that the urban elections 
on their own are supposed to function as the key tool for the reform, transformation and 
decentralization of responsibilities, tasks and for the diffusion of power to local areas and 
citizens, within the governance transition process. For most civic association, citizen and 
private sector interviewees, urban elections offer a space to include the public in 
governance exercises. Despite introducing a level of representative democracy, the new 
arrangements have failed to fully support participatory governance. What emerged from the 
data gathered through the interviews supports the view that public participation in urban 
elections has been unable to reach a satisfactory level. To address the deficiency in voter 





turnout four key areas were identified:  1- Combining elections; 2- enhancing the public‘s 
awareness and trust in the ICC; 3- a well-judged selection of ICC candidates and 4- 





















Assembly of Experts of the Leadership of Iran  (Majles-e Khobregan or Majles-e Khebregan-e 
Rahbari), also translated as Council of Experts, is a deliberative body of 86 Mujtahids (Islamic 
scholars) that is charged with electing the Supreme Leader of Iran and supervising his activities. 
Members of the assembly are elected from a government-screened list of candidates by direct public 
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7.0 Introduction  
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, to date, Iran has experienced two modes of mayoral 
selection. Prior to the governance shift in 1997, conventional mayoral selection was based 
on a top-down approach through appointment by the State Secretary. In the pre-shift pattern 
the functions and authorities of mayor were also controlled and monitored mainly by the 
central government, and the municipality was considered as a dependent central 
government sub- entity. Following the shift and the ICC Act, code 71, the responsibility for 
selecting the mayor moved to the ICC. In the existing system, the selection and dismissal of 
the mayor is considered to be a key ICC duty. The mayor is selected for a period of four 
years and should not hold the position of an ICC representative. According to this system, 
following the selection of the mayor by the ICC, for the cities with populations greater than 
200,000, the mayor must receive the consent of the Ministry of State. In smaller cities, the 
mayor must receive the consent from the provincial governors.     
Recently, a proposal has been put before parliament, according to which mayors are to be 
selected through an electoral process in cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants. This 
proposal still processing its way through parliament and the way of selecting a mayor as yet 
remains unchanged. This chapter discusses the issues that concern the process of mayoral 
selection by looking at the ways and means through which mayors can be selected. The 
interview findings show a variety of opinions about the most appropriate method for 
selecting a mayor. Interviewees‘ responses are summarised in Table 7-1 and can be 
grouped into the following categories:  
 
1. Selection of Mayor by the State Secretary (Previous Method) 
2. Selection of Mayor by the ICC (Existing Method) 
3. Selection of Mayor through the electoral process and direct public participation 
(Potential Method)  
 





           Table 7.1 Preferences for methods of selecting a Mayor, based on interviewees‟ responses 
Interview Groups Direct Election  ICC Central Government 
Citizens 19 3 3 
Civic Associations 4 1 0 
Private Sector 4 0 1 
Neighbourhood 
Councils 
2 3 0 
City Council 0 5 0 
Urban Experts 4 1 0 
Central 
Government 
2 2 1 
Municipality  5 0 0 
Overall 40 15 5 
 
7.1 Selection of Mayor by the Secretary of State (Pre-shift Method) 
The selection of the mayor by the Secretary of State is the method that was in place prior to 
the shift. It was rejected by 55 interviewees, representing all groups. According to the 
interview findings, this method was bureaucratically involved, centrally managed and 
politicised. In addition, the old method is viewed as a step backwards that undermines 
governance principles and values. Notwithstanding these objections, five respondents 
stressed that the old method had some social benefits. They define the previous method as a 
―solid, integrated and steady‖ form of urban management in which the monitoring process 
and exercises were well established. They further argued that the method offered an 
independent mode of decision-making that excluded interference from external actors.  
Other views in support of the previous method were based on considering the existing 
tensions between the municipality and the ICC. According to two citizens, the conflict 
between the municipality and the ICC has an important impact on the municipality‘s 
performance. It was argued that even the divergences between ICC members negatively 





influenced the quality of governance and supervisory functions in the city. It was argued 
that the process of selecting a mayor following the existing method is time-consuming and 
lengthy. A citizen and employee in public services stated: 
        ―Currently the number of cities that are without a mayor has exceeded 100. 
The average time that each mayor is in municipal office is only one year and 
a few months. This is insufficient for any development to take place.‖ [OC 
014, Interview: 11 April 2010]. 
By contrast, under the previous system where the mayor was selected through the state 
ministry, a city lacking a mayor was a very rare phenomenon, demonstrating the need for 
more certainty and firmness. Another concern expressed by citizens was disagreement 
towards the authorisation of regulations, planning and development agendas, which are 
seen to be affecting the development and construction agenda in the city. 
In a similar way, the financial and fiscal weaknesses that exist in city councils resonated in 
the citizens‘ interviews. The traditional method was ―practically effective and financially 
sufficient‖, asserted a citizen working in a small local business [PS 05, Interview: 12 April 
2010]. According to two citizen and private sector interviewees, under the existing system 
the municipality has been largely independent from central government in terms of drawing 
its financial revenues from taxes and levies. However, the revenues derived in this way 
have been unsteady and uncertain and on many occasions the municipality has faced a 
budget deficit. In addition the state has no obligation to endorse the city‘s agenda. This 
therefore affects the course of development in the city. However, under the preceding 
method where the mayor was appointed by the Ministry of State, the central government 
was committed to fully support the chosen mayor both technically and fiscally. Thus 
financial features were effectively sustained in the city. In contrast and with regard to 
financial issues, the experts emphasised the financial autonomy of the municipality as a 
strength which could uphold the self-sufficiency of local government.  
Surprisingly, four interviewees from the state officials and executives group showed no 
interest and enthusiasm over the previous method where the mayor was selected by the 
central government. Only one of the interviewed state officials from the Council and 





Municipal Office in the Ministry of State supported the conventional method. Interviewees‘ 
support for the former system appeared to be linked to current weaknesses and delays being 
experienced with the implementation of city projects such as the metro, the deficiency in 
municipal accountability, tensions between the municipality and the ICC, and the 
mismanagement of fiscal resources. 
 
7.2 Selection of Mayor through the ICC (existing pattern) 
The selection of the mayor through the ICC (existing pattern) was supported by almost 15 
interviewees, particularly those representing the council associations groups. In general, 
two factors were put forward by the interviewees who support the existing method as 
adequate for the selection of mayor: 1) It has strengthened the position of the ICC and the 
state of accountability in the municipality, and 2) It allows for a proper choice of candidates 
and avoids the politicisation of the municipality. 
 
7.2.1 Strengthened position of the ICC and the state of accountability in the 
municipality 
In contrast to the municipality administrators, none of the official participants from ICC 
associations showed any support regarding the proposal for direct election in the selection 
of a mayor, due to the fact that attention and respect for the ICC‘s voice and decisions is 
thought likely to be diminished via the authorisation of the new proposal. Interviewees 
mainly argued that despite the strengths behind the public voting method for mayoral 
selection, there was a consensus that the implementation of the new proposal would 
negatively affect the ICC‘s function and position as the key symbol of governance shifts in 
Iran. By the same token, the three local councillors suggested that if the duty of appointing 
the mayor were eliminated, the ICC would be at considerable risk of losing some of its 
value. Their view is based on the suggestion that by transferring the duty of electing the 
mayor to the public through the operation of the electoral scheme, ultimately the ICC‘s 
policymaking and monitoring roles would also be removed. This would erode the 





effectiveness and usefulness of the ICC and, according to their view, the organisation 
would be considered to be weak and passive. Two representatives from council institutions 
viewed the scheme as a gradual expunging of the ICC. They argued that any proposal about 
mayoral selection that does not take the ICC‘s role into account would diminish even its 
minor authority and influencing powers. Thus in a future phase the ICC could be 
considered a redundant and meaningless institution.  
Comments from municipality officials mainly criticised the abovementioned view. As 
senior officials from the municipality stated, the function of the ICC cannot be summarised 
in terms of mayoral selection only, and it cannot be assumed that the ICC‘s existence will 
end with the implementation of the direct election method. They unanimously argued that 
the monitoring duty is the main function of the ICC and will remain so even if the electoral 
proposal were to be implemented. By contrast, two interviewed expert and civic association 
representatives suggested that, in constitutional terms, the selection of the mayor is not the 
key duty of the ICC; it nevertheless plays a significant role in shaping and forming the 
ICC‘s other functions. As a result, if the ICC were to lose this role, it is likely that its 
monitoring role would also be undermined, leading to failures of accountability and 
responsiveness in the municipality.  
The issue of monitoring resonated particularly in the interviews with the central 
government officials. Two state official interviewees from the Social Department and the 
Organization of Municipalities confirmed that the only body in the existing structure that is 
able to accurately perform the monitoring tasks associated with urban management and 
administration is the ICC, which through the implementation of the electoral proposal 
would lose its screening capability. According to their view during the previous state of 
administration (pre- 1997) financial concerns were highlighted in the municipality, while 
under the current structure the ICC has adequately succeeded in its financial and fiscal 
monitoring mission, without interfering in political matters. Furthermore it was claimed 
that the state of accountability and transparency in the urban administration would be 
affected due to the weakening of the monitoring capability and capacity of the ICC under 
the direct election method. This was further reflected in the comment of one state official: 





         ―The selection of a mayor through citizens‘ contribution widely relies on the 
public‘s vote and power, instead of the ICC votes, which would put the 
accountability and responsibility of the municipality at risk.‖ [GO 05, 
Interview: 17 April 2010] 
He concluded by stating:  
―The mayor would simply not be answerable to the monitoring bodies due to 
citizens‘ supporting assumptions.‖   
Similar views were echoed by three citizens. According to their view, despite the 
enhancement of participation levels, the proposal would challenge the monitoring concept 
and screening tasks in the city. They argued that the shift would affect the manner in which 
the interactions between the ICC and the municipality have been established, diluting the 
existing transparency and confidence in the municipality. Citizens mentioned the process of 
dismissing the mayor under the existing structure as being accomplished through a certain 
set of procedures by the ICC. However, following a participatory method of removing the 
mayor from office would not be an easy task, even in the case of misconduct.    
 
7.2.2 Proper choice and avoiding the politicisation of the municipality 
For seven interview ees representing council associations, the direct election of the mayor 
may enhance democracy in the first instance, but the method may not assure an apposite 
and fit choice of incumbent for the mayoral post. According to this view, since the selection 
of the mayor is a specialised and focused exercise and not a political practice, it needs to be 
undertaken competently and with expertise. It was suggested that the selection criteria 
would be undermined by insignificant and irrelevant considerations if the direct 
participation method were implemented; thus direct election may result in an 
―inappropriate‖ and ―unsuitable‖ outcome. Their view is based on the suggestion that 
public knowledge and understanding about the competence of potential candidates in large 
cities is limited, making the selection of the mayor a decision-making process that is 
lacking in ―confidence‖ and ―certainty‖.    





However, three urban experts criticised the view that the ―public is incapable‖ of selecting 
a mayor by stating that ―considering the public‘s collective willpower and decision through 
the lens of its deficiencies is very sensitive‖. Furthermore, they suggested that if the public 
is competent to participate in appointing the most significant executive actor in the country 
(i.e. the president), then they should be considered to have the ability and capability of 
electing their own mayors, as well. According to the experts, the public selection of the 
mayor can have a positive influence on the competence and capability of the mayor elected, 
offering a competitive arena, wherein citizens are able to evaluate the appropriateness and 
suitability of candidates and then decide on the best alternative. However, under the 
existing form (selection by the ICC) there is no opportunity for comparing and monitoring 
the suitability of individuals. Thus the ICC bases its selections on its own interests and 
tendencies, rather than using transparent eligibility criteria and measures to single out an 
individual for the position. By setting electoral criteria and conditions for accepting 
mayoral nominees, the process would result in more competent mayors. One member of an 
academic association stated: 
―In the existing system there is no sign of competition or even comparison 
for the selection of mayor, as the ICC selects the mayor according to its own 
advantages and circumstances.‖ [UE 04, Interview: 6 March 2010].          
Supporting the argument a young citizen asserted, ―I think the view that considers the 
public‘s sense and decisions to be reckless is illogical and irrational‖ [OC 08, Interview: 10 
April 2010]. Similarly, two members of civic associations, perhaps somewhat tendentiously 
assuming that a more participatory process could result in more competent mayors, criticise 
the current method because under it, the ICC has to some extent failed to identify 
competent individuals to undertake the mayoral role in a large number of cities, and in 
many cases four to five mayors have been appointed during one period of the ICC.   
A different view that was favoured regarding the ICC‘s existing method of mayoral 
selection was expressed by the participants, including four respondents particularly 
representing the Secretary of State‘s office, citizens and civic association. According to 
their view, the existing method does not undermine public competence. However, because 





of their understanding and knowledge about the credibility of actors, the ICC 
representatives are able to come to a better decision compared with the general public. In 
addition, since the ICC consists of trusted professionals and elites who are aware of the 
aptitudes of potential individuals eligible for the mayoral position, the credibility of their 
decision is ensured. As one of the administrators from the Secretary of State‘s office 
stressed:  
―The ICC‘s performance in appointing the mayor for the city has been 
admirable; thus the ICC committed itself to select the most appropriate option 
for mayoral position, because of their needs for public support.‖ [GO-01, 
Interview:  4 March 2010]. 
Another concern put forward by the eight interviewees representing council associations is 
that the electoral proposal could drive the municipality into a political focus and context. 
Thus, the risk of shifting the significance of the mayor‘s role from a specialised position 
into a political position emerges alongside the introduction of mayoral elections. They 
argued that the electoral proposal goes against the attempts made recently to redefine the 
municipality‘s structure and practices away from politicised approaches. Since the mayoral 
elections and their procedures are likely to be fully politicised in Iran, the risk of forfeiting 
the municipality‘s main core value would be anticipated as a result of the electoral 
approach.   
Supporting this argument, an expert confirmed that mayoral elections are not the only type 
of process esteemed to politicise the system in Iran. According to his view, the 
politicisation of the municipality has already had a negative effect on its ability to attract 
public support as well as trust and confidence. They believe that the municipality is the key 
urban institution and it needs to isolate itself from current political contests. The possible 
politicisation of the municipality following the implementation of the direct election 
scheme was also emphasised by a respondent from the civic associations. He referred to the 
accumulation of political power which may result through the implementation of the new 
proposal that would distance the municipality from its core functions and duties as a social 
focus; and may also exacerbate frictions that exist between the municipality, the ICC and 





central government. He argued that the proposal would engender a challenged and 
competitive space, unfavourable to positive interactions between the state, the ICC and the 
municipality.  
The weakness of the proposed direct election method is that it would not contribute much 
support to the main principles of the existing governance set up. This is identified by the 
interviewees in Table 7.2. 
 













7.3 Selection of Mayor through Direct Election 
According to another tranche of interviewees, an electoral process with direct public 
participation would be the most appropriate method for selecting a mayor. This view was 
supported by 40 interviewees representing experts, civic associations, citizens and 
municipality officials. The reasons underlying their support for this method are: 1) the 
 
 The risk of losing the value and weakening the position of the ICC  
 Failure of accountability and responsiveness in the municipality 
 Number of elections in Iran 
 Respect for the ICC‘s decisions will be decreased due to the authorisation of the new 
proposal 
 Inability of the method to fully support governance values, principals and exercises 
in Iran  (Instead of introducing a new space for representative democracy, there is a 
need to focus on the issue of participatory democracy in city) 
 Questions over the impartiality of the monitoring mechanism throughout electoral 
procedures (Doubts regarding the fairness and trustworthiness of the mechanism for 
selecting potential candidates proposed for the mayoral position) 
 Considering elections in terms of fashionable, rather than practical, issues.  
 The risk of an inapposite and unfit choice compared with the ICC representatives‘ 
selections (with reference to the need for the incumbent of the mayoral post to act 
competently and expertly rather than making general public contributions) 
 The risk of shifting the significance of the mayor‘s role from a specialised position to 
a political position 





promotion of good governance principles and devolution, which was particularly 
recognised by citizens, private sector, civic association and expert interviewees; and 2) the 
need to give more weight to the mayor‘s position, as particularly suggested by the 
municipality officials (see Table 7.3).  
However, the interviewees acknowledged that this approach to selecting the mayor is not 
without its constraints. For ten interviewees, representing experts and civic association 
groups, the details of the current proposal for direct mayoral election are considered as 
deficient and needing to be complemented by supportive measures. In addition, the need to 
implement an impartial and fair mechanism for selecting the potential candidates for the 
mayoral position was emphasised. This is based on the suggestion that similar to the ICC 
electoral process, candidates for the mayoral position with no basis tend to be excluded 
from the process, prompting the need for the nominee selection process to be more  ―fair 
and inclusive‖. One of the urban experts and a member of an academic society expressed 
the following view:  
                  ―If the direct participation of citizens for mayoral election is not accompanied 
by an impartial monitoring mechanism and a sound competitive pattern, the 
participation in the mayoral election will in itself be insufficient.‖ [UE 02, 
Interview: 22 February 2010]. 
Similar views were expressed by civic associations and citizens. Two citizens active in 
civic associations further suggested that the election of a mayor by citizens must not be a 
‗fashionable action towards enhancing governance‘. It should rather be a ‗practical step‘ for 
listening to citizens‘ voices and for facilitating governance processes in the city. A 
university student mentioned that the criteria for accepting or rejecting candidates should be 
―transparent‖ and ―traceable‖, ―clear‖ and ―understandable‖.   
The risk of interference by the central government into urban issues due to its role in 
placing restrictions on the exercise of governance was highlighted in the direct participation 
method by municipality officials. As a municipality executive stated, according to the 
proposal for direct election of the mayor, in any case where the elected mayor must be 
dismissed or discharged, the state secretary would be responsible for appointing an acting 





mayor until the new elections have taken place. This could potentially therefore cause 
central government to place some impediments on urban decision-making. In the 
interviews, such a view was expressed by the expert and legal advisor who argued that, ―in 
the direct participation method after the dismissal of the mayor the secretary of state would 
be held accountable for the appointment of the new mayor‖ [UE 05, Interview: 7 March 
2010]. It was also stressed that by accepting the proposal the interference of the state in 
urban issues would once again be legitimatised. However, interestingly it was suggested by 
a senior official from the municipality that in order to avoid the interference of any third 
party, the mechanism must include the condition that parallel to the election of mayor, his 
deputy be simultaneously elected through direct participation, so that in any case of 


























Experts  limits the influence of political lobbying, as outsiders can play a strong and direct role 
in appointing the mayor 
 
 enhances the level of trust and confidence in mayoral selection 
 
 presents a realistic means of shifting power and responsibilities from the centre to 
society 
 
 can prevent the mayor from being ejected from his post on the basis of political, tactical 
and even ethnic dissimilarities  
 
 offers a competitive arena, where citizens are able to measure the  appropriateness and 




 offers a fresh space for citizens‘ participation 
 
 enhances citizens‘ weight within the wider body of stakeholders in urban governance 
 
 offers a significant and permanent role to the citizens 
 
 enhances the independence and autonomy of the municipality (local government) 
 
 enhances cooperation and interaction between citizens and urban decision-makers 
Citizens   allows citizens‘ voices to be heard and taken into account more visibly 
 
 prolongs and accomplishes the spirit of the first urban governance act (i.e. participation 
in the ICC election) in 1998 
 
 ensures that the public‘s interests are taken into account 
 
 reduces ambiguity and uncertainty with regard to the process of appointing a mayor   
 





 gives greater weight to the position of the mayor, particularly in terms of public 
confidence  
 limits the interference of the ICC into the municipality‘s executive authority. 
 enhances the weight, influence and credibility of the municipality among key 
governance stakeholders 
          
7.3.1 Good governance principles and devolution  
According to the interviewees who supported the direct election of the mayor (i.e. 
representatives of citizens, the private sector, civic associations and expert groups), direct 
public participation must be taken into consideration in order to boost the existing city 





governance machinery in Iran. Their view is based on the suggestion that the mayoral 
election would be the second major practical measure subsequent to the shift in 1997 that 
furthers decentralisation and devolution at city level; it is a measure that can be seen to 
support and complement the first move towards participatory city governance in the form 
of the ICC election.   
The view that mayoral selection through citizen participation could strengthen the value 
and principles of governance was supported by private sector interviewees. They argued 
that the public‘s direct contribution could enhance ―accountability‖ and ―responsiveness‖ in 
the municipality, in contrast to the existing system where the municipality is accountable to 
the ICC. However, in the proposed scheme, wherein the mayor is appointed by the public, 
the municipality might be expected to be more openly and directly accountable to the 
citizens. This is anticipated to bring to bear greater pressure on the mayor to act for the 
benefit of the public.    
In the same way, the electoral process offers the opportunity to affect the way in which 
power is distributed in the city. According to the civic associations, this participative 
approach not only enhances the responsiveness of the municipality, but it also promotes the 
weight of citizens‘ role within the wider group of urban stakeholders. One member of a 
civic association commented:  
        ―The public‘s position in the main body of the stakeholders is insignificant within 
the recent decision-making pattern. By changing the manner of mayoral selection, 
the citizens‘ will power and capacity will be considered as the key dynamic in the 
city; thus this proposal would offer an influential and permanent role to the 
citizens.‖  [CA 02, Interview: 25 February 2010]. 
Another member of the civic association group argued that this may help citizens to be 
heard and taken into account within the decision-making machinery.   
A total of 19 citizens unanimously agreed that they wished to have the right to select the 
mayor. It was argued that the appointment of the mayor by the ICC did not underwrite the 
public‘s rights. According to five interviewed citizens, as citizens have only limited 





influence over appointing the mayor through the ICC, the manner in which the mayor is 
selected does not guarantee that citizens‘ interests will be taken into account. In addition, 
the selection of mayor through the ICC seems likely to respond to the influence of political 
or other privileged interests, as opposed to public interests. A graduate student criticised the 
current scheme by stating that although the import of citizens‘ views is taken into account 
in the input phase of the current mayoral selection method, citizens are excluded from both 
the process and outcome phases. He thus implies that citizens make no contribution to the 
procedures and results of the mayoral selection process within the ICC. According to the 
citizens interviewed, the way in which the mayor has been selected by the ICC is not 
inclusive and does not ensure equality. However, they believe that the direct voting system 
designed for the selection of mayor will be devoid of favouritism and discrimination 
regarding disadvantaged and marginalised people, and that all socio-economic groups will 
be offered an equal opportunity to engage in the task.   
For citizens, a direct public contribution to the selection of a mayor would be a useful tool 
for limiting the over-politicised and partial decision-making in the ICC. A representative 
from the citizens group working in the education sector asserted that: 
        ―Regardless of the strengths of the individual selected for the mayoral post, in 
all three periods that the ICC appointed figures to the mayoral position, 
decisions were commonly politicised, even where the technical competences 
of the individual in question were taken into account.‖ [OC 012, Interview: 
13 April 2010]. 
Similarly, four experts confirmed that under the existing system, political lobbies and 
outsiders play a major role in appointing the mayor. They go on to suggest that the existing 
method may play a role in inhibiting trust in the process of mayoral selection. For experts 
and citizens, one of the advantages expected from the electoral method is the enhancement 
of the level of trust and confidence in the selection of a mayor. One expert observed that: 
 ―There is no doubt over-confidence in the majority of ICC members. 
However, the ICC should accept the fact that the processes and 





circumstances of selection of the mayor are ambiguous and unclear for the 
general public.‖ [UE 03, Interview: 01: 5 March 2010].  
A similar comment was made by a pensioner from the citizen stakeholders group, stating: 
―I have participated in three ICC elections; however, I am not aware of and 
convinced by the procedures and circumstances that lead to the decision on 
the mayoral position.‖ [OC, 015, Interview: 13 April 2010]. 
He further stated that since the process is not transparent and comprehensible 
for citizens, it is thus exploited by political groups and lobbies.    
In similar accounts, the majority (three) of officials from the state department suggested 
that the electoral method is good and would enhance participation as the key constituent of 
governance, along with supporting the democracy at the city level. However, two 
representatives from the state offices were sceptical towards the electoral method for the 
selection of mayor. Thus, there were discrepancies among views particularly those held by 
the state interviewees. One government official from the Organization of Municipalities 
and Rural Administration (O.M.R.A.) commented: 
―Participation in mayoral elections will not automatically lead to enhanced 
governance in the city. In spite of experiencing participation in ICC elections 
for almost a decade, I do not personally believe that electoral participation 
constructively affects the manner in which the city is being governed. Instead of 
introducing a new space for representative democracy, there is a need to focus 
on the issue of participatory democracy in the city through neighbourhood 
councils and CBOs.‖ [GO, 02, Interview: 28 February 2010].  
Another concern put forward by two state representatives is the number of elections in Iran. 
According to their view, the excessive number of elections fulfilling different purposes in 
Iran (i.e. presidential, parliamentary, Assembly of Experts of the Leadership and ICC) – 
coming to 30 elections in 30 years − have inflicted deleterious consequences on the 
country. Elections impose substantial expenses on the nation. One state official commented 
that ―the number of elections is absolutely soaring in Iran. Thus I believe the expenses and 





tensions have exhausted the society and it is suffering from the electoral process‖ [GO-01, 
Interview: 4 March 2010]. 
As discussed earlier, prior to the implementation of the electoral method, certain supportive 
adaptations would be required. According to state officials the need for structural 
preparation and legislative reform both within the ICC and the municipality, based on the 
government and parliament interaction model, would need to be taken into consideration in 
relation to the implementation of the electoral method. They suggested that, similar to the 
apportionment of roles between central government and parliament whereby the latter is 
responsible for approval and dismissal of key officers in the executive, if the mayor were to 
be elected through direct participation, the approval and dismissal of his deputies and key 
administrators would need to be handled by the ICC.   
 
7.3.2 Enhancement of the mayoral position  
All of the interviewed municipality senior officials preferred the mayor to be elected by 
citizens instead of being selected by the councillors. Meanwhile, interviewees from the 
citizens, civic association, private sector and expert groups also supported mayoral 
selection through the electoral system as a realistic measure in shifting power and 
responsibilities from elected elites to wider society. For municipality executives, the issue 
of uncertainty and lack of confidence regarding mayors under the existing system was a 
significant factor in considering the electoral method as the most appropriate means. It was 
argued by municipality officials that the selection of mayor via the ICC can have a negative 
influence on the mayor‘s performance, and might be a factor in the dismissal of the mayors. 
This lack of trust is said to affect the process of administration, planning and development 
in cities. According to their view the fear of being removed from office by the ICC made 
the mayoral position ―unsteady‖ and ―trembling‖; thus making mayors less effective and 
efficient actors in the existing format. Furthermore the ICC‘s monitoring role with regard to 
the municipality means the imposition of certain policies and procedures on the latter, 
based on forces and pressures from inside and outside the ICC. One municipality director 
commented, in support of the electoral proposal, that the election of the mayor through 





direct participation would reduce the lack of trust in the municipality‘s key decision-
makers. Thus the mayor, his deputies and key urban decision-makers will encounter a 
better sense of ―security in the role‖ and a more ―consistent‖ reception in delivering 
governance tasks.  
In the same way, according to two expert interviewees, the issue of dismissing mayors 
because of ―disagreement‖ and ―disparity‖ between the ICC and the municipality is a 
widespread concern. The majority of experts believe that in many cases the perception that 
mayors can be dismissed on the basis of ―political‖, ―tactical‖ and even ―ethnic‖ 
dissimilarities, rather than on purely ―practical‖ and ―technical‖ grounds, detracts from the 
value of the ICC being the body that chooses the mayor. By implementing the direct 
election proposal, the mayor could not be removed without any convincing reason. It was 
also suggested that the responsibility for the mayor‘s dismissal needs to be shifted to the 
Resolution Council. As a third party it can secure the mayoral position on the one hand and 
avoid claims that no valid principles underlay a dismissal on the other hand.  
In the same way the issue of the ICC‘s interference in the municipality‘s legal and 
institutional framework was stressed by the respondents who were in favour of a direct 
election scheme. For instance, two senior officials from the municipality referred to the risk 
of converting the ICC‘s legal oversight role into a source of interfering behaviour. For 
example, it was argued that the interference of the ICC into the municipality‘s executive 
functions and interfering in the dismissal and appointment of the city executives (i.e. 
mayor‘s deputies and city directors) within municipalities is a common issue within the 
existing system.  
According to two representatives of civic associations the idea behind the new proposal is 
not merely about limiting the interference of the ICC into the municipality‘s internal 
affairs; it is also about enhancing the independence of the municipality. They argued that 
since the municipality depends on the ICC for many issues, the ICC regularly interferes in 
the municipality‘s internal affairs under the current structure, a pattern of interactions that 
complicates the issue of the municipality‘s autonomy. The electoral method would 
therefore support organisational sovereignty and autonomy in the municipality. Similarly, it 





was highlighted by municipality officials that the weight of the municipality among key 
governance stakeholders would be enhanced through implementation of the new scheme. 
For municipality representatives, the municipality has insufficient institutional power to 
implement its policies and strategies under the existing system. However, public 
participation in electing its mayor could offer more weight, credit and influence to the 
municipality, thus resulting in a better balance of power in favour of the municipality in the 
cases of disagreement between the municipality and the ICC or the central government. As 
a senior member of the municipality stated:  
―Generally people‘s votes in Iran extensively offer a sort of credibility and 
weight to the elected organisation body and to the individual who leads the 
machinery. The citizens‘ willpower provides bargaining and negotiation 
power to the municipality in any situations where it is challenged.‖ [ME 05, 
Interview: 16 March 2010]. 
It was also highlighted by interviewees representing the civic associations and citizens 
groups that the relationships between citizens and urban executives would be enhanced if 
the mayor were selected through the direct participation method. A member of the NGO 
group mentioned that this could result in municipal decisions being more respected and 
valued by citizens. Given that the mayor‘s power and authority would be accredited by the 
public, it could also result in enhanced responsiveness in the municipality. Similarly, two 
members of the civic association group asserted that the mayoral election will distinguish 
and promote interaction between citizens and urban decision-makers and executives, which 
could in turn build cooperation and partnership. 
In the same way the experts suggested that the citizens‘ responsibility and trust could be 
promoted in relation to the municipality and mayor, enhancing further cooperation between 
citizens and urban decision-making. Under the current system, the ICC election is regarded 
as the only space for public contributions to urban governance. Accordingly, the public 
have been largely isolated from the urban decision-making process. Moreover, it was 
suggested that the scheme could prevent further social segregation, exclusion and 





distancing of citizens from urban decision-making processes because their power would 
have to be taken into consideration in the appointment of the most important post in the city  
Two experts who agreed with the direct election proposal spoke about the contradictions 
that exist within the ICC‘s responsibilities. They referred to the fact that while the ICC has 
been functioning as a legislator and policy-maker, it has also been delivering monitoring. 
Through direct participation for mayoral selection, the ICC would remain the primary 
entity of scrutiny in the city, but its policymaking duties would be shifted fully to the 
municipality. According to the experts, under the system currently in place, the ICC‘s 
capacity and authority is wasted and overshadowed because it is overwhelmed by issues of 
mayoral selection, while actually the ICC‘s powers should be focused on key guidelines 
with the purpose of fostering development and planning agendas in the city. Despite this, 
the ICC‘s capacity and authority has been overused on the subject of its mayoral 
assignment. As an expert respondent from an academic society pointed out: 
         ―The selection of the mayor has been overemphasised in the ICC; as such, 
some councillors assume that the selection is the only obligation and duty 
that should be addressed by the ICC.‖ [UE 03, Interview: 25 February 2010]. 
He further commented that it might be problematic to engage the ICC further in monitoring, 
policy-making exercises and city development agendas and also held that the duty of 
mayoral selection should be transferred to the citizens.      
 
7.4 Conclusion   
What is remarkable to consider from the mayoral selection debates is that the majority of 
interviewees, particularly the citizens, civic associations and urban experts, were optimistic 
and encouraging about the direct election method and assumed that this would contribute to 
public confidence in the urban governance process. The mayoral election provides ways 
and means for democracy and decentralisation to take place. It was argued that these 
advantages can be exercised for the benefit of urban governance. They would overcome 





many of the trust and confidence related challenges that have arisen through the previous 
and current methods of mayoral selection. Similarly, it would help to enhance the mayor‘s 
status and weight compared with key stakeholders, therefore the urban machinery would 
speed up through the implementation of the proposal. The ICC frequently takes an 
interfering role with regard to the municipality‘s missions. This compromises the 
independence of the municipality. The proposal would thus shore up the municipality‘s 
autonomy. However, as mentioned in section 7.2.1, the implementation of the proposal 
could also diminish the power of the ICC, raising issues about accountability.  
According to the current system, the municipality is committed to being liable and 
accountable to the ICC and the public. However, by transferring the selection of the mayor 
from the ICC to the direct electoral method, it is hard to believe that the municipality 
remains to the same extent an accountable institution regarding its decisions. The 
implementation of mayoral selection through the electoral method must therefore include 
and redefine a full account of the ICC as a complementary space for participation and 
accountability. It must be noted that the ICC has been handling the task of monitoring and 
supervising the municipality; thus any proposal with regard to direct election of the mayor 
must take into consideration the monitoring, accountability and transparency issues that are 
associated with the declining position of the ICC.               
In general two difficulties with regard to the selection of the mayor through an electoral 
process were raised. These included the possibility that citizen‘s choice of mayor might be 
inappropriate compared with the mayor selected through the ICC; and the politicisation of 
the municipality following direct participation. It was argued that since the selection of the 
mayor is a specialised task, rather than a political exercise, citizens may fail to select the 
right individual. In the existing method the ICC, which consists of a number of professional 
elected actors, will thus to some extent assure the suitability of the person chosen for the 
mayoral position. Also it was argued that the elections and their circumstances could 
convert the municipality from a social actor into a politicised node, thus removing it from 
its core values and guidelines. Finally, the selection of the mayor by the Ministry of the 
Interior (previous method) was not supported by the majority of interviewees. The method 
was considered centralised, top-down and against good governance principles.       
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8.0 Introduction  
 
In 1999, following the governance shift and the inception of the ICC, the necessity of 
forming a mechanism for participation at the lower (neighbourhood) level was appreciated 
by decision-makers. Based on this, the machinery of governance committed itself to 
launching Neighbourhood Council institutions (Anjomanhaye Showrayari Mahallat), also 
known as Public forums. Their aim is to function as the primary level of urban decision 
making in Iran; they are conceived as non-governmental institutions that are decentralised, 
apolitical, participatory and voluntary. According to Article 71 of the Islamic City Councils 
Act, October 1999, the implementation of public forums as a dynamic space for local 
citizens‘ interactions in Tehran was authorised by the ICC and was followed by the first 
neighbourhood elections in 2000, which appointed Public forum representatives.  
Similar to the Neighbourhood Council (public forums), Civic associations would 
potentially be considered as a dynamic mechanism for public participation and for 
developing interrelationships between citizens and the state. Despite the soaring growth of 
Civic Associations and non-governmental organizations in Iran since the 1990s, their 
effectiveness and efficacy in terms of participation has not been assured (Saidi, 2003). 
Related to this, Civic Associations have been faced with a number of structural and 
organizational issues which will be discussed in this chapter. More in detail, this chapter 
discusses the existing circumstances of Public forums and Civic Associations, based on 
responses provided by the study‘s interviewees. The findings are structured into the 
following two main categories: Neighbourhood Councils; and Civic Associations. Then 
strengths and weaknesses of each category are discussed.   
8.1) Neighbourhood Councils  
 
8.1.1. Strengths and benefits of Neighbourhood Councils: this section presents 
governance outputs, including the service management and advisory support 
associated with Neighbourhood Councils.  





8.1.2. Weaknesses and barriers in Neighbourhood Councils: this section illustrates 
the technical and institutional barriers that Neighbourhood Councils have been faced 
with, including the nature of the relationship between forums and higher level urban 
stakeholders;  
 
8.2) Civic Associations 
 
8.2.1. Strengths and benefits of Civic Associations: this section illustrates governance 
outputs, including participatory governance and enhanced social capital  
 
8.2.2. Weakness and barriers in Civic Associations: this section presents the central 
administration‘s attitudes towards Civic Associations, as well as the internal/technical 
issues that the existing Civic Associations have been faced with.   
 
 
8.1 Neighbourhood Councils (Public Forums) 
8.1.1 Strengths and Benefits of Neighbourhood Councils (public forums) 
Overall, 40 interviewees spread across different stakeholder groups demonstrated an 
overwhelming interest in the establishment of Neighbourhood Councils. They view 
Neighbourhood Councils as mechanisms that are capable of developing participatory city 
governance. From their perspective the single systematic space for public forums that 
Neighbourhood Councils provide is a tool that successfully supports citizens‘ involvement 
and contributions. In general, the interview findings indicate that Neighbourhood Councils 
have constructive impacts in two areas: 1) the enhancement of governance values and 
principals; and 2) the enhancement of policy-making and services. Table 8.1 summarises 
the strengths and benefits of the existing Neighbourhood Councils, based on the interview 
responses.   
 
 





 Table 8.1 Strengths and benefits of Neighbourhood Councils 
Groups Views 
Experts  
     Enhances good governance conduct and standards 
 
 Strengthens social capital by practising democracy, enhancing citizenship 
values,     and by learning to elect and being elected 
 
     Transforms passive forms of citizenry into active forms of citizenry 
  
 Supports the prioritisation of local projects and agendas consistent with local  





 Offers citizens opportunities to express their views 
 
 Offers an opportunity to assess and criticize the neighbourhood agenda in a                        
legitimate manner 
 
 Provides opportunities and possibilities for electing and being elected at the 
local level  
 
 Positively enhances trust and confidence among citizens 
 
 Accelerates and simplifies servicing in neighbourhoods‘ 
 
 Reduces bureaucratic barriers facing neighbourhood projects, through, for 




     Provides a fresh space of electoral participation and interaction 
 
 Enhances inclusiveness and collectiveness in the process of nominee 
selection,   by  avoiding  discrimination and partiality towards women; the 
disabled; disadvantaged and ethnic minorities 
 




 Generates a deep sense of citizen empowerment, as the urban decision-
making  tasks are no longer in the hands of urban elites and influential actors 
 
 Enhances the approval and recognition of decisions made in neighbourhoods 
by  the urban machinery  
 
          Helps reduce inaccuracies and errors in policy-making and servicing of 
neighbourhoods 
 
Municipality   Affects the way in which information is disseminated among local citizens,  
given  that  neighbourhood representatives are members of the Public forums 
 
 Exercises professional  competence and capacity in city matters without costs 
and complexities 
 
     Supports the policy-making agenda and fosters dialogues at local level 





Enhancement of governance values and principals  
There was a unanimous agreement among 25 citizens forming the citizen group of 
stakeholders on the establishment of the Neighbourhood Councils as a fitting mechanism 
for the public to express robust opinions and communicate with decision-makers in a timely 
manner. Moreover, they saw it as a mechanism for emphasising ―localisation‖ and ―local 
decision-making‖. It is on this basis that Neighbourhood Councils are considered to have 
been able to shift the manner of handling urban issues from an existing top-down approach 
to a bottom-up approach.  
 
          Supporting the citizens‘ views, seven interviewees representing municipality and state 
officials suggested that the forums have been welcomed by the majority of local residents. 
In particular, they referred to the Neighbourhood Council‘s elections, where public 
participation has recently been found to have improved in comparison to the first and 
second periods. According to their view, this demonstrates that citizens‘ expectations and 
attitudes towards the forums have to some extent been met. By contrast, the interviewed 
urban experts criticised the manner by which the effectiveness of public forums is assessed 
through electoral measures. They unanimously viewed public forums as a form of support 
for (direct) participatory governance, rather than a form of representational democracy. 
They further recommended that when attempting to measure the effectiveness of public 
forums, the interactions and communications that citizens engage in through the forums 
must be taken fully into account. 
  
Overall ten interviewees, representing in particular the experts group, suggested that 
―good‖ public forums should support the ―good governance code‖ and ―standards‖, and aim 
to strengthen the values and ideals of urban governance. According to one member of the 
expert group, ―every citizen has equal rights to be involved in public forums and everyone 
should be heard in local forums‖ [UE-03, Interview: 25 February 2010]. In the same way, 
public forums must be inclusive and devoid of any bias which might affect the ―equal 
opportunity‖ of every resident at neighbourhood level to be involved in the forum. When 
the citizens group were asked to explain the matter of inclusion in practical terms, their 





responses confirmed the importance of a state of openness and availability in 
Neighbourhood Councils. They indicated that the availability of council meetings is 
broadly convenient for citizens. Additionally, the possibility of being selected as a nominee 
in the Neighbourhood Council‘s elections also was substantiated by 22 of the interviewed 
citizens. The interviewed officials from the Secretary of State‘s office stated that one of the 
major strengths of Neighbourhood Councils is the fact that their members are elected 
through a system of direct participation, whereby representatives of the forums are 
nominated by public vote. As far as state officials are concerned this method is devoid of 
any discrimination and partiality towards women, the disabled, the disadvantaged and 
ethnic minority groups.    
Within the context of participatory governance, the devolution and distribution of power 
came up in interviews with six citizens and Civic Association members. It was suggested 
that through the development of the Council, power and authority was to some extent 
disseminated across the local level, generating a sense of empowerment in citizens. This 
could occur because the urban supervisory tasks would no longer be in the hands of urban 
elites and influential actors, but in those of ordinary individuals from diverse socio-
economic backgrounds. Furthermore, through the forums, citizens at the lowest possible 
level of the social hierarchy can be voluntarily involved in advisory and dialogue processes.  
Similarly, ten interviewees representing citizens and Civic Associations suggested that 
levels of trust and confidence among citizens had been affected positively throughout the 
Neighbourhood Councils‘ implementation. Their view was based on the suggestion that 
neighbourhood forums consisting of neighbourhood designated representatives who are to a 
certain extent involved in urban supervisory tasks can potentially strengthen the confidence 
and trust experienced by the local residents. One member of a Civic Association 
commented:  
―When decision-makers take into consideration the Neighbourhood Council, 
the approval and recognition of decisions in neighbourhoods made by the 
urban machinery is enhanced among local residents.‖ [CA-03, Interview: 21 
February 2010]. 





In the same way it was suggested by two municipality representatives that the degree of 
transparency and accountability has been improved through forums. According to 
municipality officials and in their capacity as members of the Neighbourhood Council, 
neighbourhood representatives can affect the way in which information is disseminated 
among local citizens. They believe that the circumstances in which urban decision-making 
proceeds also become more explicable to the public, enhancing therefore the state of 
transparency through securing procedural openness. Supporting this and making reference 
to issues of accountability, an official member of the municipality asserted: 
―On one hand public forum representatives (Neighbourhood Councillors) are 
assiduously involved in the city administrative exercises, and on the other 
hand, higher level urban administrators are commonly available and 
accessible for the forum representatives. This suggests that the level of 
accountability has to some extent been improved at local level.‖   [ME-01, 
Interview: 1 February 2010].                            
The point about strengthening social capital was also recognised by six interviewees, in 
particular those representing the urban experts group. For three representatives of this 
group, public forums are the most effective and appropriate way to support social 
interrelationships and interactions at the local level. Their view is based on the suggestion 
that through public forums, democracy can be practiced; and ordinary citizens can learn 
how to elect and be elected. Forums also have the potential to transform citizenship from a 
passive into an active and dynamic form. According to this view, to a certain extent, forums 
place the responsibility for tackling neighbourhood affairs in the hands of local residents. 
This results in citizens‘ collective wishes not being routinely determined at a distance from 
the actual decision-makers. The value of citizenship is therefore defined through the 
dynamic participatory and localized mechanisms within public forums, developing a sense 
of responsibility and liability amongst citizens, which includes the capacity to monitor local 
affairs. 
In addition, three officials from the municipality suggested that as the scope of the issues 
that urban decision-makers in Tehran have been faced with is substantial, there is a need for 





local citizens‘ capacities and competencies to be fully exercised across various agendas. 
From the municipality executives‘ point of view, public forums have these absorptive 
capacities. This is further reflected in the comment made by one municipality senior 
executive:  
―If human resource management is delivered effectively in the local forums, 
then the capacity and advantage of Neighbourhood Council representatives 
who are commonly considered as local elites would routinely be exercised 
throughout the urban machinery without costs and complexities.‖[ME-04, 
Interview: 11 March 2010]. 
Services management and policy-making   
Throughout the interviews, when citizens were asked to spell out the forums‘ effects and 
influences on their neighbourhoods, their responses connected more with the level of ―local 
services management‖ and ―local basics‖, rather than with policy-making. According to 
their perspective, institutions address citizens‘ demands in local service sectors and attempt 
to enhance civic services both qualitatively and quantitatively. In support of this, almost 20 
citizens confirmed an enhanced delivery of neighbourhood services through public forums. 
In their view, the ―acceleration‖ and simplification of services in their neighbourhoods 
demonstrated the advantages of public forums. They referred to services that increase the 
quality of living conditions and consequently diminish problematic neighbourhood issues 
such as traffic concerns. In one remark, a senior citizen said: ―honestly, the public forums‘ 
effects on local issues are considerable; to some degree they reduce barriers and concerns in 
the neighbourhoods‖ [OC-011, Interview 10 April]. In addition, public forums support 
connections and interactions between different organisations, including the central and 
local entities that function in neighbourhoods to promote servicing tasks. 
According to ten representatives, representing urban experts and municipality officials, 
alongside services support, public forums have been supportive of the policy-making 
process and facilitated dialogue in the city. Their view is based on the suggestion that the 
main roles of the public forum are first to ―identify‖ and ―monitor‖ neighbourhood issues, 
and second to bring about ―consultation‖ and ―collaboration‖ with the local authority to 





address the neighbourhood issues. On this basis, they suggest that the forums are likely to 
support the ―prioritisation‖ of neighbourhood projects, as their agenda is consistent with 
local residents‘ perceptions on neighbourhood issues. This is further reflected in the 
comment of one urban expert: 
        ―The remarks, dialogues, comments and even criticisms made by local citizens 
are exercised through public forums as the prioritized agenda designed for 
neighbourhood development.‖ [UE-01, Interview: 5 March 2010]. 
In addition, since the nature of the challenges and concerns that each neighbourhood has 
been faced with are different in various municipal districts, there is a need to act locally. 
According to the experts, transferring local demands and requests − including those of 
residents and of the private sector − to higher level decision-makers through systematic 
surveying has been enhanced through the public forums.  
In the same way, it was suggested by three Civic Association interviewees that inaccuracies 
and imprecision in policy-making largely reflect the ―dominance of top-down‖ approaches 
in the contemporary urban decision-making machinery. However, public forums have the 
potential capacity to reduce existing policymaking and servicing faults in neighbourhoods 
by enhancing localism. According to these interviewees, development and planning 
agendas treated through public forums should be based on local needs and priorities. Thus, 
since forum members are long-term residents of their constituencies and are involved on a 
daily basis with neighbourhood issues and affairs, their capability and awareness regarding 
the barriers that exist is superior to any top-down administrative views.  
According to four citizens and private sector interviewees, involving local citizens in urban 
decision-making through public forums can to some extent support a more direct delivery 
of local agendas and a reduction of ―bureaucracy‖. Their view is based on the suggestion 
that local issues and problems are reflected directly by forum members to the ICC and to 
the municipality without intervening bureaucratic barriers. They referred to the period prior 
to the establishment of public forums when it was unlikely that citizens‘ views on local 
issues would be heard by urban authorities without engaging in complex processes. Yet 
with public forums, citizens‘ voices can be heard in a ―legitimate‖ and ―authorized‖ 





manner. In effect, based on the findings, local residents appreciate the public forums‘ 
ability to offer opportunities to access decision-making hierarchies, a chance to participate 
in local dialogues, and to assess and criticize the neighbourhood agenda.  
Two interviewees from the state officials groups suggested that ―local‖ and ―spatial 
inequality‖ would be reduced by the augmentation of localism. In their view, direct public 
contributions to local affairs foster a degree of localization in which local services are 
shaped and ordered according to local needs and requests. This is based on the suggestion 
that Neighbourhood Councils provide equal influence and voice to each neighbourhood, 
enhancing fairness and equity in the distribution of wealth and resources.  
8.1.2 Limitations and Barriers of Neighbourhood Councils (public forums) 
Similar to the ICC (see Chapter Five), ―legislative‖ and ―technical‖ limitations were 
considered the main barriers affecting the effectiveness of public forums. According to the 
interview results, the functions of public forums are overshadowed by the existing 
governance structures, and the driving force of governance must therefore aim to address 
the barriers associated with forums in a proactive way. The limitations and barriers in the 
public forums are further summarised in Table 8.2 and presented in terms of stakeholder 















Table 8.2 Limitations and Barriers of Neighbourhood Councils 
Groups Views 
Citizens  Narrow level of citizen awareness with regard to public forums 
  
 Risk of converting public forums to small neighbourhood level administration 
centres 
 
 Insufficient criteria through which public forum candidates gain consent for their 
position as representatives 
Public 
forums 
 Dealings with public forums are devoid of coordination and correlation between 
various levels of urban machinery 
 Higher level decision-makers fail to recognize forums as co-operators and 
advisors in local matters  
 The relationships and communications between forums and key urban decision-
makers are devoid of any regularized and legitimated pattern 
Experts  Absence of an integrated and collective mechanism for dealing with forums with 
reference to policy-making, strategies and guidelines 
 
 Indecisive and unsecure position of public forums in the country‘s consultative 
landscape  
 





 Uncertainty and unwillingness among decision-makers in dealing with public 
forums 
 
 Lack of understanding and knowledge with regards to contemporary issues in the 
city among forum members 
 
Institutional Limitations 
What emerged from the interview data suggests that interactions with public forums are 
devoid of coordination and correlation between the various spheres of urban decision-
making. According to three experts, this underlines the absence of an integrated motivation 
in terms of strategies and guidelines. The extent to which public forums are appreciated by 
governance stakeholders varies. This reflects the insufficient credibility and legitimacy of 
public forums. To clarify this point, forum representatives indicate that since the majority 
of local services are outside the influence of the municipality and of the ICC, service 
operators and decision-makers do not have adequate interactions with public forums. It was 
mentioned that electricity, gas and water corporations, which are under the authority of the 





state, do not cooperate and coordinate well with forums in dealing with neighbourhood 
concerns. This is further reflected in the comment of one forum representative:  
Many organisations do not acknowledge forums as a co-operator or advisor 
in local matters and on most occasions when they are asked to give an 
explanation about local concerns, they commonly produce reluctant and 
reckless responses to the forum‘s requests. [LC-02, interview: 30 Feb 2010]. 
Four Civic Association and private sector interviewees noted the dominance of 
centralisation as an obstacle for urban machinery that translates into a threat for local 
forums. According to their view, despite the implementation of urban (ICC) and local 
(public forum) mechanisms, the dominant tendency in decision-making structures is formed 
around centralised norms and strategies. For the Civic Association and private sector 
interviewees, the implementation of local forums has to some extent been faced with the 
―lack of a convinced attitude‖ toward these institutions, exhibited in ―uncertainty‖ and 
―unwillingness‖ among decision-makers.  
Another concern expressed by seven interviewees, particularly the public forum group, was 
the unsteady manner in which local forums‘ key urban stakeholders (i.e. the ICC and 
Municipality) take them into account. According to three forum representatives, many local 
decisions are established without considering the public forum‘s advisory role. They refer 
to the public transportation pricing agenda as a case in point, where the ICC and the 
municipality simply paid no attention to the views of the public forum and established a 
pricing agenda without taking the forums‘ voices into account. This affects the value and 
accountability of Forums in response to local citizens. Forum members asserted that 
relationships and communications between the forums and key urban decision-makers are 
devoid of any regularized and legitimated pattern. For example, they argue that at most 
meetings, instead of attendance by senior municipality and ICC decision-makers, a number 
of experts and less significant figures (in terms of their hierarchical position) are delegated 
to attend. According to the forum representatives, this shows that forums have not been 
tested by key urban actors as a sound mechanism for neighbourhood participatory 
governance. Supporting the argument, two urban experts pointed out that since the forums 





have not been recognized as established bodies in the urban hierarchical structure, some 
organisations have not accredited the correspondences, communications and demands made 
by the forums.  
According to responses provided by the experts, citizens, Civic Associations and forum 
representatives, despite achievements in the ―identification‖ of neighbourhood concerns 
and in part, ―consultation‖ with decision-makers, the public forums are unable to 
constructively collaborate and associate with local authorities. Within this context, 
according to the urban experts, in its existing configuration the forum is not a ―well-defined 
and standardized‖ consultative body, therefore it rarely has a significant influence on 
policy-making. Moreover, the interactions and dialogues between public forums and higher 
level stakeholders have not yet been effectively established; thus public forums are 
principally excluded from contributions to the policy-making agenda. Urban experts have 
argued that senior urban authorities prefer views and decisions to be imparted by their own 
centralised consultative figures, rather than by local citizens.     
The insignificance of the forum‘s position in the urban hierarchical structure was 
particularly represented in the responses of four interviewees from the Civic Association 
and the experts groups. According to their view, not only do the Forum representatives 
have no voice and influence to amend decision-making that concerns their regional and 
local municipal position, but, in most cases, they are also unaware of local administrative 
changes taking place in their constituency. It was suggested that a prospective role which 
could be given to forums to empower local voices might include the contribution of the 
forum‘s representatives in the selection of local and regional administrative figures. This is 
further reflected in a comment by a member of a Civic Association: ―Public forum 
representatives must be involved and their voice must be heard in the process of appointing 
the districts‘ and regions‘ mayors.‖[CA-05, Interview:  6 March 2010]. 
Technical Limitations  
What emerged from the interviewees‘ views, particularly those representing experts and 
Civic Associations, supported the idea that despite being in place for a decade, public 
forums have not translated into a significant participation space. They confirmed citizens‘ 





involvement and input into forums as being ―dissatisfying‖. When less enthusiastic citizens 
were asked to discern the basis that negatively affects their view of public forums, their 
responses appeared to be linked to the public forums‘ efficiency. This is further reflected in 
the comment made by one citizen: ―personally I have no interest in participation in Local 
Forums since I think my contributions are a waste of time.‖ [OC- 018, Interview: 11 April 
2010]. According to the five citizens who were not interested in any communications with 
the public forums, participation would have no influence on local circumstances due to the 
fact that decision-making in the neighbourhood was formulated beyond the local level and 
out of local residents‘ power.  
Since forums function locally at the neighbourhood scale, it was expected that citizens will 
have attained an acceptable level of understanding and awareness about them. However, 
when compared with their understanding regarding the ICC, their awareness about public 
forums seemed to be somewhat narrow. For 15 citizens and private sector interviewees, 
their awareness about public forums was summarized in their knowledge of the existence of 
forums in their neighbourhoods. One of the citizens working in a small business stated 
―Personally I am not aware about what is going on in my local forums and I am uninformed 
of the agendas and programmes that are scheduled at my local forum.‖ [PS-05, Interview: 
12 April 2010]. This view was supported by three representatives in Civic Associations. 
According to their view, not only local citizens but even a large number of decision-makers 
and administrators involved in urban issues are uninformed about the public forum‘s 
agenda and circumstances.  
Equivalent to the ICC, the issues of lack of institutionalization of public forums also 
resonated across the interviews, particularly those representing urban experts. They 
highlighted the manner in which the culture of participation and collective decision-making 
was explicated and defined for the public. They stated that for many citizens their 
perceptions and attitudes towards the meaning of participation in the forums could be 
summarized by their participation in the forum elections; thus, the promoted meanings of 
contribution to the forums were weakened because of an inadequate characterization of 
forums.  





In the previous section, a number of citizens and private sector interviewees stated that the 
bureaucracy has been lessened following the implementation of public forums. By contrast, 
according to the responses provided by five local citizens ―bureaucracy‖ was considered as 
a ―threat‖ to the existing public forums. Their view is based on the suggestion that public 
forums are supposed to be locally trusted and composed of local informants who are 
outside the bureaucratic and administrative frameworks handling the prioritization and 
clarification of local issues. However, to some extent forums appear to have been converted 
to small administrative centres at the neighbourhood level, which are equally afflicted by 
common bureaucratic concerns and challenges.  
In addition, as discussed earlier, interviewed citizens confirmed that in contrast with the 
ICC elections, everyone - regardless of his/her socio-economic category - has the right to 
fully contribute to election exercises. However, the degree of inclusiveness of the public 
forums was mentioned as a matter of concern for seven interviewees, in particular citizens, 
Civic Associations and private sector interviewees. According to their view, the sufficiency 
and effectiveness of the criteria through which candidates are given consent to stand for 
election as forum representatives by the supervisory board was open to question. They 
referred to ―literacy‖ as the minimum level of educational competence for potential forum 
nominees, which they regarded as insufficient and inadequate for any representative 
position in public forums. According to their view, the preconditions and requirements for 
addressing the awareness of standards and codes designed for forum candidates need to be 
reconsidered. In line with this view, two experts suggested that despite public forums 
having only an advisory role and not handling any executive, administrative and 
technocratic exercises in neighbourhoods, there is a need for forum members to possess a 
certain level of knowledge and awareness with regard to urban issues. This is further 
reflected in a comment made by one urban expert:  
―Not acknowledging representatives‘ familiarity and understanding of 
local issues may lead to structural and technical deficiencies in public 
forums.‖ [UE- 02, Interview: 21 February 2010] 
 





8.2 Civic Associations  
8.2.1 Strengths and Benefits of Civic Associations 
The better impact of Civic Associations in governance practices was acknowledged by 
almost 30 interviewees, particularly those representing urban experts and Civic 
Associations. They emphasised that Civic Associations contribute to wide-ranging issues 
and features, including the organization of aid, socio-economic and cultural activities, 
development discourses, and the capacity to affect city governance practices. Thus, the full 
implementation of Civic Associations could lead to the realisation of participatory 
governance and enhance social capital. According to three urban experts, there are 
meaningful relationships between Civic Associations and social capital. The enhancement 
of Civic Associations results from the production of social capital which itself is strongly 
dependent on three essential elements: ―social trust‖, ―social integration‖ and ―social 
participation‖. Without these elements social capital would not emerge. In the same way, 
Civic Associations are core initiatives that can acquire creative and entrepreneurial 
strength, and capacity for knowledge and experience that could be considered a driving 
force and foundation for social capital. In addition, Civic Associations are well-established 
spheres in terms of their form and connections, as they can collectively ―facilitate‖, 
―accelerate‖ and ―simplify‖ public inputs into urban matters.  
The responses provided by the two Civic Association interviewees demonstrates that, due 
to the lack of balance between state-oriented and grassroots-based participatory spaces, 
there is a need to establish bottom-up mechanisms to enhance equality between the two 
categories: the state-orientated and grassroots-based participatory space. Furthermore, 
because of Civic Associations‘ ―economic‖ and ―social‖ weight, they potentially have the 
ability to define further meanings of equity in terms of the distribution of power and 
resources between the state and public.  
According to the four interviewees representing the state and the municipality groups, in 
comparison with public forums, the major strength of Civic Associations can be defined in 
terms of their traditions and history. For the state and municipality officials, citizens‘ 
contributions and inputs into ―traditional associative spaces‖ are still widely admired, 





where this adapted and customised culture of participation played a key role in forming and 
shaping contemporary Civic Associations. As one of the officials from the state department 
suggested, traditional mechanisms have an inevitable role in building present-day Civic 
Associations in Iran, with public participation being mainly effected through traditional 
means. Current charitable foundations, communal companies and cooperatives 
(Ta‟avoniha), charitable trust banks (Sandooghe Gharzolhasaneh), donor institutions and 
religious communities (Hey‟athaye mazhabi) were referred to as common traditional types 
of Civic Associations. 
Furthermore, the view that the traditional forms of Civic Association
1
 tend to focus more 
on citizen participation than the contemporary forms of Civic Association do, was 
expressed by ten councillor respondents.According to their view traditional Civic 
Associations refer to the traditional spaces of public participation which have a well-
established history and are strongly linked with foundational socio-cultural factors in Iran 
such as mosques, religious organisations and groups and religious charities. However, 
concerns were raised by experts with regard to traditional associations. Five urban experts 
and NGO representatives pointed out that although there is no doubt about the importance 
of traditional Civic Associations for participatory city governance, the autonomy and 
independence of these associations is a matter for concern. This has overshadowed the 
value of the exercises undertaken by the Civic Associations, leading to some traditional 
Civic Associations not fully embracing the codes and conduct guidelines designed for Civic 
Associations. 
8.2.2 Limitations and Weaknesses of Civic Associations 
The ―effectiveness‖ of Civic Associations as a participatory device to support governance 
bodies was a concern for 20 interviewees across various stakeholder groups. In their view, 
the influence of Civic Associations on city governance procedures is ―negligible‖ and their 
position in the urban machinery has been ―ignored‖. Similarly, when Civic Associations 
were asked to clarify their influence and impact on the course and practices of city 
governance, they unanimously emphasised the lack of effective contributions. As well as 
highlighting the ―isolation of Civic Associations‖ from decision-making procedures, they 





also stressed the insignificant position of Civic Associations in the existing configuration of 
stakeholder governance. In general, according to responses provided by the interviewees, 
the limitations were twofold: 1) central government attitudes towards Civic Associations; 
and 2) internal and technical hindrances. Table 8.3 shows the weaknesses and limitations 
that lead to the isolation of the Civic Associations in the city governance structure, as 
identified by the study‘s interviewees. 





 Centralised and lack of collective decision-making with regard to Civic 
Associations   
 Lack of determination and willingness of the state to deal with Civic Associations 
 Financial and budgeting limitations 
 Bureaucratic barriers and complexities  
 Obstructive and fussy administrative procedures in the registration process for 
Civic Associations 
 Lack of inclusiveness in the state‘s attitudes towards Civic Associations 
Experts  Lack of an established strategy and agenda in dealing with Civic Associations 
 Civic Association members lack understanding regarding organisational and team-
working activities (self-centred and self-prioritising concerns among Association 
members) 
 Lack of effective contribution of social elites in Civic Associations‘ financial 
affairs  
 Lack of effective communications between Civic Associations and international 
organisations (deficiency in universal mechanisms of information dissemination 
among Civic Associations) 
 Poor status of Civic Associations in the stakeholder configuration 





 Lack of healthy interactions between the state and Civic Associations based on trust 
and confidence 
 Insufficient public awareness 
 Centralised way of dealing with Civic Associations has often imposed a tendency 
of favouritism, with many forms of Civic Association being excluded. 
 Dependence of Civic Associations on the state and their manipulation by the state 
 Lack of innovation, originality and enterprise within Civic Associations 
State 
officials 
 Interference of outsiders and threats to the state‘s value 
 Manipulations of Civic Associations by influential bodies 
 Motivated by narrow organizational goals (i.e. financial grounds) 
 Foreign aid is narrowly targeted to certain specific themes 
 Politicization of Civic Associations  
 
 






As indicated in Table 8.3, in terms of the support originating from higher level decision-
makers, there is general consensus that the central government‘s attitudes and behaviours 
towards Civic Associations is a significant factor in the enhancement of these 
organisations. According to ten interviewees representing Civic Associations and urban 
experts, Civic Associations are devoid of basic endorsements from higher level 
administrations. In their view, a lack of trust and confidence, as well as a degree of friction, 
best defines the existing relationships between the state and Civic Associations. Their view 
is based on the suggestion that the top-down attitudes towards these Associations are 
dominated by ―suspicion‖ and ―doubt‖ rather than by ―promotion‖ and ―endorsement‖. 
They argued that this ―uncertainty‖ and ―hesitation‖ towards Civic Associations can 
undermine their position in the city, as it translates to a lack of consistent communication. 
For these interviewees, the communications and relationships between the Civic 
Associations and administrative bodies are devoid of ―consistency‖ and ―strong 
interactions‖. This excludes Civic Associations from contributing to supervisory 
committees and boards, weakening therefore, their role as effective stakeholders in 
governance.  
The view that the support from the higher administrative level is ―sporadic‖ and ―irregular‖ 
was also expressed by the Civic Associations themselves. They suggested that there is a 
clear lack of willingness and determination among the higher level executives to enhance 
Civic Associations. According to their view, the rare measures and policies that actually 
encourage and favour Civic Associations tend to be the product of political changes and 
circumstances, rather than resulting from a ―systematized‖ and ―regularized‖ focus on the 
matter of Civic Associations. With the exception of state officials, ten interviewees from all 
interviewed groups agreed that an established strategy and approach in dealing with issues 
of Civic Associations at state level, including the manner in which Civic Associations are 
run and organised, is lacking. This is further reflected in the comment of one Civic 
Association member:  





―Civic Associations have been suffering from uncertainties and 
suspiciousness through various administrations, resulting in diverging and 
contrasting views of the Civic Associations.‖  [CA-02, Interview: 1 March 
2010]. 
Similar views resonated in the interviews with citizen representatives, which pin-pointed as 
an issue the dominance of top-down approaches. For the citizens, since the responsibility 
for handling Civic Associations‘ affairs, including decision-making, conduct and 
monitoring, is delivered in an entirely centralised manner, the state is the sole responsible 
legal player. Concerns therefore about the comprehensiveness of centralized policy-making 
were raised. For example, citizens referred to the way in which permissions and 
authorisations are given to Civic Associations based on ―centralised‖ and ―mistrustful‖ 
procedures. Supporting this argument, all Civic Association interviewees emphasised the 
complexity of procedures along with ―bureaucratic‖ and ―institutional‖ barriers. According 
to the Civic Association representatives interviewed, the process of registration for Civic 
Associations is time-consuming, fussy, ambiguous and without legitimated milestones.      
         By contrast, the majority of interviewees (21) from all groups view the state‘s attitudes 
towards Civic Associations in a positive light. All state officials interviewed waved aside 
the concerns over restrictions by pointing to recent advances made through the 
establishment of fresh policies and strategies relating to Civic Associations. Their view is 
based on the suggestion that the implementation of Iran‘s third and fourth national 
development schemes led to increases in the number of Civic Associations and NGOs. 
State executives referred to the quantitative increase, as well as to the rate of expansion of 
Civic Associations, which over the last 10-15 years have multiplied tenfold. This position 
was in some measure also confirmed by four urban experts. They suggested that despite 
Civic Associations being faced with extensive barriers and challenges generated by 
political and social infrastructures, the third decade of the Islamic revolution has been 
considered a turning point to their progress. They suggested that the way in which Civic 
Associations are taken into account was modified through policies and strategies promoted 
by new administrations in the late 90s. Since then, for the urban experts, the development 
of Civic Associations was decisively taken into consideration by policy-makers. However, 





three experts viewed the recent advances as a partial and largely quantitative expansion of 
Civic Associations, rather than representing a qualitative and comprehensive development 
of these organisations.  
Another issue expressed by five interviewees, particularly from citizens and private sector-
groups, was the lack of inclusiveness in dealing with Civic Associations. Their view is 
based on the suggestion that central government measures towards Civic Associations do 
not have a comprehensive and inclusive approach. They referred to the tendencies and 
motivations towards the development of a certain form of Civic Association that has 
commonly prevailed, with the significance of a particular Civic Association being 
highlighted receptively, in comparison to the other less favoured forms of Civic 
Association. Such selectivity is focused on particular matters and interests which are in line 
with different administrations in power, of which each tends to stress a particular agenda. 
Central government‘s support for Civic Associations often excludes therefore many 
―potential themes‖ and ―categories‖. Furthermore, citizens argue that the centralised way in 
which Civic Associations are dealt with, thus without the existence of collective decision-
making, has often imposed a tendency of favouritism for Civic Associations. This causes 
Civic Associations to largely depend on central government patronage, rather than mooring 
themselves in a public and bottom-up foundation. Additionally, they emphasized that the 
―manipulation‖ and ―exploitation‖ of Civic Associations is likely to occur as a result of the 
centralized form of policy making. As one citizen said, the ―interference of the state into 
Civic Associations‘ affairs undermines the autonomy and value of Civic Associations‖ 
[OC-022, Interview: 20 April 2010]. Another citizen working in the public sector supported 
this argument by stating: ―Notwithstanding the meaning of Civic Associations entailing the 
idea of institutions created for and by the public, they are profoundly linked to the state in 
nature‖ [OC-16, Interview: 22 April 2010]. Thus, an accurate and precise label for Civic 
Associations which can best express the current situation is that of ‗governmental-
associations‘ instead of Civic Associations. According to one executive member of a 
private sector company, due to the extent to which Civic Associations depend on the state, 
administrative changes and governmental transactions undermine their ―stability‖ and 





―solidarity‖ in terms of policy-making, strategies and agendas. It follows that the 
Associations have been unable to gain a long-term and stable profile. 
When government officials were asked about the interference of the state in the affairs of 
Civic Associations, the responses emphasised the necessity of monitoring. This view is 
based on the suggestion that, while Civic Associations should reflect public visions and 
attitudes in a broad sense, in practice they should be treated as ―radical parties‖, which are 
typically opposed to government procedures and strategies. According to one state official, 
the majority of existing Civic Associations are politicised in nature. This is in contrast with 
the Civic Associations‘ values and principles, as they aim to address a certain political 
group‘s objectives rather than the interests of the wider public.  
Similarly, concerns over the manipulation of Civic Associations by oversea‘s organisations 
resonated in the interviews with state administrators and urban experts. Their view is based 
on the suggestion that since Civic Associations engage freely and openly in public 
interactions, they are at risk of ―exploitation‖ and ―co-option‖ by ―outsiders‖ (i.e. foreign 
governments and organisations), which impose their own motivations and interests in place 
of national interests. According to this view, foreign countries (particularly Western 
countries) take advantage of some Civic Associations, particularly of NGOs, and infiltrate 
their own interests and ideas into the country. Thus, on some occasions, it seems that Civic 
Associations‘ activities are not just opposed to the government, but they are also opposed to 
the state‘s values. This is further reflected in the comment of one urban expert, who 
criticised overseas aid:  
       ―Matters of trust and confidence are an overwhelming concern with overseas 
support. Through aid targets they concentrate on particular selected themes 
and issues which are considered sensitive issues in this society.‖ [UE-03, 
Interview: 5 March 2010]. 
These include themes such as women issues, with an emphasis on the ―gender equality 
agenda‖ from the western context, which has been triggered by many foreign entities.   





To reduce the aforementioned challenges, and better engage Civic Associations in 
governance exercises in the city, 12 interviewees representing the Civic Associations 
suggested that the responsibility for overseeing the conduct of Civic Associations must be 
reassigned to local government (i.e. the ICC and municipality) instead of central 
government. Their view is based on the suggestion that local administrations are capable of 
dealing with Civic Associations in an enhanced manner without interfering in political 
matters. According to their opinions, if compared to the relationship with central 
government, the extent of interactions and connections between Civic Associations and 
local governments mean that this is a deeper exchange. Consequently, this preferred mode 
of interaction is able to build trust and confidence between the two stakeholders in a 
manner which facilitates the wider involvement of Civic Associations in the city. By 
contrast, the state officials and two urban experts defined this proposal as a ―controversial 
scheme‖. In their view, due to the complex and multifaceted nature of Civic Associations 
concerned with ―political‖, ―social‖ and even ―security‖ issues, the subject must be tackled 
through central government.  
Internal or Technical issues 
Parallel to the consensus about the state‘s attitudes, concerns about internal and technical 
hindrances within the Civic Association were echoed by interviewees across all selected 
groups. They emphasised the significance of internal and technically-orientated hindrances 
that are equal to external barriers.  
The practice and understanding of Civic Association actors was a matter of concern for 
three interviewed experts. The absence of a sufficient level of understanding and familiarity 
among Civic Association members with the necessary organisational and team-working 
activities was regarded as generating internal difficulties. Despite recent improvements, for 
the urban experts this is largely due to the lack of an effective contribution by social elites 
in Civic Associations. On this basis, to be effectively involved in governance Civic 
Associations need to be a focus for elites, as they are capable of enhancing the interactions 
between the government and Civic Association. They argue that this would improve overall 
public and administrative attitudes towards Civic Associations.  





Furthermore, the deficiencies in the overall information dissemination mechanisms among 
Civic Associations were raised by two urban experts. According to their view, a lack of 
enhanced communications and networking practices between the Civic Associations in the 
city, even those that are operating within similar disciplines and categories, exists. This lack 
collaboration lessens structural ―integration‖; ―stability‖ and ―firmness‖, hindering the 
extent to which Civic Associations have an impact on the political, social and cultural life 
of the city and undermining their capacity to take part in the practice of governance.  
These technical and procedural deficiencies have negative effects on the financial fitness of 
Civic Associations. Financial issues are key concerns put forward by 15 interviewees, 
particularly those representing Civic Associations and experts. The nature of the financial 
constraints includes a lack of facilities, with the majority of Civic Associations being 
devoid of a place and location for carry out their meetings. Furthermore, four 
representatives of the civic association group view their socio-political circumstances as 
key to the financial barriers they experience. For example, for most Civic Associations 
using overseas assistance and aid is not considered a common and regulated way for 
gaining resources. Their view is based on the suggestion that Civic Associations are 
affected by macro-level circumstances such as the country‘s international relationships with 
other countries. Moreover, that political circumstances and interactions with ―outsiders‖, 
affect the way in which Civic Associations interact and communicate with overseas 
supporters.   
However, the urban experts pointed out the deficiencies of attracting financial resources on 
the bases of technical constraints, rather than those based on political circumstances. 
According to their perspective, international donations and aid represent a major source of 
financial support for Civic Associations in developing countries. However, technical 
barriers and constraints, such as communications-related issues, hinder the use of this 
support in Tehran. This view is based on the suggestion that the majority of Civic 
Associations are not aware of the processes and means through which communications and 
interactions with international donors can be constructed. Therefore, the majority of Civic 
Associations do not benefit from established international organisational support in terms 
of logistics, facilities and services.   





Furthermore, since a lack of innovative and pioneering activities is pervasive in the existing 
pattern of Civic Associations, it was believed that they have generally relied on the 
traditional ways in which financial expenses can be met. According to ten interviewees, 
membership fees and donations are a major source of earnings for Civic Associations, 
though they are not considered efficient and sustained sources of income. A state official 
commented: 
―Existing Civic Associations prefer the financial contributions of their 
members, rather than any other kind of input and involvement, which in the 
long term can put the effectiveness of Civic Associations at risk.‖ [CV-04: 
Interview: 5 March 2010]. 
The financial expectations placed on members of Civic Associations were considered by 20 
interviewees as a discouraging and off-putting factor that diverts citizens from the broader 
meanings of contribution.  
Another basic issue with regard to financial circumstances expressed by two state officials 
is the motivation behind the establishment of Civic Associations. According to their view, 
rather than enhancing participatory processes, economic and financial motives appear to 
represent the fundamental grounds behind the establishment of Civic Associations. They 
argued that the fiscal and financial profitability intended for members of Civic Associations 
was often considered as a key driving force, rather than the use of financial incentives as a 
means to persuade public participation. Furthermore, the lack of contribution by the private 
sector to Civic Associations was also raised as an issue by three state officials. They 
pointed out that usually, Civic Associations are supposed to rely on private sector 
contributions. However, it appears that the involvement of the private sector has been very 
small and limited. Reasons for this appear to be the lack of ―innovation‖, ―originality‖ and 
―enterprise‖ within Civic Associations, as emphasised by two private sector interviewees. 
According to their views, the issue of confidence overshadows the engagement of the 
private sector with Civic Associations. This raises risks and uncertainties which largely 
reflect the position of Civic Associations in the power structure. One executive member of 
an entrepreneurial organisation confirmed this by stating that ―due to constraints and lack 





of assurances underwriting Civic Associations, the private sector‘s interest in Civic 
Associations in Iran as a whole are low‖. [PS-03, Interview: 8 April 2010]. 
Based on the responses provided by the citizens, the everyday understanding and awareness 
regarding Civic Associations appears to be slender. The fact that Civic Associations were 
unable to develop general information and establish a broad knowledge platform intended 
for a range of participants from various socio-economic classes emerged in the interviews 
with four municipality officials and urban experts. In order to overcome the issue of a 
dearth of citizen inputs, it was suggested that ―informing‖, ―marketing‖ and ―publicity‖ 
mechanisms must be implemented fully and widely; and that Civic Associations‘ activities 
and actions should not be limited to a few themes. This view is based on the suggestion that 
Civic Associations must extend their area of activity across a range of socio-economic 
disciplines, including the environment, health, charity, women, young people and children-
related themes, educational and cultural areas to embrace different and wider socio-
economic groups and interests. 
   
8.3 Conclusion 
From the analysis of the data collected on forums, it appears that the majority of 
respondents are optimistic about the Neighbourhood Councils (public forums) prospects, 
and regarded them as a constructive mechanism for both representative and participatory 
governance. This is based on the fact that public forums have provided fresh spaces for 
participation and interaction based on localisation. The fact that public forums provide a 
platform for exchanges and strengthen relationships between urban decision-makers and 
citizens, and that they enhance the quality of local level service support was expressed 
throughout the interviews.  
Notwithstanding this, various institutional and technical concerns were considered as 
barriers for public forums. These largely appeared to be linked to the attitudes and 
motivations of the higher executives who deal with public forums, and to the resulting 
uncertainties and doubts over their purpose. As indicated, the idea behind public forums 





was to support the ICC and the municipality in identifying and tackling local concerns; 
however, according to the responses provided, in many cases the forum‘s views have not 
been taken into consideration. Despite their patchy advisory role, public forums lack 
systematic and regularised advisory weight. In addition, there is a lack of correlation 
between different levels of urban decision-making and state hierarchies. As a result, better 
coordination between different levels of governance was seen as necessary to enhance the 
effectiveness of the forums.   
Based on the interview findings, the traditional ways in which the Civic Associations 
formed (largely through religious origins) have contributed to the forming and shaping of 
existing Civic Associations in Iran. Thus, compared with the latter, it appears that the 
traditional associations are in a more advanced position to absorb public participation. 
However, the poor position of Civic Associations within the governance structure, and their 
lack of power and weight, prevents them from making an effective contribution. According 
to the interview findings, the manner in which Civic Associations are characterised in Iran 
is unconstructive, and uncertainty and lack of direction in terms of how to deal with Civic 
Associations predominate. For some respondents, the state‘s attitudes towards Civic 
Associations are not inclusive; thus it is common for the state to limit their supports to 
particular types of Civic Associations.   
The lack of institutional, financial and technical support from the state were considered, 
along with bureaucratic barriers, as general obstacles preventing Civic Associations from 
effective participation in governance practices. Also the state‘s seems to be more interested 
in providing financial and technical support for traditional forms of association, rather than 
for the contemporary associations. The widespread lack of confidence and trust in overseas 
support for Civic Associations was echoed across many interviewees, which argued that in 
most cases, financial aid imposes and promulgates certain interests and values only.  
Concerns regarding the competence of Civic Association representatives and their 
understanding of organisational and cooperative requirements, as well as budgeting and 
financial issues, were considered as significant issues. Another concern which was 
mentioned widely is the exiguousness of public awareness regarding participatory 





mechanisms. When citizens were asked about the state of their understanding and 
perceptions regarding Civic Associations their responses suggested a widespread deficiency 
in terms of general awareness and knowledge about the contemporary meanings of Civic 
Associations in the city.
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9.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to integrate and synthesise the core issues raised in the study. It 
comprises the discussion section of the thesis, in which the research findings are evaluated 
against the theoretical and experimental frameworks developed during the research. The 
chapter discusses key findings from the fieldwork, the literature review and the UN-Habitat 
Urban Governance Index (UN-UGI) assessment. It consists of three main sections. The first 
section evaluates the UN-UGI method as a governance assessment approach. In the second 
section, consideration is given to the main governance challenges. Finally the third section 
expresses the quality of interactions between the key stakeholders involved in the decision-
making process.     
 
9.1 Review of the UGI Assessment  
As discussed in sections 2.5 and 4.4 of this thesis, the assessment of urban governance not 
only necessitates of precise ―indicators‖, but also ―standards‖, which supply the dimensions 
to be measured (Stewart, 2006: 200). This research used the standards derived from the 
UN-Habitat Urban Governance Index (UGI) to generate an account of city governance in 
Tehran, based on which the most vulnerable theme in Teheran city governance appeared to 
be ―participation‖. The UN method includes structured sets of indicators that provide a 
primary assessment tool aimed at systematizing information and data regarding city 
governance in Tehran. The assessment offers a foundation and a general picture of existing 
governance and allows a comparison of outcomes, which was presented in chapter 4. This 
method, however, is not without deficiencies and the implementation of the UGI for 
assessing governance issues in Tehran highlighted some critical challenges.  
 
One major issue is that there is insufficient scope in this methodology to debate all of the 
normative potentials of multifaceted urban governance. For example, with regard to the 
‗Selection of Mayor‘ indicator, for its capacity to enhance citizen engagement mayoral 





selection through direct participation received the highest score 1, compared to the mayoral 
selection by councillors which received 0.75, and other methods of appointment, which 
tally 0.5. The selection of mayor indicator, however, is devoid of information about the 
surrounding electoral circumstances, which play a key role in the mayoral selection. As 
discussed in chapter 7, if the method of direct participation does not include an impartial 
monitoring mechanism and a sound competitive basis, then direct participation in the 
mayoral election could be a defective procedure.  
 
As discussed in chapter 4, general governance indicators can be categorised into: Input, 
Process, Output, Perception, Outcome and Impact indicators (UNDP, 2006 and Fonseka, 
2000). Yet, the UN-index method appears to be mainly based on Output indicators, which 
‗demonstrate‘ results which are already visible. The key challenge for these Output 
indicators is to reflect those activities that are invisible, expressed by „input‟ and „process‟ 
type indicators. This is in line with what MacLeod and Goodwin (1999:505) observed, 
thus, that the kernel of the problem is in theorizing and understanding “process‖. In effect, 
one fundamental inconsistency between the UGI findings and the interview findings 
presented in this research is the focus on context. While the UN-UGI predominantly 
reflects ‗what‘ indicators privileging the end output of governance (i.e. election result) over 
the ‗how‘ and ‗why‘, the interview findings attempt to include issues of input and process.    
 
The over-simplicity of some indicators restricts therefore the analysis of the more complex 
urban governance features, such as the quality of governance actors, governance 
mechanisms, decision-making processes and institutions. This is further reflected in the 
indicators that are summarised by scorecard options of ―yes or no‖, such as ―Existence of 
Vision Statement‖, ―Elected Council‖ and ―Public Forum‖ indicators, which limit the 
enquiry to the existence, or lack of, a particular ―facility‖ or ―service‖ for citizens. Such 
indicators are unable to capture the different dimensions, components and qualities of 
governance principals. For instance, the existence of a ―Vision‖ and even the 
implementation of two Master Plans in 1968 and 1992, were not able to conceal and solve 
many basic urban issues in Tehran (Rafiei and Athari, 1995), although there was some 





improvement in physical and infrastructural sectors (Mozayeni, 1998). In fact, it could be 
argued that problems with the recent shaping of social and physical urban issues under 
these planning approaches has been the result of the poor context of the plans or the 
misleading nature of these planning approaches. In fact ‗Existence of Vision Statement‘ 
indicator clearly lacks the ability to address the context and the issue of failing to respect 
the plan/vision. Furthermore, the operation of a council or of a forum could be hampered by 
the inadequacy of some of its features, such as its role, composition and efficiency, along 
with the institutional abilities and competencies of members considered key for enhancing 
the council‘s performance. In general such oversimplified indicators merely allow for a 
holistic assessment. For example, as suggested by the research findings, although an elected 
city council (ICC) and public forum (Neighbourhood Councils) may exist in Tehran, this 
does not guarantee the adequacy of their performance, and consequently, of their success in 
delivering good governance.   
 
Indicators such as ―local government revenues‖ theoretically imply the financial autonomy 
of local government as a constructive factor for governance. However, this does not 
necessarily ensure good governance practice. An example that emerged from the interviews 
suggested that in Tehran the central government‘s financial support for key servicing areas 
such as public transportation could respond to several existing governance dilemmas in the 
city, despite the reduction in the municipality‘s financial sovereignty. Consequently, 
citizens could directly benefit from central government financial aid, and public faith in 
decision-makers might be enhanced. As it can be seen, the indicator is unable to rationally 
express how the lack or dearth of central government financial support might be a 
beneficial point for local government, meaning that the exclusive consideration of local 
government autonomy as a positive point is rather risky. 
 
The lack of comprehensiveness of some indicators limits their application. For instance, an 
indicator such as ‗Percentage of women councillors in the key urban positions‘ is not 
achievable in urban governance structures and designs where the legislator and monitoring 
body (council) is separated from the executive (municipality), as they function separately as 





two distinctive institutions. In such cases having a member of the council act in both 
legislator and executor positions is impossible. At a more practical level, the indicator 
cannot be addressed in Iran/Tehran because of the existence of regulations that restrict 
council representatives from having an additional executive role and responsibility in city, 
beyond the one that they already fulfil with the council. From a governance perspective, to 
some extent these regulations have had beneficial effects on transparency. For instance, if 
the monitoring board is considered equal to the executive board, then transparency in 
governance may be undermined. What, in other words, are the likely consequences of a 
councillor holding a position of responsibility in both the executive and the monitoring 
boards of the city, that is, taking an active role in monitoring finances and budgeting in the 
city and also playing a key role in budget implementation? The issue here is to what extent 
can such a structure ensure that the councillors having an active role in both organisations 
are impartial in their (complementary) monitoring and implementing roles? Despite the 
significance of women fulfilling key positions in the city for enhancing gender equality in 
governance, the interviews revealed that based on the existing design of city governance 
through separation of the executive role and monitoring and legislative roles, transparency 
and accountability have been promoted. Thus, offering an executive role to the councillors 
will alter the position of the urban council from being an observer to being an evaluator of 
the municipality. 
A further technical challenge that concerns the aforementioned indicators is that they 
mainly address ‗democracy‘ rather than ‗governance‘. Democracy at the local level focuses 
on the foundations of local government, for example, in terms of the existence of regular 
elections and citizen participation rights (International Idea, 2001). By contrast, while 
including issues of local democracy, governance assessment also cuts across a number of 
broader and complex issues, addressing primary features such as the nature of the local 
political and electoral system, the policy process, codes and conducts of elections, 
candidate and party certification (UNDP, 2004).   
 
Initially, what emerged from the exploration of the meaning and context of governance 
through the UN methodology mainly concerned issues of ―quality‖. Despite the ease of 





collecting data on quantitative variables (UN-Index, 2006), the over-quantitative nature of a 
large number of indicators make this method unable to explore the multifaceted nature of 
governance in the city. Although the reliance on quantitative data provides a clear-cut 
outline of existing governance in Tehran, the deficiency in the breadth of the quantitative 
indicators undermines the value of the results. For example, as analysed in Chapter 4, the 
‗Civic Associations indicator‘ simply seeks to identify the number of associations that exist 
in the city. The issue here is to what extent the indicator is able to articulate important 
aspects of the civic associations in the city. Even if the results indicate the existence of a 
large number of civic associations in the city, does this ensure the contribution of these 
associations to decision-making? Does the figure show the extent of their active 
engagement? A single figure would fail to provide a response to these questions. This is 
further reflected in the views of Saidi (2003), who suggests that despite the soaring growth 
of civic associations and non-governmental organizations in Iran since the 1990s, their 
effectiveness and efficacy in terms of participation has not been assured. By contrast, the 
data gathered from the fieldwork goes beyond numbers, providing greater insight for 
example into the extent of interactions between the civic associations with central and local 
government codes of conduct and top-down policies..  
Furthermore, with regard to methodological issues, in the existing sources of governance 
data, objective (official, documentary etc.) data plays a major role in the evaluation of 
governance. This could be considered as a limitation since the role of subjective 
(individual, perceptual etc.) data is underrepresented in existing governance assessment. 
This is in line with Kaufmann et al.‘s (1999) views‘ that perceptions, for instance, carry 
greater weight and meaning compared with objective data in assessing citizens‘ faith in 
organisations. The lack of inclusion of the views and perceptions of individuals and 
stakeholders involved in governance fails to provide the full story on governance in Tehran. 
         
        9.2 Obstacles to Good Governance 
This section presents the obstacles associated with governance identified in the research. It 
is structured in four parts, corresponding to the issues that arose from the interviews. These 





are centralised dominance, lack of governance direction, lack of an integrated form of 
governance; and technocratic rationality or democratic principles.  
9.2.1 Centralised dominance: government or governance? 
Successful local government is dependent on a well-defined structure of decentralization 
(International IDEA, 2004), where an appropriate balance of power between governance 
stakeholders is considered vital for ‗good governance‘ (UNHABITAT, 2002). However, 
what emerged from the research findings is an emphasis on the way in which power is often 
not equally shared between national and local government in Iran. This is particularly 
indicated in the unbalanced structure of governance shown in Figure 9.1. According to the 
existing structures and distribution of administrative functions, Iran can be considered a 
centralised country. Central government looms large, exercising a potent influence on the 
relationships with local government/institutions, and having a dominant voice on a wide 
range of issues in Tehran. It follows that to a large extent, local government/institutions rely 
upon central government. Based on the data collected, central government has both the 
ability to monitor local government (municipality, ICC) and to play a significant part in 
local affairs, because it has responsibilities that extend across both domains. In general the 
establishment and termination of local institutions; their ability to approve, consent, appeal 
and reject the authorised regulations is exercised under central government authority. 
Article 53 of the ICC Establishment Act discussed in Chapter 4, emphasised the central 
government‘s role in the structure of governance. The same views were echoed by the first 
mayor of Tehran, who was quoted in a newspaper article saying that following the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979 and after a decade of experiencing urban shifts, centralisation is still a 
dominant tendency within the existing executive driving force in Iran (Mehr, 2007). In 
another article it was asserted that the following are controlled by local government: 
monitoring ability with regard to local institutions through authorization of regulations, 
codes and agendas; delegation and substitution of the ICC in terminations and cases of 
unattended cases; assessment on implementation of the local agenda, and on research 
investigating and identifying local issues; consent to loans and financial supports with 
regard to local associations (Ghahari, 1985; Kazemian  and Saidi-Rezvani, 2002). These 
circumstances enable central government to directly and indirectly influence local 





institutions in general, and local government institutions in particular. In the same way, as 
discussed in Chapter 8, Civic Associations and NGOs are governed in a centralised manner. 
The establishment, approval and termination of these associations are handled by central 
government and by its sub-entity, the state ministry.  
 
Overall, the interviews revealed that top-down and hierarchical types of interaction weaken 









         Figure 9.1 Unbalanced Governance Structure 
 
Despite central government‘s loss of some power in the city and the 1997 attempt to 
support local government as a key and independent player in urban decision-making, the 
research findings show that local government is largely devoid of sufficient political and 
institutional competence to function as a key player in the city. Some interviewed urban 
experts were however sceptical about using the term ―decentralisation‖ within the context 
of the 1997 shift. They suggested that decentralisation has three dimensions: political, 
administrative and fiscal, and that none of these features had been fully addressed in the 
shift.  This remark is in line with what emerged from the literature review, based on which, 
















and devolution (Coudouel and Paternostro, 2006). In practice this can be seen in the gap 
between the ICC‘s constitutional position discussed in Chapter 4 and its existing role 
discussed in Chapter 5. Codes 7 and 100-106 of the Constitution take into account the ICC 
Act and highlight the ICC‘s significance. According to section 7 of the Constitution 
approved in 15/11/1979, councils are the main bodies for decision-making and 
administration in the country, whereby governors, mayors and administrators must commit 
to respecting the councils‘ decisions (Fakhroleslam, 2005). This raises questions about the 
extent to which existing councils have succeeded in achieving the idealistic principles that 
are described in the constitutional act. As previously stated, based on the constitutional act, 
the position and function of the council is substantial. However, based on the findings of 
this research, the lack of practical position and weight offered to the elected council (ICC) 
places limits on local governance capacity. This shows clear signs of inconsistency between 
‗rhetoric‘ and ‗reality‘ that undermine local government capacity. The most recently 
modified ICC regulations and guidelines are considered to be a long way from its 
constitutional roots and principles. On this basis, the ICC‘s influence can be summarised as 
being more effective in municipality affairs, rather than in city affairs. Such a view is 
indeed a point worthy of consideration and reflects the views expressed by the 
interviewees. They claimed that in its current form, the ICC is far from being an ―urban 
parliament‖ or a ―city council‖. As suggested by the experts, ―municipality councils‖ seem 
to be a more realistic label for the present ICC system in Iran.  
 
According to the Constitution, all organisations involved in the city are obliged to respect 
regulations authorised by the ICC. However, as emerged from the interviews, in practice 
the ICC‘s orders are applicable only to the municipality, therefore various entities active in 
the city are not obliged to commit to those orders. This has a negative effect on the role and 
status of the ICC as an effective council in the city. In the same way, the limited 
institutional power and influence of the ICC in the centralised pattern of governance affects 
the ‗voter turnout‘ in the ICC elections. The evidence from the interviews suggests that, 
since the ICC only has a marginal capacity to act as an influential governance player, the 
public has been sceptical with regards to their real impact on urban governance. Indeed, the 





findings emphasise that the effectiveness and value of the ICC are ‗insignificant‘ for most 
participants. This perception negatively affects participation in the ICC elections.     
       
These  are in line with the position expressed by Beheshti (2001), who argues that the legal 
and institutional status of local government bodies, particularly of the Islamic City 
Councils, have been faced with ambiguity and uncertainty within the city‘s multifaceted 
governance structure. Consequently, the heft and reach of such institutions can be 
questioned. The main concern is not about the lack, comprehensiveness, integration and 
creativity of regulations and codes (Putnam, 1993); rather, it is about the lack of practical 
assurances around the operationalising of these codes and regulations. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, due to its institutional limitations, the bulk of ICC responsibilities come without 
legislative and practical assurances. Talaie, the head of Social Commissioning in the ICC, 
argues that although a decade has passed since their establishment in Iran, doubts still 
remain about the extent of responsibility and weight to transfer to the ICC (Fars, 2010). 
Similarly, Ghalibaf, the current mayor of Tehran, argues that processes of administrative 
and political decentralisation have not succeeded in the country, suggesting that the transfer 
of power is being ignored across a range of central administrative bodies (Hamshahri, 
2010a).  
Supporting this argument and based on the third Development Scheme and article 44 of the 
constitution (see Chapter 4), Chamran, the head of the ICC, suggests that it was expected  
that 23 responsibilities and tasks would be transferred from central government to local 
government and to non-governmental institutions (Hamshahri, 2010b and Irna,2010b). He 
goes on to suggest that not only has there been no attempt to transfer these tasks to local 
institutions; but that an attempt has been made to reduce their existing roles (ibid.). For 
instance, while previously the ICC alone was responsible for approving the municipality 
budget, through recent changes, the state ministry now has a voice in authorising it. 
Supporting this, Akbarnejad, a Member of Parliament, argued that central government has a 
desire and interest to expand its command and authority on urban issues, suggesting that 
there is no will or enthusiasm for reducing its existing influence and power in the city 
(Hamshahri, 2010c). These remarks support the absence of a solid ‗determination‘ and 





‗motivation‘ to devolve responsibilities to the local government level, a point that was 
echoed widely throughout the research findings. The interviewees argued that the attempts 
undertaken to counter decentralisation mean that there is a lack of confidence and purpose 
about transferring power to local government.  
 
9.2.2 Integrated Urban Management or Management of Urban Units  
The nature and context of governance as discussed in the literature is about collectivity, 
sharing, power and inclusion of a range of stakeholders in the city (Boddy and Parkinson, 
2005). However, based on the empirical research, the existence of multiple organisations 
and institutions responsible for the city emerged as a concern. The evidence suggests that 
the duty of management in the city has been delivered through a range of local and central 
stakeholders (see Table 9.1). According to the existing system, over 25 organisations are 
formally involved in governance issues in Tehran (see Organisation of Municipalities, 
2002). The key concern here is: ‗who‘ is/are making decisions in the city and who has 
power and influence over decisions.  
What emerged from the interview findings indicates that due to the existence of several 
policy-makers and executive bodies, the city has suffered from the lack of an ‗integrated‘ 
and ‗coherent‘ form of management. There has been inconsistency and contradiction in 
decision-making. Each organisation in the city is dealing with instructions and circulars 
which have been authorized by related ministries or organisations. These organisations are 
distributed in the city in line with their own organisational remit. The lack of uniformity in 
instructions for various organisations about how to address similar issues in the city has led 
to confusion.  
In general, the confusion relates mainly to city services, the monitoring and control of the 
construction and supply infrastructures in the city that are handled through local 
government.  However, a wide range of other key services such as policing, security, 
welfare, water, gas and electricity, health, education, housing and so on are delivered by the 
central government and by its sub-entities. The fact that these organisations are outside of 
the influence and control of local government has an effect on governance. For instance, if 





the role of local government and of the ICC is to ensure accountability, then in the absence 
of coherent governance accountability is likely to be undermined. While the ICC merely 
carries out the monitoring role for tasks that are handled by the municipality, other 
organisations and stakeholders active in the city tend not to recognise the ICC‘s monitoring 
role on many issues. This has emerged from the interviews with citizens, for whom it is 
hard to distinguish ‗who‘ is running the city. It appears that the functions and position of 
local government may be undermined by the existing form of task distribution, because 
local governments have no voice on many key issues in the city. As a consequence, local 
government has simply been considered as an institution intended for the delivery of 
services, instead of an institution that is meant to handle city issues comprehensively.  
Such distribution of roles has implications on the extent to which local governments are 
inclusive and comprehensive in dealing with urban issues. Although it is expected that local 
government will be a key coordinator and leader which will engage closely with citizens on 
various issues, at the same time, local government is not considered a key agent in social 
life. This means that local government is unable to cooperate and to respond to citizens‘ 
concerns on a wide range of issues in the city. In practice, this is largely reflected in the 
interviews with Forum representatives, which indicated that since the majority of local 
services are outside the influence of the municipality and of the ICC, service operators do 
not have adequate interactions with the neighbourhood council on local issues. This 
negatively affects the level of ‗public trust‘ in the competence of the ICC and of the 
municipality in the city.  
Supporting these findings, Fadaie, a representative of the ICC and spokesman for the 
Provincial Supreme Council, argued that an integrated form of city management would 
enhance public perception and confidence regarding local government, which would 
therefore have a constructive effect on public input in urban affairs (Hamshahri, 2010a). On 
the one hand integrated urban management can correlate and integrate decision-making 
between central government, local government and civic associations. On the other hand, it 
can reduce divisions and schisms between these stakeholders. An integrated form of city 
management was intended to merge processes, systems, functions and conducts to create 





solidarity in city governance. By transferring key duties to the municipality, the 
municipality itself can act as a key coordinator in the city. 
The question that may arise here is to what extent local government is prepared to assume 
these responsibilities. As discussed throughout the research, the need for capacity building 
in terms of legal, political and technical matters is essential for local government. However, 
an integrated form of urban management cannot be achieved without citizens‘ 
contributions. It cannot be formed through the modification of administrative structures and 
regulations or the creation of technological infrastructures; rather, it requires public input 
and the contributions of all actors involved in governance (Ellis and McKay, 2000).  




























 The Ministry of State and related Departments 
 The Housing and Urbanism Organisation 




 The Ministry of State and related Departments  
 Plan and Budget Organisation  




 Water and Sewerage Organisation  
 Regional Electricity Company  
 Gas Company 
 Transport Administration 
 Telecommunications Company   
 Post Company 
Providing Public 
Services 
 Education Administration 
 University and Higher education entities 
 Health and medication organisations 
 Sports organisations 
 Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance 
 Administration for Estates Registration 
 Administration for Devotion 
 Department of the Environment  
 Department of Business and Unions Committee 
 Department of Industry 
 Department of Culture and Heritage  
 Police Department 
 Justice Department 
Providing Housing 
and land   
 The Housing and Urbanism Organisation 
 Administration for charitable trust  
 National Organisation for Land and Housing  





          
9.2.3 The direction of urban governance: forwards or backwards?  
As discussed in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, in Iran the implementation of local organisations 
and the decentralization process are lacking in direction. The initial attempts by 





government to extend governance date back to 1907, with the passing of the first 
Establishment of Municipal Act (Anjomanhaye Baladiyeh). However, four years later, due 
to the defeat of the constitutional revolution, these city institutions were abolished. Thus, 
throughout the 20th century the move towards governance has been faced with trembling 
and unsteady progress in Iran. In the same way, what has emerged from the findings has 
shown that the recent governance initiative implemented through the 1997 shift, which was 
intended to empower local institutions and citizen engagement, has encountered obstacles. 
This has made it difficult for the research to draw a clear-cut line regarding governance 
trends since 1997. This is mainly reflected by the lack of a firm strategy with regard to 
publicly-orientated and grass-roots institutions. Iran‘s governance machinery appears to 
suffer from a lack of vision and in-depth objectives. Despite the existence of a reasonably 
clear vision for the city in terms of development and planning, there is no vision or route 
map for ―how the city is going to be governed‖. Considering, for example, the Urban 
Development Vision and the fifth Development Scheme, public meaning and participation 
(in terms of both functions and practice) are entirely overlooked. A lack of clear 
consideration of urban governance priorities, citizen participation and collective decision-
making are evident within the Vision, which is meant to encompass the next 20 years. It is 
hard therefore to distinguish a persistent and convincing strategy and vision meant for 
governance. In fact, the key uncertainty here is: ‗where do we want to be‘ or ‗where are we 
going‘. Following the city governance shift in 1997, it was expected that the 
decentralization trend would progress towards further practical devolution, citizen 
participation and the empowerment of grass-root institutions. However, the momentum has 
not been decisive. The findings show that since the shift, state attitudes towards grass-root 
institutions (i.e. civic associations and forums) have been unsteady, and have not been 
followed through by consistent operational actions. The impetus for reform has been 
determined by the configurations of different administrations and interests, rather than by 
consistency with a precisely designated direction of change. Over the course of a decade 
this has resulted in the institutions having inherited a controversial and agonistic decision-
making process and set of policies with regards to governance. For example, in terms of the 
selection of mayor, two entirely antagonistic proposals came into view over the same 





period of time. One view consisted of enhancing existing participatory governance by 
shifting the responsibility for selecting the mayor from the ICC to the citizens. The second 
view reflected a persuasive intention to reverse the method for selecting the mayor from the 
ICC to the Ministry of State, a system that recalls the pre-shift approach of the past. In 
terms of the research findings this can be considered a ―backward shift‖. 
Furthermore, while the establishment of the Neighbourhood Council (Public Forums) can 
be likened to a new step towards more participatory governance, the parliament‘s recent 
efforts to demolish and scrap the Local Councils as the bottom-most sphere of participatory 
city governance can be considered as an example that confirms the continuing thrust in an 
opposing direction. Khadem, a councillor and head of the Planning and Budgetary 
Commission in the ICC, considered the proposal to be controversial and likely to halt any 
progress towards participatory city governance (Hamshahri, 2010b). Despite the proposal 
being rejected later on, such examples highlight the doubt, confusion and lack of 
consistency that exists within the governance system and its lack of genuine and concrete 
direction. This overall vision is further echoed in the words of an interviewee, who 
mentioned the ―lack of conviction‖ and ―uncertainty‖ among decision-makers in dealing 
with these institutions. The aforementioned examples relate to the importance of the 
‗direction‘ and ‗strategy‘ that should exist in governance, as considered in Chapter 2.   
 
Governance studies express the distinctiveness between governance trends, approaches, 
manner and pace in various parts of the world (see Painter and Goodwin, 2000). Parallel to 
strategic deficits, the findings of this study show that the Iranian response to the need for 
participatory governance lacks solid methodological approaches. The lessons from over 
three decades of urban policy-making in Iran often demonstrate inconsistency on exactly 
‗how‘ to respond to matters of governance. Therefore, another key question that may be 
raised is: ―how do we get there‖ The key idea that a variety of macro political and 
executive factors appear to be linked with local governance and issues of participation, but 
participation tends to not be a part of the mainstream agenda in governance. Lacking 
sufficient significance, it has become something that is accomplished erratically in an ad 
hoc and partial manner. What emerged from the data relating to perceptions about the 





context of participation, revealed a meaning of participation that was not inclusive. The 
majority of the respondents, including decision-makers, viewed participation merely in 
terms of representative democracy and citizen involvement in elections. According to the 
researcher‘s viewpoint, this is largely due to the lack of ‗contextualisation‘ of governance 
and of issues of participation in Iran. Throughout the interviews, when the participants 
(mostly executive interviewees) were asked about the degree of success of the 
Neighbourhood Councils as a participatory governance mechanism, they simply referred to 
the election results as evidence of successful participation. Equally, there is an 
overemphasis on adopting ‗representative‘ governance approaches, rather than on 
‗participatory‘ governance initiatives. As discussed in Chapter 7, there is a strong desire to 
change the body which selects the mayor from the ICC to the citizens.  
 
9.2.4 Technocratic rationality or democratic principles?  
Technocratic governance comprises technical influence in decision-making (Ward, 1998). 
Based on the research findings, there is an overwhelming emphasis on technocratic 
functions, which undermines the democratic and political meaning of the ICC. Thus, urban 
management and the ICC are seen merely as technocratic functions and institutions, where 
a technocratic rationality overrides democratic governance. The members of the ICC are 
expected to be experts rather than politicians. This partly reflects Article 28 of the ICC Act 
that prevents governmental, legislative and juridical actors from participating as candidates 
in the ICC elections. According to this article, the individuals who are employed in any 
state organisation, including media, city and provincial governors and military heads are 
not permitted to be ICC representatives. A large number of interviewees referred to this and 
argued that the purpose behind this article is to prevent the ICC from being converted into a 
political space. Thus, there was a controversial debate on excluding political actors from 
participating in the ICC as nominees. This technocratic power may initially arise from the 
need to exercise more effective local government in a context of complex issues and 
challenges in the city; and the existence of technical shifts in society. However, the key 
argument here is that urban governance embraces two key dimensions: the 
political/democratic aspect and the technical aspect. Since the ICC is a product of an 





electoral and political process, its existence is not justified without politics; thus, without 
taking politics into account, the ICC‘s position would be reduced to that of an advisory 
board. The political aspects of governance ensure the involvement and contribution of a 
range of individuals and groups in decision-making.  
While the technical aspect of governance focuses on the all-round competence of actors 
involved in governance, what has been revealed mainly from the interview data is a narrow 
emphasis on the level and area of education among councillors instead of an inclusive 
insight into matters of competency. As asserted by an interviewee, ―In terms of quality and 
value some representatives are unfit for this level of decision-making duty and the task is 
heavy for some of them.‖ The implementation of a standard measurement and tool based on 
technical factors to apply throughout the scrutinizing process for selecting capable potential 
candidates was suggested. However, this raises questions about the area of technical 
expertise the ICC candidate should have. According to the interview findings, since the 
ICC is delivering a wide range of technical functions and issues, including transportation, 
planning, environment and health, there is a need to put in place a detailed set of criteria 
stipulating the range of professional actors that should make up the composition of the 
council. However, this would be in contrast with the value of governance and would 
undermine the inclusiveness and significance of the ICC because it is in tension with the 
principle of electoral competition and pluralism. Furthermore, even if such criteria were 
designed, how could these ensure that all the required expertise are actually covered? It can 
be concluded that the critiques on the issues of the ICC representatives‘ competence mainly 
appeared to be linked with misapprehensions about the ICC being a technical institution. 
This false impression negatively affected the level of participation in ICC elections. As was 
discussed through the interviews, some people did not participate in the ICC elections 
because they were unconvinced about the technical competence of the candidates.  
Technocratic governance commonly produces some effective results; however, it does not 
necessarily lead to good governance (Ward, 1998). Of course using experts within the 
make-up of the ICC can be considered positive; but it should not challenge the democratic 
value of the ICC. In addition, the research has revealed that the nature of key issues in the 
city is associated with political rather than technical matters. Therefore, most existing 





challenges in the city require political solutions rather than technocratic ones, and a 
necessity to focus less on executive and technical matters and more on issues of politics. 
Centeno (1994) suggests that the key responsibility of local politicians is to go beyond the 
various experts and consultants; and to give a tangible and solid political response to the 
challenges that citizens are facing. From the researcher‘s viewpoint, the most appropriate 
way to tackle the knowledge and skill deficiency within the ICC is through employing in 
the ICC committees consultants and advisors with relevant awareness of different service 
area, rather than opting to expand the number of councillors or impose educational criteria 
upon ICC candidates. 
In the same way, the selection of the mayor was considered to be a technical task, instead 
of a democratic and political exercise. Once again due to this misconception, the selection 
of mayor through direct participation was believed by many to be unable to guarantee a 
suitable choice of candidates for the mayoral position. Given that it is a specialised task, 
some interviewees argued that ordinary citizens‘ knowledge and understanding about the 
competency of potential nominees is limited, thus direct election may result in an 
inappropriate outcome. Therefore, it was suggested by many that the selection of a mayor 
by the ICC is the most appropriate method. Once again this is a clear sign of the 
domination of a technocratic view of urban governance, in which the ICC is estimated to be 
a pure technical entity with expert knowledge across a wide range of issues, including the 
selection of a mayor. Similarly, some participants argued that there is a need for the 
neighbourhood council members to possess a certain level of knowledge and awareness 
with regard to urban issues. However, from the researcher‘s viewpoint, since 
neighbourhood councils are not handling any executive, administrative or technocratic 
exercises in neighbourhoods, there is no requirement to prescribe the level of education 
needed for neighbourhood council representatives. These issues largely reflect the lack of 
awareness about the role and meaning of the ICC and of the municipality among ordinary 
citizens and among some professional actors. 
  
 





9.3 Competition or collaboration?  
This section presents findings about the quality of interactions between key stakeholders 
and decision-makers in the city. The nature and scope of the investigation was incapable of 
providing the information needed for a comprehensive analysis into all relationships, but 
remarks derived from the participants‘ interviews and the literature yield some insights. 
The section is divided into two parts: the relationship between central and local 
government; and the relationship between the ICC and Municipality.   
9.3.1 The relationship between central and local government 
Undoubtedly, the manner of interactions and communications between and among state and 
local bodies is a crucial factor in shaping governance and once the relationships have been 
cemented, the exercise of governance appears to become easier. However, what was 
revealed through the research is that the absence of adequate interactions and correlations 
between different organisations affects ―how‖ governance is implemented in the city. It was 
argued through the interviews that the design and structural limitations of the governance 
machinery impose contested relationships, instead of interaction and synergy. The co-
existence of elected and appointed institutions in the governance landscape, combined with 
the lack of clarification about roles and interactions between organisations, leads to poor 
quality exchange. Furthermore, the organisational relationships between central 
government on the one hand and local governments and civic associations on the other, is 
viewed in terms of influence and control, instead of support. Akhoundi et al.‟s (2008a) 
review of governance indicates that these organisations do not have efficient horizontal 
interactions with each other and that their functions were formed and defined mainly 
through vertical organisational interactions (Akhoundi et al. 2008a). Supporting this, 
Pejman, the mayor of the Mashhad
1
 Metropolitan municipality, criticised the existing 
governance system by stating that cities are governed through multiple headquarters which, 
instead of correlating effectively, subsist with interference and conflict (Hamshahri, 2010a). 
To some degree, considering the discrepancies between central government and local 
government in complex cities such as Tehran, conflict is natural and inescapable. However, 
one key challenge for governance are the tensions between the central and local 





government. To understand this issue, the research has explored some of the most recent 
contentious cases, mainly arising through the accounts of the interviewees. Such cases 
critically threaten the ecology of interactions. 
Case one: Partial financial decentralization severely limits practical devolution, as well as 
producing tensions. This becomes a challenge for local government, because they are not 
entirely autonomous in financial issues and unable to accomplish key projects through taxes 
and levies. It is the central government‘s responsibility to fiscally support the municipality 
in key areas such as public transportation (e.g. the Metro). However, in many situations 
these fiscal relationships have a negative effect on cooperation and service provision. The 
municipality tends to be blamed for failing to manage its resources; and central government 
is guilty of a lack of effective financial assistance. Shakeeb, a councillor, describes the role 
of the municipality in managing the Metro system as ‗appropriate‘; and considered finance 
as a key challenge for the development of the Metro (Islamic City Council, 2009b). 
Furthermore, Moghimi, MP and head of the construction commission, argued that central 
government‘s resistance to provide financial support for the Metro has continued despite 
the efforts of parliament and of the ICC (Sama, 2010). By contrast, the head of the Traffic 
Supreme Council, an organisation at the national level, blames the municipality for the 
misconduct of financial resources and claims that the central government‘s fiscal support 
was sufficient and consistent with its codes and schedules (Borna, 2010a).  
Case two: Similarly, central government‘s lack of persistence on delegation and of co-
operation with the decentralization process may lead to friction between the central and the 
local government. Government at national level may try to enforce its control, but a severe 
tension exists between the desire for top-down actions and agreement at the local level 
(Rhodes, 1996). 
Following the shift, urban transport management was reassigned from central to local 
government; however, a recent intention to revert this responsibility to central government 
resulted in some inconsistency. The proposal was largely rejected by the ICC, municipality 
and parliament collectively. Talaie, a representative of the ICC, criticizes the proposal 





because it is in contrast with the principle of decentralization and code 44 of the 
constitution (Jam-e-Jam, 2010a). Similarly, Ghalibaf, the mayor of Tehran, states that the 
disagreement of the municipality with the scheme is because the key issue for Metro is 
finance, not administration and management (Shahr, 2010). Furthermore, Hosseinnejad, 
MP and head of the Urban Committee in parliament, argued that the central government‘s 
plan goes against the codes and bylaws that were approved by parliament in 2005, whereby 
responsibility for public transportation was devolved from central government to local 
government (Iraneconomist, 2010).   
Case three: Central government‘s interference in local issues could create friction between 
central and local government. Another controversial proposal made by the central 
government was that it should introduce 22 or 11 governors for Tehran, directed by the 
national vice president. According to the existing pattern, the 22 district mayors are 
undertaking an executive local government role in the districts, so the new proposal was 
considered contradictory. Olia and Nariman, MP and member of the Urban Management 
commission in parliament, suggests that the proposal would lead to the interference of 
government in local affairs and create chaos and disorder in governance (Tehran-Emrooz, 
2010). However, Tamodon, the provincial governor of Tehran argues that the proposal does 
not contrast with municipality functions and would not undermine local government and 
local decision-making. On the contrary, the proposal would facilitate services (Fars, 2010). 
Case four: Segregation between the executive and political structures of urban management 
results in tensions and contrasts. Although aware that the proposal for the partit ion of 
Tehran was unsuccessful with negative social and physical effects, central government 
came up with an attempt to separate Shahre-Ray (district 20) from Tehran. The proposal 
was criticised by the local government. The mayor of Tehran argued that the plan is in 
contrast with the goals of the Tehran Master Plan and that it would undermine the vision for 
the development of the city (Donya-e-Eqtesad, 2010). In the same way, Bayadi, deputy of 
the ICC in Tehran, stated that the plan has spatial and physical consequences for the city 
and would negatively affect the neighbouring districts 15, 16 and 19 (ibid., 2010). In 
addition to these technical views, Masjedjamei, another member of the ICC, considered the 





proposal from a political perspective, believing it was intended to undermine local 
government and bottom-up decision-making (Ilna, 2010a).   
Case five: The central government‘s drive to impose its technical and procedural ideas may 
lead to conflict. This can be illustrated in the central government‘s plan for operating a 
‗monorail‘ in Tehran, in place of developing a ‗Metro‘ system. The scheme, which was 
operationalised in some neighbourhoods of Tehran such as Sadeghiye, was faced with local 
government resistance and confrontation. Central government argues that the scheme has 
technically been given consent through the Supreme Council of Traffic, as the most 
advanced policy-maker in transport for the country. However, if the Transport Master Plan 
for Tehran is considered, there is no evidence of a plan to operate monorail in the city. 
Shakeeb, the ICC representative, suggests that any plan that regards the city needs to be 
certificated by the ICC and that the first priority in transport for local government is 
developing the Metro (Donya-e-Eqtesad, 2007b). In addition, Najafi, a councillor, argued 
that the plan has been formulated based on political motivations instead of expertise 
(Etemad-e-Melli, 2007). Ghalibif, the mayor of Tehran, suggests that based on the 
Transport Master Plan that has received parliamentary consent, the local government is 
held responsible for the management of transportation; therefore, any plan should be 
considered through the municipality and the ICC (Traffic-Tehran, 2007).  
What emerged from the interviews was the emphasis on ‗political factors and 
circumstances‘ in shaping the features of these relationships, more than any systematic 
interactions and organic relations. Indeed, each organisation has dealt with the issues in the 
city according to their own interests and considerations. As was argued by the participants, 
the quality of the relationships between governance stakeholders (central government, the 
ICC and the municipality) depended on their respective political interests. The key issue 
here is that in recent decades the city was led in opposition to, or in divergence from, those 
in office at the national level. In terms of governance this should enhance the distribution of 
power; however, in practice this resulted in political tensions which strongly constrained 
the scope of these entities to make a beneficial contribution to governance.   





9.3.2 Relationships between the ICC and the Municipality  
City management in Iran is established through the ―Council-Manager‖ model (see 
Mouritzen and Svara: 2002). Based on this model, the mayor is selected by the council and 
has executive power in the city; thus the relationship between the ICC and the municipality 
is crucial for governance (ibid. 2002). It is possible that a key role exercised by the ICC is 
the oversight role, delivered through hearings and questions. This mechanism allows the 
ICC to consider cases of municipal misfeasance and obliges the municipality to be 
accountable for its actions. Based on the findings, the existing approach to ‗accountability‘ 
appears to be the result of an acceptable interaction between the ICC and the Municipality. 
In line with this, the Head of the Social and Cultural Commission in the province‘s 
supreme councils believes that despite some of these challenges, the cities have benefited 
from interactions between the councils and the municipalities (Fars, 2008). This supports 
Lapuente (2010) who argued that the Council-Manager model leads to a distinction in 
powers between the council and the municipality, which can facilitate an effective working 
relationship.   
 
However, some evidence in the research shows that institutional and design barriers have 
an effect on delivering the existing role of the ICC in relation to the municipality. Such a 
view is indeed a point worthy of consideration and reflects the views expressed by Biadi, 
the ICC deputy. He criticized the municipality because of its disregard of several 
regulations authorised by the council, stating that ignoring the council‘s guidelines and 
policies is endemic to the actions of the municipality (Irib, 2010; and Borna 2010b). 
Kashani, another representative of the ICC, expresses the view that the state of 
accountability in the municipality with regard to regulations approved by the ICC is 
insufficient (Iran Network, 2010). He considers the municipality‘s response to these 
regulations to be reluctant and inadequate (ibid., 2010). Furthermore, Ahmadinejad, a 
councillor in the ICC argued that the monitoring role of the ICC has not been taken into 
account seriously by the municipality (Zaman, 2011).  
 





As revealed through the interviews, fiscal disagreement is an issue that has undermined the 
interaction between the ICC and the Municipality. As an example, Daneshjo, the ICC 
spokesman, criticizes the municipality for overspending on some projects: in some cases, 
the municipality spent three times more than the approved financial plan (Jam-e-Jam, 
2010b). He argues that due to this issue, there is a significant delay in accomplishing other 
key projects (ibid., 2010). Supporting this, Shakeeb, the ICC representative, claims that 
―within the ICC, no-one wants to blame the municipality. However, Ghaalibaf [the Mayor 
of Tehran] should be aware that the municipality‘s financial procedures in the pecuniary 
and capital sectors have not been transparent‖ (ILNA, 2010: 4b). Contrasting with this 
view, Poorzarandi, the financial and administrative deputy of the municipality, claims that 
the municipality‘s financial affairs are entirely transparent (Communications and 
International Affairs of Tehran Municipality, 2010).  
What has emerged from the empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that the ICC is not 
fully equipped to play its monitoring role, as somehow regulations authorised by the ICC 
tend to be disrespected by the municipality. This affects interactions between the ICC and 
the municipality. These inconsistencies are linked mainly with issues of process rather than 
the structural features of the institutions in question; and relate to the regulations and 
criteria set to systematise the relations between the ICC and municipality. For instance, 
there are no specified procedures for conducting inquiries and hearings. In the same way, 
there is no clear-cut process through which the municipality can technically challenge the 
regulations approved by the ICC; thus these processes and mechanisms are not clear for 
either organisation. To support this, Azarbayjani et al. (2007) and Beheshti (2001) argued 
that the interactions between the two institutions required greater definition and the 
establishment of a more joined-up and balanced relationship. Clearly, one key issue is the 
relationship between the ICC and the municipality; here, it is worth noting that based on  
the ICC Act, the ICC can suspend the mayor for any abuse of office. However, since the 
ICC has no such power over the district mayors (22 districts) and the senior executives in 
the municipality, this results in poor working relationships and in an accountability deficit 
between the chief executives and the ICC. In some interviews it was suggested that the ICC 
should be given the power to terminate the employment of these senior municipality 





executives. Contrasting with this position, Akhoundi et al. (2008b) argued that such a 
proposal can lead the ICC to impinge on the executive responsibility of the municipality.  
Furthermore, the technical limitations of the ICC are counted as a barrier to the effective 
implementation of its role. As was heard throughout the interviews, the ICC is ill-equipped 
financially, affecting the extent to which it can oversee the work of executives. Thus, the 
ICC‘s investigative capacities with regards to gaining information on the municipal 
executive agencies are considerably restricted. Apart from such institutional and technical 
issues, once again the role of political factors in shaping these interactions was revealed 
through the research. One of the expert interviewees from an academic institution 
mentioned the following with regard to the issue of interaction between the ICC and the 
municipality: 
Where governance stakeholders have somewhat comparable political 
interests and have originated from identical political tendencies, the 
interactions and relationships have been strong. 
 
This remark also relates to what is observed within the literature. For example, Akhoundi et 
al. (2008) argued that it seems that the relationships between the council and the 













9.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the main issues that emerged from the research. It begins with a 
discussion of the UN-Habitat Urban Governance Index (UGI) assessment method and its 
features. The assessment provides a broad outline of governance in Tehran. However, the 
research identified a number of issues which cannot be covered by such an assessment 
method. One general critique is that this method is unable to narrate the full story of 
governance in Tehran because it was unable to analyse key aspects and factors involved in 
governance. Furthermore, while the UGI laid its emphasis on the outcome indicators, the 
‗input‘ and ‗process‘ indicators were missing from the assessment. This has led to an 
overemphasis on the result aspect. In fact the main divergence between the result from the 
UN-Index on the one hand and the interview findings on the other hand is that the UN-
approach failed to capture and cover complex dimensions and variations in Tehran, which  
largely materialised through the interview findings.    
The research findings show widespread central government involvement in the running of 
the city. In the central government ministries, departments are profoundly involved in city 
management, crowding out the involvement of the local government authority. Research 
shows that because these central government branches are directly involved in the 
management of urban affairs, the role of local government is strictly limited, thus reducing 
the input of local democracy. Basically the matter of the legislative and institutional 
limitations of the ICC differentiates the actual Council from its original and intended 
position in the constitution, as has been widely articulated throughout the study. This has an 
effect on public input and trust. The research shows that in order to realise decentralisation, 
local entities want to be offered further space and autonomy, for the purposes of which 
devolution is required, to bring about an appropriate transfer of authority and resources 
from the state to the local government.   
This chapter has stated that the strategy for governance has not been translated into a 
meaningful reality on the ground. The lack of integrated urban management and the 
existence of multiple stakeholders lacking any kind of homogeneity in the city are 
considered to be a serious issue. This has a negative effect on accountability and 





responsiveness of the local government. The discussion of the quality of relationships 
between governance stakeholders has shown that since these actors and stakeholders are 
mainly lacking in horizontally-compatible and focused relationships and objectives, poor 
interactions between them result. Institutional and design-related issues, fiscal 
disagreements, central government interference and political contests are considered to be 
major grounds for tensions between the stakeholders, undermining the capacity for good 














         1.Mashhad is the second largest Metropolitan city in Iran.
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This chapter brings together the overall outcomes of this study on governance and 
participation in Tehran and addresses the central research aim of exploring the dynamic 
nature of and the interrelationships between, the factors that influence urban governance 
and local participation in Tehran. Based on the findings, it recommends ways through 
which the existing barriers and hindrances could be minimised and therefore the principles 
and meanings of governance achieved in a more effective manner. Furthermore, the chapter 
will discuss the limitations of the research, its contribution to knowledge and topics and 
recommendations for further research within the field of urban governance, and how these 
findings can help governance in practice. 
 
10.1 Achievement of the Research Aims 
As discussed in the section 1.1, it is apparent that decision-makers have attempted to 
establish the new urban machinery of governance via a transformative process that has been 
referred to as ‗the shift‘. The shift has influenced the city in many ways, including its 
strategies, policy-making, and governance. In terms of enhancing governance principles, 
the shift has affected accountability, transparency and participation. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the research aimed to assess governance and participation in Iran. The data 
evaluated in this study underlines the general trend and course that key decision-makers are 
taking and their attitudes towards participation.        
Based on the data triangulated and analysed, the findings of this research have shown that a 
number of the issues and circumstances that affect urban governance and participation in 
Iran‘s cities appear to be linked with the general features revealed in the research literature, 
while others have emerged in explicit association with the Iranian context. The research 
considered the hindrances and barriers that affect the implementation of governance 
mechanisms to be dynamic in nature, as the issues continued to be active, even unsteady, 





through all phases of the research. The next section sets out a debate on the independent 
response to each research question.  
 
10.2 Responses to the Research Questions 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the central aim of this research was ―to explore the dynamic 
nature of and the interrelationships between, the factors that influence urban governance 
and local participation in Tehran‖.  
Three questions were established in order to achieve the central aim of this research, as 
follows:   
1.  How can urban governance be evaluated? 
2. Which of the basics of good urban governance in Tehran are currently adequate or    
failing? 
3. What measures can be taken to improve governance in Tehran? 
 
To deal with the first query, the research considered the preceding investigations existing in 
recent literature on the subject of governance, its factors and values, as discussed in Chapter 
2. Furthermore, taking the features and elements within the literature into account allowed 
the foundation of the selection of a well-established method for assessing governance, 
which was required to address the second research question. What has been achieved from 
this literature review is an understanding of governance with an emphasis on four general 
values and principles: participation, accountability, equity and effectiveness. Governance 
should aim to take on these values practically and inclusively in order to realise “good 
governance‖.   
Chapter 4 assessed urban governance in Tehran using the UN-Habitat Urban Governance 
Index. The assessment sets out four governance principles identified through the literature. 
These are detailed in Tables 4-9 and 4-10. The assessment identified accountability as the 





most enhanced and participation as the weakest area of governance in Tehran. Based on 
these primary results and drives from implementation of the UN-assessment, the following 
four subsidiary questions were also addressed.  
SQ1: How is the Islamic City Council (ICC) functioning in Tehran? 
 SQ2: Why is the voter turnout in local elections insufficient? 
SQ3: Based on existing governance circumstances, what is the most appropriate method for 
mayoral selection in Tehran?  
 
SQ4: How are public forums and civic associations functioning in Tehran? 
To answer these complementary questions and to investigate and assess the dynamic nature 
of urban governance and participation in Tehran five indicators of participation, which 
were identified by the UN Index, were selected for the study: elected council, voter 
turnout, selection of mayor, public forum and civic association. Exploring these areas 
also inclusively and explicitly identified the governance gaps in the Iranian context; and the 
measures which needed to be taken into account to enhance urban governance in Tehran.  
 
Islamic City Council (ICC) 
Most of the participants considered the elected council as the major outcome of the local 
governance shift in 1997. The new decentralising mechanisms introduced by the shift (i.e. 
the electoral process and selection of mayor) contrasts with the centralised mode of 
decision-making in Iran. As shown by the data, the interviewees have argued for the 
enhancement of devolution at the local level through the establishment of the elected 
council. The Elected Council brings the decision-makers closer to the citizens and improves 
the responsiveness and transparency of decision-making processes. According to Matani 
(2003) the formation of the ICC upholds the decentralization and transfer of power. In 
general most interviewees supported the role of the ICC in improving accountability 
through its monitoring role with regards to the municipality (as discussed in Table 5.1). 





Many highlighted that prior to the establishment of the ICC, city management tasks had 
been faced with serious deficiencies with regards to transparency. As a consequence of the 
newly achieved accountability, trust and confidence have to some extent been enhanced 
through the establishment of the ICC.    
As discussed in Chapter 2, the UN‘s Millennium Project (2004) sets out a scheme of 
proposals and suggestions towards gender equality in decision-making and to give greater 
power to women.  Based on this study‘s findings, the ICC provides innovative pathways 
and means to further gender-equity and women‘s engagement in city governance. It is 
evident from the data that the ICC offered a higher proportion of the available capacity to 
women. Women representatives‘ performance in the City Council demonstrate their 
―capability and aptitude confidently‖, as they play a key role in decision-making in the city. 
However, due to both social and technical factors, the municipality‘s capacity to allocate its 
key decision-making posts (e.g. the district mayor or deputy mayor) to women has not been 
realised.   
Based on the data analysis, none of the stakeholders interviewed argued that the ICC is an 
ideal elected council. As noted in section 5.2 which analysed the ICC, there are various 
limitations and barriers that need to be addressed within the Councils. The analysis 
identified three major obstacles to the process of implementing good urban governance: 
institutional and legislative, structural and technical, and political limitations. With 
reference to the ICC‘s limitations, a large number of stakeholders emphasised institutional 
constraints, rather than technical and political hindrances. As is evident from the data, the 
legislative and institutional limitations of the ICC distance the ICC from its original 
position in the constitution. As noted in the analysis according to Code 103 of the 
constitutional law, central government executives, including governors and managers in 
cities and at the provincial scale, are obliged to respect the Council‘s decisions. However, 
by referring to the latest regulations, governmental organisations or administrators can 
waive their obligations to respect the council‘s decisions and orders. Thus according to 
existing circumstances the experts believed that the ICC is far from functioning as an 
―urban parliament‖ or a ―city council‖. It was suggested by the experts that the 





―municipality‘s council‖ is a more realistic label for the present ICC system in Iran. This is 
due to the partial nature of devolution, as many responsibilities and roles have not been 
transferred from central government and its departments to the local bodies. This notion is 
in line with what Akhoundi et al. (2008a) noted with regard to the devolution of power and 
tasks of Iranian central government to local authorities being considered as deficient in its 
realisation.    
Voter turnout 
As discussed in Chapter 2, elections are considered as the core characteristic of democratic 
politics (Dulani, 2005). Based on the interview findings, the ICC‘s elections are considered 
to be a key feature for enhancing urban public participation. Most interviewees suggested 
that the ICC elections uphold general democratic principles at the city level as every citizen 
is offered equal rights to participate in city affairs. However, some stakeholders were 
sceptical with regard to ICC elections. According to this vision, while the achievement of 
good governance should be associated with the understanding and implementation of both 
representative and participatory governance, the ICC elections merely focus on the 
representative kind.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, while generally in Iran the level of voter turnout in the general 
elections (i.e. presidential elections) is high; at the city level (i.e. council elections) the level 
of participation is low. In the same way, the level of participation in the ICC elections in 
Tehran appeared to be even lower than the voter turnout at the national level, meaning that 
the level of participation in Tehran is even lower than the country‘s average in the ICC 
elections. This is due to several factors (as presented in table 6.1). One of these is that local 
governance is in its early phases of evolution in Iran, as it was only in 1997 that policy-
makers came to a decision about the implementation of local democracy. Its achievement 
therefore needs to be ―gradual‖ and ―timely‖. This also resonates with what is argued by 
Wilde et al. (2008: 5): ―Decentralized governance and building its processes is not a quick 
fix‖. Another barrier mentioned by the stakeholders is the manner in which the organisation 
and its decision-makers have dealt with the ICC elections. The lack of a ―collective mode 





of determination‖ with regard to the ICC elections existed, in contrast to the general 
elections. Various associations, including ―governmental‖ and ―non-governmental‖ 
organisations, are ―besieged‖ to get involved in general election procedures, thus society is 
fully equipped for the election processes. However, this sort of ―willpower and driving-
force‖ has not existed in the ICC elections. To enhance voter turnout in the ICC elections 
the following recommendations are put forward by various stakeholders: 
 
a) Combined Elections: This view is based on the suggestion that the combination of the 
ICC elections with national elections, particularly presidential elections, will result in an 
increase in the level of voter participation (see Table 6.2). This combination supports the 
electoral enthusiasm that already exists in society during the presidential elections. This is 
likely to lead to a more consistent voter turnout in the ICC elections. This resonates with 
the view of Chamran, the head of the ICC in Tehran, who suggests that the level of 
participation in councils can be enhanced by a combination of local elections (council 
elections) and general elections (parliamentary and presidential elections) (Islamic 
Republic News Agency, 2010c). 
 
b) Enhancing Public Trust and Awareness: As discussed throughout the interviews, trust 
is considered as a pivotal point for the level of voter turnout. This reflects Franklin‘s (2004) 
claim that turnout is lower when the results of elections make little difference. What 
surfaced from the data about public awareness supported the view that public understanding 
of the ICC and of its elections are insufficient. There is a need to focus on building citizens‘ 
awareness, knowledge and experience with regard to local democracy and participation in 
the city 
 
c) Inclusive and fair selection: Based on the interview findings, inclusiveness in the 
selection of the ICC candidates appeared not to be fully achieved through the ICC electoral 
procedures. Thus, the way in which the monitoring bureau screens potential candidates is 
implicated. Interviewees observed the need for an impartial selection of individuals without 
discrimination and favouritism. It was suggested that an appropriate mechanism would be 
based on guidelines and codes instead of narrowed politicised interests, and be designed to 





recruit a variety of individuals and disciplines for the purpose of election. The research 
confirms Franklin‘s (2004) view that there is a reduction in voter turnout when an election 
is not seen as competitive and inclusive.  
 
d) Enhancing the ICC‟s institutional position: Findings in this section mainly reflect the 
institutional, technical and structural limitations of the ICC, which were discussed broadly 
in chapter 5. This is based on the suggestion that citizens are not convinced about the 
competence and capability of the ICC because of the ICC‘s insufficient political power in 
the overall governance of the city. The findings are in line with Boddy and Parkinson 
(2005: 121) that the ―process of participation is sustainable where power is devolved‖. This 
also resonates with what is argued by Pateman (1970). As well as the quantity of 
participation, the quality of participation and how much of an effect citizens had on the 
outcome of the policy process is key for voter turnout (Pateman, 1970). 
 
Selection of Mayor 
 
Based on the interview findings, the direct participation model appears to be the most 
appropriate method for the selection of the mayor. The data indicates that this method 
would lead to promoting democratic principles and devolution in the city; and could offer 
more weight, credit and influence to the municipality. The stakeholders‘ view is based on 
the suggestion that subsequent to the shift in 1997, mayoral election would be the second 
major practical action towards decentralisation and devolution at city level. They argued 
that the public‘s direct contribution could enhance ―accountability‖ and ―responsiveness‖ in 
the municipality, in contrast to the existing system where the municipality is accountable to 
the ICC. According to this vision, in the existing method (selection of mayor through the 
ICC) lobbies and outsiders play a major role in appointing the mayor. They go on to 
suggest that the existing method may play a role in hindering trust in the process of 
mayoral selection, arguing that,  ―The processes and circumstances of selection of the 
mayor are ambiguous and unclear for the general public.‖ According to interviewees, the 
fear of being sacked by the ICC made the mayoral position ―unsteady‖ and ―shaky‖ thus 





making mayors less effective and efficient actors in the existing format. In many cases it 
appears that mayors can be sacked on the basis of ―political‖ and ―tactical‖ dissimilarities 
instead of ―practical‖ and ―technical‖ bases. Through the implementation of the direct 
election proposal, the mayor could not be sacked without any convincing reason. However, 
as Lapuente (2010) suggests, this method is not without its limitations. For example, 
according to the council-manager model (the existing model in Iran), the distribution and 
separation of powers between the elected legislator and the independently elected executive 
in the city has been achieved. Nevertheless, in the direct participation model (mayor-
council) a high degree of concentration of power exists in the municipality (ibid., 2010). 
Supporting this point, a number of participants mentioned that the proposed direct 
participation method would lead to a decrease in the degree to which ICC voices and 
decisions are heard and respected. As discussed in Chapter 4 and 7, constitutionally the 
selection of the mayor is not the key duty of the ICC; but it nevertheless plays a significant 
role in shaping and forming the other ICC functions. As a result, if the ICC were to lose 
this role, it is likely that its monitoring role would be undermined as well, leading to 
failures in accountability and responsiveness in the municipality. They viewed the scheme 
as a gradual expunging of the ICC. This also resonates with what is argued by Falaschetti 
and Miller (2001) about the council-manager model of urban management, based on which 
the city executive is appointed by the council board. They believe that in such a model, the 
efficiencies of the corporation are better sustained in comparison with the mayor-council 
model in which both the executive and legislative organisation are elected separately by the 
direct participation method.   
   
The previous method of selection of the mayor (through the Ministry of State) was 
considered as overly-bureaucratic, centrally managed and politicised. Thus, it was rejected 
by 55 interviewees representing all groups. However, a limited number of interviewees 
supported the previous method, on the grounds of the existing tensions between the 
municipality and the ICC. They defined the previous method as a ―solid, integrated and 
steady‖ form of urban management. According to their view the conflict between the 
municipality and the ICC largely affected the municipality‘s performance. ―In the existing 





method, the average time that each mayor is in municipal office is only one year and a few 
months‖, as one of the respondents put it. 
 
Neighbourhood Councils (public forums) 
 
As noted in Chapter 8, the neighbourhood councils were established following the shift in 
1999 aiming to form a mechanism for participation at the lowest level of urban decision-
making. Most participants, spread across the different stakeholder groups, demonstrated an 
overwhelming interest in the establishment of neighbourhood councils. Indeed, it is 
emphasised that the ―good‖ neighbourhood council should support the ―good governance 
code‖ and ―standards‖, and aim to strengthen the values and ideals of good urban 
governance. The neighbourhood councils are expected to operate as a mechanism for the 
public to express robust opinions and communicate with decision-makers in a legitimated 
manner. The neighbourhood councils in principle aim to offer every citizen equal rights to 
get involved and everyone‘s voice should be heard in neighbourhood councils. Based on 
the research findings, the neighbourhood councils have constructive effects on two issues: 
1) enhancement of governance values and principles; and 2) enhancement of policy-making 
and services (see Table 8.1).  
 
The findings confirmed the inclusiveness and possibility of being selected as a nominee in 
the neighbourhood councils, as well as the openness and availability of the neighbourhood 
council meetings to all local residents. One crucial advantage of neighbourhood councils is 
the fact that their representatives are elected through direct participation. According to most 
participants the method of selection is devoid of any discrimination and partiality towards 
women, the disabled, the disadvantaged and ethnic minority groups. In the same way, it 
was suggested that trust had been affected positively throughout the Neighbourhood 
Council implementation. ―The approval and recognition of decisions in neighbourhoods 
made by the urban machinery is enhanced among local residents” as one of the respondents 
put it. The participants argued that in their capacity as members of the neighbourhood 
council, neighbourhood representatives can affect the way in which information is 





disseminated among local citizens. The point about strengthening social capital was also 
recognised by interviewees. Their view is based on the suggestion that through the 
neighbourhood council democracy can be practiced; and ordinary citizens can learn how to 
elect and be elected.  
 
The neighbourhood councils‘ effect and influence on the city are linked more with the level 
of ―local servicing‖ and ―local basics‖, rather than with policy-making. It was noted that the 
delivery and quality of neighbourhood services has been to some extent enhanced through 
the neighbourhood councils. According to this vision, the key function of neighbourhood 
councils is first to ―identify‖ and ―monitor‖ neighbourhood issues, and second to bring 
about ―consultation‖ and ―collaboration‖ with the local authority ( i.e. the ICC and the 
Municipality) to address these issues.  
 
However, the implementation of the neighbourhood councils is not without its impediments 
(see Table 8.2). The lack of efficient coordination and correlation between various spheres 
of urban decision-making with regard to the neighbourhood council was remarked upon by 
participants. Based on the research findings the neighbourhood councils have been faced 
with the ―lack of a convinced attitude‖; ―uncertainty‖ and ―unwillingness‖ among decision-
makers. Despite their achievements in the ―identification‖ of neighbourhood concerns and 
partly in the ―consultation‖ with decision-makers, the neighbourhood councils were unable 
to constructively collaborate and associate with local authorities. This view is in line with 
what Kazemian and Shadmanfar (2008) noted, saying that this is mainly due to the fact that 
neighbourhood councils are not considered collectively by decision-makers as an orthodox 
and legitimated consultative body and therefore rarely have a significant influence on 
policy-making.  
 
As evident from the data, citizens‘ awareness about neighbourhood councils was 
summarized in their knowledge of the existence of councils in their neighbourhoods. A 
common state of affairs was captured by the words of one participant in the study: 





―personally I am not fully aware about what is going on in my Neighbourhood Council and 
I am uninformed of the agendas and programmes that are scheduled at my local council.‖  
 
Civic Associations  
 
It has been emphasised that the full operation of civic associations could lead to the 
realisation of participatory governance and enhance social capital. According to the 
participants there are significant relationships between civic associations and social capital. 
The enhancement of civic associations results from the building of social capital. Similarly, 
civic associations with capacities of knowledge and experience can be considered as 
motivators and foundations for building social capital. Civic associations are deep-rooted in 
their respective fields in terms of their make-up and connections; they can collectively 
―facilitate‖, ―accelerate‖ and ―simplify‖ public inputs into urban matters.  
The key strength of civic associations in Iran was mainly summarised in their tradition and 
history. Thus, the ―traditional associative spaces‖ such as charitable foundations, communal 
companies and cooperatives (Ta‟avoniha); charitable trust banks (Sandooghe 
Gharzolhasaneh); donor institutions and religious communities (Hey‟athaye mazhabi); 
play a key role in forming and shaping existing civic associations in Iran. However, 
concerns over the independence and autonomy of these associations were raised. One 
reason for this is that they are largely reliant upon government financial supports.  
As evident from the data, most stakeholders argue that the influence of civic associations 
on city governance procedures is ―negligible‖ and that their position in the urban machinery 
has been ―ignored‖. Based on the interview findings, this ―segregation‖ is caused by two 
issues: 1) central government attitudes towards civic associations; and 2) internal and 
technical hindrances (see Table 8.3). According to interviewees, the dominant top-down 
attitudes towards these associations are ones of ―suspicion‖ and ―doubt‖ rather than 
―promotion‖ and ―endorsement‖. This also resonates with what is argued by Khrestin 
(2006) and Unerman and O‘Dwyer (2006). Recently central governments have emphasized 
the scrutiny of the autonomy of civic associations through examining their financial 





procedures and their political behaviours, due to the suspicion that they were in effect 
overseas agents (ibid, 2006). 
 
Furthermore in terms of technical hindrances, the issue of transparency was considered as 
one of major concern for civic associations. This reflects the views made clear by Raynard 
(2000) and Naidoo (2004) that a dearth of transparency in civic associations is both 
destroying the reputation of the sector, and opposing to its values and principles. All civic 
association interviewees emphasised the complexity of procedures along with 
―bureaucratic‖ and ―institutional‖ barriers. According to the civic associations interviewed, 
the process of registration, as required by the central government scrutiny process, is time-
consuming, fussy, ambiguous and without precise milestones. Financial matters are 
considered as a significant limitation for civic associations. Due to this issue, a lack of 
facilities and a place and location in which to carry out their meetings are widespread 




The following sections consider recommendations emerging from the analysis of data and 
research findings.  
 
The deficit in institutional weight has been considered a crucial challenge for local 
associations in general and the ICC in particular. The insufficient legal capacity of local 
government and local government‘s existence under conditions of insufficient autonomy 
still serve as basis for lack of ‗good urban governance‘. As discussed in chapter 9, local 
government responsibilities are mainly limited to servicing and providing urban 
infrastructures in the city. The data (as highlighted in section 5.2.3) also indicate that local 
government voices are not heard on many key issues in the city. Because central 
government has not transferred sufficient competencies to local government, a centralised 
dominance and unbalanced interaction of levels of governance is noticeable. In order to 
address the matter, central government needs to transfer the tasks and responsibilities 
projected in ‗Act 44‘ and articles 136 and 137 of the country‘s third and fourth 





Development Schemes, into local government. Since facing delays and resistances (as 
highlighted in Chapter 9), the Acts are not consistently implemented and law enforcement 
remains inefficient. To accelerate and ensure the processes of devolution, these processes 
need to be supported and monitored by parliament in a more effective way. The 
empowering of local government should not be limited to transferring insignificant 
responsibilities from central to local government, rather a certain level of power at the local 
level needs to be assured. For instance, the limited fiscal capacity and autonomy of the 
municipality commonly results in significant hindrances to the city-making and managing 
competence of local government. There is a need to offer autonomy in designing and 
implementing long-term economic programmes, strategies and development plans on 
financial matters.  
 
The effectiveness of the Neighbourhood Council (forums) with reference to public 
participation would be practicable if two conditions were met. Firstly, the forums must be 
fully staffed through the neighbourhoods; thus they must not draw from a pool of personnel 
that reaches beyond local actors and stakeholders. Secondly, the state and urban executives‘ 
attitudes toward the Neighbourhood Council need to be improved. This view is based on 
the suggestion that to act dynamically, the Neighbourhood Council must be continually 
interacting and communicating with its stakeholders in both directions. On the one hand it 
should be fully conversant with the bottom tiers (citizens and community based 
organisations). Their interactions with these kinds of grassroots institutions, community 
based organisations and NGOs at the local level can considerably enhance their efficiency. 
On the other hand it is necessary for forums to be entirely supported from the higher level 
of state and urban headquarters; consequently an appropriate level of institutional voices 
and weight and long-term strategies need to be offered to the forums.   
 
The issue of a lack of well-established and structured formation of political parties was 
highlighted through the interviews. Thus, without a systematic and fair party system, it is 
hard to believe that fairness, trust, inclusion and collegiality will be ensured in the electoral 
processes. Furthermore, this affects the level of voter turnout in elections. According to 





Franklin (2004), when the political system is seen as markedly segregated, the level of 
participation reduces. He suggests that the existence of main parties or coalitions which 
present consistency and integration to the system can emerge as crucial (ibid. 2004). 
 
According to research findings, the major strengths of local participation in Iran are 
reflected in their traditions and history. Prior to the establishment of the existing initiatives 
(i.e. public forums, ICC) in 1997, neighbourhood foundations (i.e. Anjomanhaye mahalat) 
were in operation throughout Iran‘s established history, whereby the bulk of issues at the 
neighbourhood level were tackled through the traditional mechanisms of participation. 
Thus, local participation in Iran could be considered as both very old and very new. 
Therefore, instead of launching governance initiatives through simply adopting a model, 
the necessity of evolving initiatives according to local circumstances and the needs of 
citizens are clear.   
 
10.4 Research Contribution  
 
There has been a substantial increase in the amount of literature on the issues in question, 
as detailed in section 2.1. This research has added to that body of work by researching a 
city that has been overlooked and neglected in the literature. This research makes an 
original contribution to the literature by evaluating urban governance in Tehran (as depicted 
in figures 4.9 and 4.10). This evaluation has emerged and developed from the initial 
deployment of the UN-Habitat UGI assessment method to present the position of urban 
governance in Tehran. In fact, there is no pre-existing research in Iran pertaining to the 
assessment of urban governance. This study helps to fill the gap. The study also promotes a 
greater understanding of using the UN-UGI assessment, revealing to policy-makers and 
researchers some of the deficiencies and limitations associated with it that prevent its 
outcomes from being comprehensive (see section 9.1). Thus, this assessment method was 
unable to narrate the full story of urban governance in Tehran and it became clear that there 
is a need to observe a certain level of caution in using it. This study then continued to 
develop its understanding of Tehran‘s urban governance through using case study research 





methods mainly based on a qualitative investigation. The research adds to the field of urban 
and local governance through providing a dynamic view of factors that affect urban 
governance and citizen participation. This approach highlights institutional, legal and 
technical factors and interrelationships between these factors that affect quality of 
governance. The research presents the nature of deficiencies within various governance 
spheres: at the national and urban level, bottom-level institutions and citizens. There are 
also suggestions for some ways forward in tackling the identified governance and 
participation deficits. This account formulates the groundwork for offering a deeper insight 
into city governance and participation factors in a specifically Iranian context. As central to 
the entire discipline of governance, achieving citizens‘ participation and engagement would 
be a key driving force for good governance and enhancing its principles and values.  The 
research findings that can assist key governance policy-makers and decision-makers to take 
into account the elements and essentials of city governance and participation, in order to 
augment the likelihood of success in their agenda with reference to governance. Due to the 
significance of the issue of participation for society, reviewing the factors and features 
which essentially influence and shape the formation of governance in cities would be a 
practical manner in which to highlight the essentials and affect the predominant attitudes 
among key decision-makers with regard to the concept of participation. 
 
One issue with regards to the assessment of governance is the over-emphasis on 
quantitative approaches (Gissendannerô, 2003). Furthermore the main existing assessments, 
which are mainly delivered by international agents, are drawn from data published in 
administrative documents and statistics, without any effort to achieve bottom-up input. This 
study therefore contributes to filling the gap through using qualitative methods, and the 
range of various stakeholders‘ perspectives, including ordinary citizens, involved in 
governance. Using a range of stakeholders‘ perspectives allows the study to establish a 









10.5 Limitations of research  
 
Similar to any research project, this study was not without its limitations. The following 
accounts address the limitations of this study. The first issue is that the outcomes of this 
research are symptomatic and not conclusive and comprehensive. The core results can be 
explored and analysed in more detail and in a more focused way through a large scale 
quantitative study approach. The second limitation is that as the research focused on 
Tehran, the results and findings of this study cannot be generalised to other places and 
situations without further exploration.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 there is extensive amount of literature on governance assessment, 
indicators and sub-indicators, that has been designed by international and national bodies 
intending to measure governance. Nevertheless, there is currently no set of rules on how 
governance analysis should be designed, managed, or phased. It was therefore, tricky to 
distinguish which approach would be the most inclusive and exhaustive. This undoubtedly 
made the researcher hesitant and confused about identifying and selecting the most 
appropriate method of assessment. Although the approach ultimately selected was the well-
established UN-UGI approach to governance measurement, its primary list of indicators 
can be considered inexhaustive. However, measures were taken through the qualitative 
interviews to reduce the deficiency of indicators and sub-indicators. These indicators and 
sub-indicators continued to be improved and revised following the pilot case study and data 
gathering phases.        
 
Since the interviews were conducted in Persian, translating original data from Persian into 
English was risky, as some expressions in Persian had no specified meaning in English or 
some similar English words had a different meaning in Persian. The researcher had to try to 
discover a manner of defining a range of words and expressions accurately and precisely 
without losing their original meanings.  
 
 





10.6 Future research  
 
There are several implications from the research findings that are of note for further 
research in governance. The results emerging from the five defined areas of governance 
assessment can be tested independently in a more focused way using a quantitative 
approach. For example, assessing the ‗methods‘ through which the selection of a mayor 
should be conducted can be ascertained from a large scale quantitative research study. 
Similarly, the turnout deficit in local elections can be tested using a quantitative approach 
to achieve a wider and more numerically proportionate sample.        
 
More study could be conducted into the role of the ICC as a legislative and monitoring 
body in the city, discovering the role of ICC representatives towards the policy 
development and monitoring agendas in the city. These issues could help the public in 
defining the effectiveness of the ICC for governance. Further study is needed regarding the 
application of devolution and decentralisation. For instance, it will be interesting to 
investigate and see if local government capacity is able to apply the transferral of 
responsibilities and tasks from central government to local government.   
 
10.7 Conclusion  
 
        This final chapter has given responses to the research questions. In addition, the urban 
governance features that have been established within the Iranian context have been 
ntegrated with those identified in the literature. Based on the research findings, a number of 
suggestions have been offered regarding how urban governance can be improved. The 
contribution of the research to the existing body of knowledge was viewed in terms of a 
number of issues, such as filling an important gap, by researching a city that has been 
overlooked and neglected in literature; as well as providing a research approach and 
methods for implementing this. This chapter has also presented some ideas for future 
research in urban/local governance areas deriving from this study, as well as a 
consideration of the limits and constraints to the research which have been faced by the 





researcher. The results of the research fundamentally show that good urban governance is 
highly complex in nature and its implementation requires both time and vision. 
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Appendix 1: Information Sheet for Participants 
 
 
University of Newcastle 
School of Architecture, Planning 
and Landscape 
  
Interview: Urban Governance and Participation 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in this original research project. You should only 
take part if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. 
Before you decide whether you want to take part‘ it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or 
if you would like more information. 
 The purpose of this interview is to aid the researcher in developing a survey for the 
purpose of assessing urban governance structure and function in Iran/ Tehran. I am doing 
this research because I want to understand how the urban governance is functioning 
currently in Tehran and the research is intended to support future improvements in the 
urban governance system. You are being asked to review the proposed questionnaire and 
share your experience with the researcher.  I will ask you about your opinions on urban 
governance practices. I am particularly interested in how you assume urban governance 
shift has obtained good governance features in Iran. It is expected that this will require no 
more than 1 hour of your time. There are minimal risks expected as a result of this study. 
In the unlikely event that you experience any anxiety or discomfort due to the discussion 
during interview, please notify researcher.  
The information obtained through this interview will be kept confidential by the 
researcher. Your name will not be identified with any information collected during this 
research project, without your written permission to do so.  Questions or concerns 
 





regarding this study can be directed to the researcher:  Zahed Shafiei at, 
zahed.shafiei@newcastle.ac.uk.  
It is up to you to decide whether, or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign up a consent form. If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason, 
if you decided that you no longer want to be part of the research project.  
 
Thanks for Your Cooperation 





Appendix 2: Themes of Interviews  
 
Part One: General Questions on Urban Transformation   
- Defining the public participation 
- Governance transformation in 1997 contributions 
Part Two: Islamic City Council 
- Urban council as a mechanism help to progress urban governance 
- Council‘s skeleton and structure 
- Relationships and interactions between the elected councils and municipality 
- The council effectiveness in offering a chance for women participation 
Part Three:  Municipality and Selection of mayor 
- Citizen awareness and inform about the municipality decisions 
- The relationships between municipality and central government 
- Appropriate method for selection of mayor  
Part Four: Voter Turnout  
- Urban and local elections affect on urban governance 
- Voter turnout in local elections 
- The existing barriers in voter turnout in local elections 
Part Five: Public Forum/ Neighbourhood Council  
- The effectiveness of forum towards interaction of citizens and local government  
- The effectiveness of forums to address neighbourhood concerns 
- Citizen experiences with of non-electoral forms of participation 
 
Part Six: Civic Association and NGOs 
- Citizen awareness on and interaction with Civic Association 










Appendix 3: Consent Form for Participants in Research Study 
 
Thank you for thinking about taking part in this research. Please complete this form after 
you have read the Information Sheet.  
 
Title of Study: Contested Understanding of Urban Governance  
I have read the information sheet, and I understand what it means.              Yes             No 
I understand that I do not have to take part in this research if I don‘t want to, and I can 
leave at any time.                                                                                            Yes             No 
 
I agree to the interview being recorded (sound only).                                    Yes             No 
I understand that my real name will not be used with my words in any  
report and publications, and that my details will be kept private.                   Yes            No 
   
Your name (please print):------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Signed: ---------------------------------------------- 
Date: --------------------------------- 
Please contact me at the Newcastle University if you have any more questions or no 
longer want to be involved in this research. 
Zahed Shafiei 
Postgraduate Research Student 









Appendix 4 Urban Governance Index: Methodology Guidelines 
 
 
This document is an addendum to the ―Conceptual Foundation and Field Test Report‖ on the 
Urban Governance Index (August 2004). It is designed as a reference guide to the two alternative 
sets of indicators proposed in the final report. It provides the description of 25 indicators short-
listed, which also include the 18 core set of indicators. The indicators are grouped in sub-indices 
covering the core urban governance principles of Effectiveness, Equity, Participation and 
Accountability. The following format is followed for explaining the indicators: 
 
         Indicator: Indicators number and title  
         Principle(s):  States the core principle(s) of Good Urban Governance monitored by  
                                   the indicator. 
         Definition:  The technical definition of the indicator 
         Methodology:  Describes the methodology for obtaining and collection of data as well  
                                   as for the calculation of results 
                            
        Reference:       The source from which the indicator was obtained 
 
 
Global Campaign on Urban Governance 
Global Urban Observatory 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) 


















The total local government revenue (income annually collected, both capital and 
recurrent for the metropolitan area, in US dollars) per capita (3 year average) 
Methodology: The indicator is measured by identifying the following data: 
 Total local government revenue (R): This includes the income annually collected, 
both capital and recurrent for the metropolitan area, in US dollars). A 3 years 
average of the values is undertaken. Please make sure to specify whether the 
information is for the municipal area or the metropolitan region.  
 Total population (P). Please make sure that he spatial unit 
(municipality/metropolitan) is standard for the local government revenue and the 
population size. 
 Local government revenue per capita (LGR) = R/P  
 










Methodology: The indicator is measured by identifying the following data: 
 The total local government recurrent budget (R) : Recurrent includes income 
derived on a regular basis (e.g. taxes and user charges) 
 The total local government capital budget (C): Capital includes fixed income, that 
is derived after allocation of funds from internal or external sources (E.g. higher 
levels of government, private sector, donor agencies).  
 Ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget (RRC) = R/C  
 










Indicator 3:  Local government revenue transfers (core set, no.2) 
 
Principle(s): 
Effectiveness; Accountability, Participation 
Definition: 
 
Percentage of local government revenue originating from higher levels of government. 
This includes formula driven payments (such as repatriation of income tax), other grant 
donations from higher government levels including national or state governments and 
other types of transfers. 
Methodology: The indicator is measured by identifying the following data: 
 Local government revenue (R) = Total local government revenue (transfers and 
non-transfers)  
 Transfers in local government revenue (T): Income originating from higher levels 
of government, which include formula driven payments (such as repatriation of 
income tax), other grant donations from higher government levels including 
national or state governments and other types of transfers 
 Percentage of local government transfer (LGT) =( T / R )*100 
 Scoring on the percentage of transfers: 0-25% = 1.0; 25-50% = 0.75; 50-75% = 
0.50 and 75-100%= 0.25 




Indicator 4:  Ratio of mandated to actual tax collection (core set, no.3) 
 
Principle(s): 
Effectiveness; Accountability, Participation 
Definition: 
 
Ratio of mandated tax collected to the actual tax collected. Tax collection is one of the 
sources of income for the local government. 
Methodology: The indicator is measured by identifying the following data: 
 Actual tax collected (C)  
 Mandated (planned) tax to be collected (M) 
 Ratio of mandated to actual tax collected (TC): C/M 
Taxes: municipal rates and levies, any local taxes on the transfer of property and any 
other taxes such as entertainment or hotel taxes, motor vehicle taxes, taxes on business 
which do not reflect the direct provision of services 


















Does the local authority knows well in advance (2-3 years) about the amount of budget 
and level of consistency/regularity in receiving transfer from higher government? 
Methodology: 1. The effort is to measure whether the local authority knows well in advance (2-3 
years) about the amount of budget and level of consistency/regularity in receiving 
transfer from higher government.  
The following queries need to be addressed:  
- Is the amount of fund transfers from higher level of govt. (national/state known in 
advance (approx. 2-3 years) of the local budgeting process? (Yes/No) 
 
2. The second important aspect to measure the ―basis‖ of transfers. For example, the 
population in 1999 was 1 million and the transfer was $1 million. In 2000, the 
population was 1.1 million, but the amount of transfers was $900,000. In the absence 
of a strong correlation between the basis and the transfer amount, the transfers may not 
be predictable. 
 
- Is there a basis to determine the transfer amount? (Yes/No) 
 
The transfers include the formula driven payments (such as repatriation of income tax) 
and other grant donations from higher government levels including national or state 
governments 













Indicator 6: Published performance delivery standards (core set, no. 4) 
 
Principle(s): Effectiveness, accountability 
Definition: Presence or absence of a formal publication by the local government of performance 




The following queries need to be addressed.  
 Is there currently a formal publication of performance standards for key services 
delivered by the local authority? (PPS) (Yes/No)  
 If yes, what is the number of key services for which the PPS is present (S) 
 What is the total number of key services for which PPDS should be present (T) 
 Published performance delivery standards (PPDS) : PPS x S/T 
 
Key services include: Water supply, electricity, sanitation, solid waste management, 
health, education and others. 
 
 At what institutional level does the publication of performance standard takes 
place? (Municipality/District/State/Province) 
 
Reference: New indicator 
 
 
Indicator: 7 Consumer Satisfaction Survey  
 
Principle(s): Effectiveness, Accountability 






The indicator is measured by the following: 
 Has a survey of consumer satisfaction with local government services being 
undertaken in the city? (Yes/No) 
  
 At what institutional level is the consumer satisfaction survey undertaken? 
(Municipality/District/State/Province) 
 
Note: Data can be available at individual government departments / consumer courts, 
sometimes Consumer Satisfaction Surveys might be handled by a department external 
to government, such as a local university. 
Reference: New Indicator 
 





Indicator 8: Existence of a vision statement  
 
Principle s): Effectiveness, Accountability, Participation 
Definition: The measure of local authorities commitment in articulating a vision for the city‘s 
progress. Does the local authority articulate a vision for the city‘s future through a 




The following queries need to be answered: 
 
 Is there a vision statement developed for the cities‘ future by the local government 
(VS)? (Yes/no) 
 If Yes, has the vision statement been drafted through a participatory process 
(involving local government, civil society and the private sector (PP)? (Yes/No)  
 Vision statement (VSE) = 0.5 (VS + PP) 
 

















       B. Equity 
 
Indicator 9: Citizens‟ Charter: right of access to basic services (core set, no. 5) 
 
Principle(s) Equity, Accountability 
Definition Presence or absence of a signed, published statement (charter) from the local authority 




The Citizen‘' Charter may have been drafted by the local authority or representative 
people‘s associations.  The following queries need to be addressed: 
 
 Is there a signed, published statement (charter) from the local authority which 
acknowledges citizens‘ right of access to basic services (CC)? (Yes/No) 
 If yes, what is the number of key services for which the CC is 
present (S)? 
 What is the total number of key services for which CC should be present (T)? 
 Citizen charter for basic services (CCS) = CC x S/T 
 
Additional information: 
 If Yes, at what institutional level the published statement acknowledges citizens' 
rights for basic services? 
 Key services include: Water supply, electricity, sanitation, solid waste 
management, health, education and others. 
 What is the medium of publication of the Charter? (Newspaper, radio, Internet, 
Notice Board etc.) 
 
















Women councilors (core set, no. 6 and 7) 
 
Principle(s) Equity 
Definition  Percentage of women councilors to the total number of councilors in a local 
authority (in the last election). 




The following queries need to be addressed: 
 
 What is the Number of women councilors, both elected and nominated (in the last 
election), as a percentage of the total number of councilors in the local authority? 
This can be answered by applying the simple equation: 
 
X = (We + Wn) x 100 
                T 
Where X=Percentage of women councilors; We= No. of women councilors 
elected; Wn= No. of women councilors nominated; T= Total no. of councilors in 
the last elections, Wk- = No. of women in key positions (Mayor, Deputy Mayor 
etc.), Y = Percentage of women in key positions 
 
 Percentage of women councilors in key positions, can be addressed by: 
 
       Y =  Wk x 100 
                      T 
Additional information: 
 In what year was the most recent election held (e.g. 2001)? 
 What is the frequency of local elections? (e.g. every 3, 4, or 5 years) 
 What is the break up of women councilors position? (Mayor, Deputy Mayor etc.) 
 














Pro-poor pricing policies for water (core set, no. 8) 
 
Principle(s): Equity 
Definition: Presence or absence of a pricing policy for water which takes into account the needs of 
the poor households, translated into lower rates for them compared to other groups and 
prices applied to business/industrial consumption. 
Methodology: 
 
The pro-poor policy can be evaluated in terms of its content and the actions undertaken 
through the policy. The following queries need to be addressed:  
 
 Is there a pro-poor pricing policy for water? (Yes/No) 
 Percentage households with access to water supply (within 200m) 
 Median price of water (supplied by the local authority): 
- Informal settlements (poor households) (Wi) 
- Other residents (Wr) 
- Difference in the median water price = Wr-Wi 
 
 In the absence of no data on water price the following information will be useful: 
Is the water price in informal settlements, same or cheaper than the other 
residential areas? (Yes/No) 
 
Additional information: 
 What is the water supply delivery mechanism? 
 If yes, please explain the policy‘s key features (e.g. subsidy or cross-subsidy). 
Average price of water is the cost per hundred liters of water in US dollars, at the time 
of year when water is most expensive. 




















Definition: Presence of particular areas in the central retail areas of the city where small scale 
(informal) street vending is not allowed (or submitted to particular restrictions). Also 
measures the existence of incentives for informal businesses e.g. street vending, 




The informal nature of his activity would render it difficult to quantify in absolute 
terms. However, the following simple queries will determine the local governments 
effort to support the informal sector, thus signifying principles of equity:  
 
- Are there any particular areas in the central retail areas of the city where small 
scale (informal) street vending is not allowed? (Yes/No) 
- Are there any particular areas in the central retail areas of the city where small 
scale street vending is submitted to particular restrictions? (Yes/ No) 
- Are there any other incentives like information pubic markets, municipal fairs? 
(Yes/No) 
Additional information: 
- Within the past year, approximately how many protests or confrontations have 
taken place involving informal street vendors and local authorities or police? 
Reference: New indicator  
 




Elected Council (core set, no. 9) 
 
Principle(s): Participation; Effectiveness 
Definition: The indicator measures whether the local governing council is elected through a 
democratic process or not. An Elected Council is a body of Local Government 
Officials selected/chosen by the local population through organized voting with an 





The indicator is measured by a simple ‗yes/no‘ questions that should however be 
verified 
- Are councilors locally elected? (Yes/No) 
- If the councilors are both elected as well as appointed, please provide the 
distribution (% appointed and % elected). 
 
Reference: New indicator  








Selection of Mayor (core set, no. 10) 
 
Principle(s): Participation; Effectiveness, Accountability 
Definition: The indicator measures how the mayor is selected, whether directly elected, elected 




The indicator is measured by providing a simple Yes/No:  
 
- What is the process of selecting the Mayor? 
- Directly elected 
- Elected amongst councilors 
- Appointed 
 
Intermediate scores have been applied towards this indicator, directly elected (1.0), 




Devas, Nick (2000) Connections between Urban Governance and Poverty, Theme 
Paper 20 in the Urban Governance, Poverty and Partnerships Study, University of 




Voter turnout (core set, no. 11) 
 
Principle(s): Participation, Equity, Accountability, Effectiveness 




Voter turnout (both male and female) in percentage is simple indicator that measures 
voter participation. 
 
Additional information:  
- What is the frequency of elections? 
- Which year was the last election held? 
 
Reference: UN-HABITAT Global Urban Indicators Database (GUID) 
 







Public forum (core set, no. 12) 
 
Principle(s): Participation 
Definition: The public forum could include people's council, city consultation, neighborhood 





The indicator is measured by a simple ‗yes/no‘ question with additional open-ended 
information on the type of public forum. 
- Is there any public forum for the citizens to express their views? (Yes/No) 
- If yes, please provide information on the type of public forum, frequency (how 
many times in a month or year) of such forums. 






Civic Associations per 10,000 population (core set, no. 13) 
 
Principle(s): Participation, Equity, Accountability, Effectiveness, Security 
Definition: Measured as the number of civic associations (registered) per 10,000 people within the 




The total city population is divided into clusters of 10,000. Divide the city‘s population 
first by 10,000 and then by the number of civic associations registered with the local 
authority. 
 
C= 10,000 x N/Y 
C is the Civic association per thousand populations; N is the number of Civic 
Associations and Y is the Total Urban Population.  














Formal Publication of contracts/tenders, budgets & accounts (core set, no. 
14) 
 
Principle(s): Accountability (Transparency), Participation, Equity, Effectiveness 
Definition:  Existence of a formal publication (to be accessible) by the local government that 




A formal publication process may be assessed through regular mass publication of 
contracts, tenders, budgets and accounts of the local government's activities.  
 
The following queries need to be addressed: 
- Is there a formal publication of:  
- Contracts and tenders?  (Yes/No) 
- Budgets and accounts? (Yes/No) 
- What is the medium of publication of the standards? (E.g. Newspaper, radio, 
Internet, notice board etc.) 




Control by higher levels of Government (core set, no. 15) 
 
Principle(s): Accountability (Responsiveness), Effectiveness, Participation 
Definition: Measures the control of the higher levels of government (National, State /provincial) 




The indicator is measured by a simple ―yes‖ or ―no‖ to the following questions:  
- Can higher levels of government (National, State /provincial): 
- Close the local government? (Yes/No) 
- Remove councilors from office? (Yes/No) 
- If the higher level of government can remove the councilors, what is the 
process? 
 
- Can the local government, without permission from higher governments: 
- Set local tax levels?  
- Set user charges for services? 
- Borrow funds? 
- Choose contractors for projects? 
Reference: UN-HABITAT Global Urban Indicators Database (GUID) 
 







Codes of conduct 
 
Principle(s): Accountability (integrity), Participation, Equity 
Definition: Existence of a signed published statement of the standards of conduct that citizens are 




The following queries need to be addressed: 
- Is there a signed, published statement of standards of conduct citizens are entitled 
to from their elected officials and local government staff? (Yes/No) 
- At what institutional level are these codes of conduct prescribed? (Municipality, 
State/Province)  
- If the codes of conduct are prescribed at the District/State/Province level are they 
applied to local councilors?  (Yes/No) 
- Please submit a copy of the published code of conduct. 
 




Facility for citizen complaints 
 
Principle(s): Accountability (Integrity, Corruption: Disincentives & Protection), Participation, 
Effectiveness 
Definition: The existence of a facility established within the local authority to respond to 





A simple ―yes‖ or ―no‖ measures the existence of the facility while ―percentage of 
complaints addressed‖ measures the level of responsiveness. 
 
The following questions are elaborated: 
1. Are there any facilities or mechanisms to receive complaints or grievances 
from citizens? (Yes/No) 
2. Is there any official appointed to receive and respond to complaints against 
public authorities (Yes/No) 
3. Percentage of complaints addressed (Pc) 
Pc = (Ta/Tc) x 100 
Tc= Total number of registered complaints (last 1 year) and  
Ta = Total number of cases addressed  
Reference: New Indicator (Adapted from indicator Ombudsman‘s office of Transparency 
International) 









Disclosure of income/ assets (core set, no. 17) 
 
Principle(s): Accountability (Corruption: Disincentives & Protection) 
Definition: Are locally elected officials required to publicly disclose their income and assets (and 
those of their immediate family) prior to taking office? 
Methodology: A simple ―yes‖ or ―no‖ can measure this indicator.  
 
- Prior to taking office, are locally elected officials required by law to publicly 
disclose: 
 Personal income (Yes/No) 
 Personal assets (Yes/No) 
 Immediate family income (Yes/No) 
 Immediate family assets (Yes/No) 
 
- Are local office bearers' incomes and assets regularly monitored? (Yes/No) 










Anti-corruption Commission (core set, no. 16) 
 
Principle(s): Accountability (Corruption: Disincentives & Protection), Participation, Equity 




A simple ―yes‖ or ―no‖ can measure the indicator.  
- Is there a local agency to investigate and report cases of corruption? (Yes/ No) 
 
Reference: New indicator 







Independent audit (core set, no. 18) 
 
Principle(s): Accountability (Corruption: Disincentives & Protection), 





A simple ―yes‖ or ―no‖ can measure this indicator.  
 
Is there a regular independent audit of municipal accounts? (Yes/ No) 
Is the audit external or internal? 
Additional information: Which entity is responsible for the regular independent audit of 
municipal accounts?  
 







































Indicator 2: Ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget 
 
‗Ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget‘ is measured by identifying the total local government 
recurrent budget (R) includes income derived on a regular basis (e.g. taxes and user charges) in one 
hand and on the other hand the total local government capital budget (C) includes fixed income, which 
is derived after allocation of funds from internal or external sources (E.g. higher levels of government, 
private sector, and donor agencies). Therefore, ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget (RRC) is 
assessed through following formula:  
R / C 
R (2009-2010) = 40,060,000,000,000 Rial = 4,451,111,111 $ 
                     
C (2009- 2010) = 30,000,000,000,000 Rial = 3,333,333,333 $  
            
4,451,111,111 / 3,333,333,333 = 1.33 
 
Indicator 1: Local government revenue per  capita  
 
This sub-indicator is measured by identifying the following data: The total local government revenue 
(income annually collected, both capital and recurrent for the metropolitan area, in US dollars) per 
capita (3 year average). Total local government revenue (R) which includes the income annually 
collected, both capital and recurrent for the metropolitan area, in US dollars (A three years average of 
the values is undertaken) are divided in total population d(P). So, simply local government revenue per 
capita (LGR) is measured by R/P.  
 
                                                                             
2,600,777,777 + 5,222,222,222+   8,222,222,222                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                        3                              
       
      R =    $ 5,348,407,407 
      P =   8000,000 (1)  
 
 
Local Government revenue per capita (LGR) = R/P                         
 
 5,348,407,407 / 8000,000 = $ 668 
 






Indicator 3: Local government revenue transfers 
 
The indicator is measured by identifying Local government revenue (R) includes Total local 
government revenue (transfers and non-transfers) in the one hand and on the other hand transfers in 
local government revenue (T) which consist of income originating from higher levels of government; 
grants and donations. As it can be seen despite of increasing the central government financial support 
and finance, for year 2009- 2010 just over 12 percent of the total local revenue was driven from the 
central government transfer‘s distribution and finance which summarized principally in public transport 
supports consist of central government‘s aids to develop metro networks and subsides on public 
transportation ticketing. Ultimately, as the constructive point for Tehran the figure classified in the 
lowest category (0 – 25%) and as a result receives the highest score ‗‘1‘‘ which demonstrates the 
financial autonomy of the local government in Tehran.  
 
Transfers in local government revenue (T) = 7,000 + 130 + 2,300 = 9430Billion Rial  
Local government revenue (R) = 74,000 Billion Rial 
Local government revenue transfers = (T/R)*100                       (9430 / 74,000)*100 = %12.7 
 
As scoring on the percentage of transfers:  
  Percentage transfer  Score 
0 - 25 1.00 
25 - 50 0.75 
50 - 75 0.50 
75 - 100 0.25 
 
Indicator 4: Ratio of mandated to actual tax collection 
 
The indicator is considered by recognizing actual tax collected (C) and Mandated (planned) tax to be 
collected (M).  
Ratio of mandated to actual tax collected (TC): C / M*100 
  
(C) = 31, 079,746,607,386 Rial until Jan 2010 
(M) = 40, 600,000,000,000 Rial planned for 2009-2010 (1388) 
 
31,079,746,607,386 / 40,600,000,000,000*100 = % 76 
 
 






Indicator 5: Predictability of transfers in local government budget 
 
The following queries need to be addressed for measuring this indicator: Is the amount of fund transfers 
from higher level of government (national / state known in advance for approximately for 2-3 years) of 
the local budgeting process? It can be seen generally in Iran and practically in Tehran there is no 
assurance in advance for implementation of fiscal transfers from higher level and there is minute visible 
enforcement of regulations. Therefore the answer ‗‘No‘‘ selected for the issue. 
 
 
Indicator 6: Published performance delivery standards (PPS) 
 
To tackle the indicator the following queries need to be addressed:  
Is there currently a formal publication of performance standards for key services (7) delivered by the 
local authority? (PPS) Yes            
                                                      
The number of key services for which the PPS is present (S) = 1 
What is the total number of key services for which PPDS should be present = 5 
 
Published performance delivery standards (PPDS): PPS x S/T = 1 x 1/5= 0.2 
 
 
Indicator 7: Consumer Satisfaction survey 
 
To some extent therefore, the municipality has been succeeding in procedure of launching consumer 
satisfaction mechanisms. The indicator is measured by addressing following issue: ‗‘has a survey of 
consumer satisfaction with local government services being undertaken in the city‘‘? Yes                
 
 
Indicator 8: Existence of vision statement 
 
In order to address this sub-indictor the following queries need to be answered: 
 Is there a vision statement developed for the cities‘ future by the local government (VS)?  Yes= 1 
 If yes, has the vision statement been drafted through a participatory process (involving local 
government, civil society and the private sector (PP)? NO=0 
 
 Vision statement (VSE) = 0.5 (VS + PP)= 0.5 ( 1+0)= 0.5 
 
As emerged from above calculation despite the existence of a vision for the city, since its processes are 
not accomplished through a participatory manner no point is given to the second part of inquiry. 
 






Indicator 9: Citizens Charter: right of access to basic services 
 
 
To tackle this sub-indicator the following queries need to be addressed: 
Is there a signed, published statement (charter) from the local authority which acknowledges citizens‘ 
right of access to basic services (CC)?  NO 
 If yes, what is the number of key services for which the CC is present (S)? 
 
 What is the total number of key services for which CC should be present (T)? 
 
 Citizen charter for basic services (CCS) = CC x S/T 
 
 
Indicator 10: Women councillors 
 
The following queries need to be addressed: ‗‘what is the Number of women councillors, both elected 
and nominated (in the last election), as a percentage of the total number of councillors in the local 
authority‘‘? Where X=Percentage of women councillors; We= No. of women councillors elected; Wn= 
No. of women councillors nominated; T= Total no. of councillors in the last elections. 
 
 We =3                        Wn= 78                              T= 1200  
 
X    =   (We + Wn) x 100                                             (3+78) x 100 / 1200= 6.75 
                       T 
 
 
Indicator 11: Percentage of Women councillors in the key urban positions 
 
The indicator addressed as follow, Where    Y = Percentage of women in key positions Wk = No. of 
women in key positions (Mayor, Deputy Mayor etc.); T= Total no. of councillors in the last elections. 
 
Y =   Wk x 100                             0 x 100 / 1200 = 0         









Indicator 12: Pro-poor pricing policies for water 
 
Therefore, to address the indicator the following responds are offered to the queries.                                                
 Percentage households with access to water supply (within 200m)? 100% 
 Is there a pro-poor pricing policy for water? Ye 




Indicator 13: Incentives for informal businesses 
 
The indicator addressed as follow: 
 Are there any particular areas in the central retail areas of the city where small scale (informal) 
street vending is not allowed? Yes 
 Are there any particular areas in the central retail areas of the city where small scale street vending 
is submitted to particular restrictions?  Yes 







Indicator 14 : Elected council 
 
This indicator considers the methods which the local council has elected or appointed.  The indicator is 
 
 measured by a simple ‗Yes‘ or ‗No‘.  Are councillors locally elected? Yes 
 
 
Indicator 15: Selection of mayor 
 
The indicator is measured by providing a simple Yes/No:  Intermediate scores have been applied 
towards this indicator, directly elected (1.0), elected amongst councillors (0.75) and appointed (0.50). 
 
What is the process of selecting the Mayor? 
 
- Directly elected 
 
- Elected amongst councillors 
 
- Appointed   






Indicator 16: Voter turnout 
 
The indicator is measured by Total voter turnout (both male and female) in percentage in the last 
election. Based on While the total population able to vote had estimated to almost 5300,000, the voter 
amount was one million and eight hundred thousand (The Secretary of State, 2006).  
Therefore based on the UN-index: 
1800.000= Voter               5300, 000= Constituent population  
 
1800, 000 / 5300000 x 100= 35.2% 
 
 
Indicator 17: Public forum 
 
The indicator is measured by a simple ‗yes / no‘ question: 
- Is there any public forum for the citizens to express their views? Yes 
 




Indicator 18: Civic Association Per 10,000 populations 
 
The indicator assessed by following formula:  C= 10,000 x N/Y which C is the Civic association per 
thousand populations; N is the number of Civic Associations and Y is the Total Urban Population.       






Indicator 19: Formal Publication of contracts /tenders budgets & accounts 
 
The following queries need to be addressed: 
 
- Is there a formal publication of:  
 Contracts and tenders?  Yes 
 
 Budgets and accounts?  Yes 






Indicator 20: Control by higher levels of Government 
 
To address the indicator following questions need to be answered : 
    
1.Can higher levels of government (National, State /provincial): 
 Close the local government? (No) 
 Remove councillors from office? (No) 
2.Can the local government, without permission from higher governments:                                                        
- Set local tax levels?  NO  
- Set user charges for services? Yes 
- Borrow funds?  Yes  
- Choose contractors for projects?  Yes  
 
Indicator 21: Codes of conduct 
 
The following queries can be addressed:                                                   
- Is there a signed, published statement of standards of conduct citizens are entitled to from their 
elected officials and local government staff? Yes 
- At what institutional level are these codes of conduct prescribed? (Municipality, State/Province)? 
In the state level. 
- If the codes of conduct are prescribed at the District/State/Province level are they applied to local 
councillors?  Yes 
 
Indicator 22: Facility for citizen complaints 
 
A simple ―yes‖ or ―no‖ measures the existence of the facility while ―percentage of complaints 
addressed‖ measures the level of responsiveness. The following questions are elaborated: 
4. Are there any facilities or mechanisms to receive complaints or grievances from citizens? Yes 
5. Is there any official appointed to receive and respond to complaints against public authorities 
Yes 
Also, Percentage of complaints (Pc) can be addressed through following formula:  
Pc = (Ta/Tc) x 100, where Ta  as total number of cases addressed is 700,000; and ‗Tc‘ as total number 
of registered complaints (last one year) is 1500,000 (Information Centre and public apprising of Tehran 
municipality , 2009). So the calculation will be as follow: 
 
700,000 / 1500,000 = .46 x 100= 46% 






Indicator 23: Anti-corruption Commission 
 
To tackle the sub-indicator following query need to be addressed:  
 
- Is there a local agency to investigate and report cases of corruption? Yes 
 
 
Indicator 24: Disclosure of income / assert 
 
The following queries need to be considered for this indicator.  
- Prior to taking office, are locally elected officials required by law to publicly disclose: 
 Personal income : No 
 Personal assets : No 
 Immediate family income : No 
 Immediate family assets : No 
 
 
Indicator 25: Independent audit 
 
The indictor addressed by following query:  
   









1. According to Statistical Centre of Iran, various census data (2006) population of Tehran was 7,797,000. 





Appendix 6: Urban Governance Index Calculation for Tehran  
 
A) Effectiveness sub-index 




No. Indicator Data (X)  Formula Result  Weight  Total  
1 Local Government revenue per 
capita (LGR)= LGR)= R/P 
Total local government revenue 
( R) 
Total population ( p) 
 
 $ 668 LGR = (log X - log min)/ (log max - log 
min)  min=2.3  max=1340  
(2.82 – 0.361)  /  (3.12 – 0.361) = 2.45 / 
2.75= 0.89 
   0.89  0.25 0.223 




 Recurrent budget = R, Capita 
Budget = C; 
 R = 4,451,111,111  billion $ 
 C = 3,333,333,333  billion $ 
 1.33 RRC = (log X - log min)/(log max - log 
min)  min= 0.09  max=8.37  (Field test, 
2003 US$) RRC= (0.13- - 1.04) / (0.92- 
-1.04) = (1.17 / 1.96) = 0.59 
 
 
0.59  0.10 0.059 
3 Ratio of mandated to actual tax 
collected (TC) 
 TC = 76/100 0.76 0.10 0.076 
 a. Mandated tax to be collected   100%    
 b. Actual tax collected  76%   
4 Local government revenue 
transfer (LGT) 
%12.7 LGT = 1 (0 – 25%=1, 25-50%=0.75, 50-
75%=0.50, 75-100%=0.25) 
1.00 0.10 0.10  
5 Predictability of transfers in local 
government budget (PoT) 
No = 0  PoT = X 0.00  0.10 0.00 
6 Published performance delivery 
standards (PPDS) 
 PPDS = PPS x S/T= 1 x 1 / 5= 0.2 0.2  0.15      0.03                           
 a. Published performance 
delivery standards (PPS) 
Yes=1  PPS   
 b. No. of key services for which 
the PPDS is present (S);  
c. Total no. of key services for 




  S = 1 
T = 5 
 
7 Consumer satisfaction survey 
(CSS) 
Yes = 1 CSS = 1  1.00  0.10 0.10 
8 Vision statement effective (VSE)  VSE = 0.5 (VS + PP)= 0.5 ( 1+0)= 0.5 0.50 0.10 0.05 
 a. Vision statement (VS) 
3
 Yes = 1   VS =  X 1.00  











 b. Vision statement drafted 
through a participatory process 
(PP) 
 No = 0  PP = X 0.00 
Effectiveness sub-index 0.638 
No. Indicator Data (X)  Formula Result  Weight   Total  
1 Citizens charter for basic 
services (CCS) 
 CCS = CC * S/T 0.00 0.20 0.00 
 a. Citizens’ charter (CC)  No = 0  CC = X   
 b. No. of key services for which 
the CC is present (S) 
c. Total no. of key services for 
which CC should be present (T) 
 S=0 
 T=5 
    
2  Percentage of women 
councilors (WC) 
6.7%  WC = X= (3+78) x 100 / 
1200= 6.75  
 
0.6  0.20 0.12 
3 Percentage women in key 
positions (WK) 
0 WK = Y =  Wk x 100/T  
                        
0.00 0.10 0.00 
4 Percentage households with 
water connection (HH wat) 
100% HH wat.= 100/100 1.00 0.15 0.225 
5 Existence of pro-poor policy 
(PPC) 
Yes = 1 PPC = X 1.00 0.10 0.10 
6 Is water price cheaper for poor 
settlements? (WP) 
Yes = 1 WP = X 1.00 0.10 0.10 
7 Incentives for informal market 
(IM) 
 IM = 1 (any one of a, b or c) 1.00 0.15 0.15 
 a. Street vending not allowed  Yes = 1  1.00  
 b. Street vending with restrictions  Yes = 1   1.00 
 c. Public fairs, municipal market Yes = 1  1.00  
                                                                                                                                                       Equity sub-index 0.695 









C) Accountability sub-index 
 
No. Indicator Data (X)  Formula  Result   
Weight  
 Total  
1  Formal Publication (FP)   CTBA  = Average (CT + BA) 1.00  0.20 0.20 
 a. Formal publication: contracts and 
tenders (CT) 
 Yes = 1 CLG = X 1.00   
 b. Formal publication: budget and accounts 
(BA) 
Yes = 1  BA = X 1.00   
2.1 Control by higher Govt. (CG)  CG = Average (CLG+RC) 1.00               
0.07   
            
0.07 
 a. Control by higher Govt.: close local 
government (CLG) 
 NO = 1 CLG = X 1.00     
    
 b. Control by higher Govt: removal of 
councilors (RC) 
  No = 1 RC = X 1.00 
2.2 Local government authorities (LGA)  LGA = Average 
(SLT+SYC+BF+CP) 
0.75 0.08       
0.052 
 c. Local government: set local tax levels 
(SLT) 
 No = 0 SLT = X 0.00   
 d. Local government: set user charges for 
services (SUC) 
Yes = 1 SUC = X 1.00 
 e. Local government: borrow funds (BF)  Yes=1 BF = X 1.00 
NO Indicator Data (X)  Formula Result   Weight  Total  
1  Elected council 
(EC) 
 Yes = 1  EC = X 1.00  0.15 0.15 
2  Locally elected 
Mayor (LEM) 
 No = 0.50  LEM = 0.50 0.50  0.15 0.075 
3 Voter turnout 
(VT) 
   VT = 1800, 000 / 5300000 x 100= 
35.2% 
0.35 0.30             0.105 
4  Peoples’ forum 
(PC) 
 Yes = 1  PF = X  1.00  0.15 0.15 
5  Civic 
associations per 
10,000 pop (CA) 
  X = 0.63 
per 10000 
 CA = (Log 0.63 – Log 0.49)/(Log 72.79 – 
Log 0.49) min= 0.49; max= 72.79   (Field 
Test 2003) 
                                                    
0.05 
 0.25 0.012  
                                                                                                                Participation sub-index 
            0.492 





 f. Local government:  choose contractors 
for projects (CP) 
 Yes = 1 CP = X 1.00 
3 Codes of conduct (CoC)  Yes = 1 CoC= X 1.00  0.10 0.10 
4 Facilities to receive complaints (FRC)   FRC = Average (OA + EF) 1.00  0.10  0.10 
 b. Official appointed to receive complaints 
on public authorities (OA) 
Yes = 1  1.00   
 c. Exclusive facility to receive complaints 
on corruption (EF) 
Yes = 1   1.00   
5 Anti-corruption commission (ACC)  Yes = 1 ACC = X 1.00  0.15 0.15 
6 Personal Income and assets (PIA)  NA PIA = (0.75* Average PIA + 
FIA) + 0.25* IAM 
0.00 0.15 0.00 
 a. Disclosure of personal income and 
assets (PIA) 
 No= 0 PIA = X 0.00   
 b. Disclosure of family’s income and assets 
(FIA) 
 No = 0 FIA = X 0.00  
 c. Income and assets regularly monitored 
(IAM) 
 No= 0 IAM = X 0.00  
7 Regular independent audit (RIA)  Yes=1 IAM = X 1.00  0.15 0.225 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Accountability sub-index 0.897                   
 
Average of Urban Governance Index = (Effectiveness sub-index + Equity sub-index + 
Participation sub-index + Accountability sub-index) = (0.638 + 0.695 + 0.492 + 0.897) / 4 = 
0. 680 
 











  ديدگاه شيرًندان در مٌرد خدمات شيرپرسشنامو ارزيابَ   
    
 
 ارزيابَ ديدگاه شيرًندان در مٌرد خدمات شيرٍ پرسشنامو
دسج ؽذٖ اٌضاِی ِ١جبؽذ ،جٕبٔجٗ ٔظش ؽّب  )اختیاری( آٔٙب پبعخ ثٗ کٍ١ٗ پشعؾٙب ثجض ِٛاسدی کٗ دس کٕبس  ؽٙشٚٔذ گشاِی
 . عپبعگزاسیُ سا ثشگضیٕ١ذ ، اص ّ٘کبسی ؽّبِٕطمٗ خبفی ٔ١غت دس أتخبة ِٕطمٗ ، تٙشاْ  ِخقٛؿ ثٗ
 زن مرد جٕغ١ت
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 ثغ١بسخٛة خٛة ِتٛعظ ثذ ثغ١بسثذ ثغ١بسص٠بد ص٠بد تبدذٚدٜ وُ ثغ١بسوُ
 5 4 3 2 1
 
آٚسٞ ِٕظُ صثبٌٗ ٚ  جّغ *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
سع١ذگٟ ثٗ وبٔبٌٙب، جٛ٠ٙب ٚ  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
ٔگٙذاسٞ فضبٞ عجض تٛعؼٗ ٚ  *=<
وبسٞ، دسختبْ،  ثٛعتبٔٙب،جٕگً ؽبًِ












 5 4 3 2 1
 













 5 4 3 2 1
 
تأِ١ٓ ا٠ّٕٟ ؽٙشٚٔذاْ اص  *=<
پً ٘ٛا٠ٟ،  طش٠ك ٔقت ٔشدٖ،
پ١بدٖ، ٔقت وؾٟ ػبثش  خظ












 5 4 3 2 1
 
عبِبٔذ٘ی فٕب٠غ آلا٠ٕذٖ ٘ٛا،  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
سع١ذگٟ ثٗ چٙشٖ ظب٘شٞ  *=<
ص٠جب٠ٟ، ِجٍّبْ ؽٙشٞ  ِٕطمٗ اص ٔظش












 5 4 3 2 1
 
ِمبثٍٗ ثب د١ٛأبت ِضادُ ٚ  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
ٚضؼ١ت عطخ آعفبٌت  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
اِىبٔبت فشٕ٘گٟ، ٕ٘شٞ،  *=<
اِبوٓ ٚاثغتٗ ثٗ  ٚسصؽٟ ٚ تفش٠ذٟ
ؽٙش  فشٕ٘گغشا،(ؽٙشداسٞ ِٕطمٗ 













 5 4 3 2 1
 
ٔقت تبثٍٛ٘بٞ سإّ٘ب، ػلائُ  *=<
تبثٍٛ٘بٞ سإّ٘ب٠ٟ ٚ  ا٠ّٕٟ ٚ



















 5 4 3 2 1
 
عشػت ٚ جذ٠ت ِغئٌٛ١ٓ  *=<
ِؾىلات  ثٗ ؽٙشداسٞ دس سع١ذگٟ












 5 4 3 2 1
 
لبطؼ١ت ثشخٛسد ثب عبخت ٚ  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
ِؾبسکت ؽٙشٚٔذاْ دس  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
ِغتّش ٚ آعبْ   استجبط *=<













 5 4 3 2 1
 
تکشیُ اسثبة سجٛع دس ٔبد١ٗ ٠ب  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
٘ب ٚ ِ١بد٠ٓ  ٚضؼ١ت ثبصاسچٗ *=<













 5 4 3 2 1
 
پٛػ  سع١ذگٟ ثٗ ٚضؼ١ت وف *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
ٚضؼ١ت سٚؽٕب٠ٟ خ١بثبٔٙب دس  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
ّ٘بٕ٘گٟ ثب اسگبٔٙبٞ ر٠شثظ دس  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
ثٗ عشٚ٠ظ ٘بٞ  سع١ذگٟ *=<
ِٕطمٗ ٚ ٔمبط پش  ثٙذاؽتٟ دس عطخ












 5 4 3 2 1
 
ٚضؼ١ت دعتشعٟ ثٗ دًّ ٚ  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
دً ِؾىً ِتىذ٠بْ ٚ دعت  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
ٚضؼ١ت پبسو١ٕگٙبٞ ػِّٟٛ  *=<












 5 4 3 2 1
 
٘بٞ ِطجٛػبت  ٚضؼ١ت و١ٛعه *=<





































  * ِذً
 













































ِ١ضاْ آؽٕبیی ؽّب ثب فؼبٌ١تٙبی ِؼبٚٔت دًّ ٚ ٔمً ٚ تشاف١ک ٚ ٚادذ٘بی 
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی . تبثؼٗ آْ 
 
 .ؽٙش تٙشاْ ِ١ضاْ اثش گزاسی عّٙ١ٗ ثٕذی ثٕضیٓ دس کب٘ؼ ثبس تشاف١ک 
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی
 
 
ثٗ دًّ ٚ ٔمً ػِّٟٛ ؽٙش " ْٚ"ِٕذٞ ؽّب اص ٚسٚد ٔبٚگبْ  ِ١ضاْ سضب٠ت
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی تٙشاْ
 
عشػت : ؽبًِ(ِ١ضاْ سضب٠ت ؽّب اص و١ف١ت عفش ثب عبِبٔٗ تبوغ١شأٟ 
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی )عفش، ٔظُ ٚ عطخ خذِبت
 
 
عشػت : ؽبًِ(سضب٠ت ؽّب اص و١ف١ت عفش ثب عبِبٔٗ اتٛثٛعشأِٟ١ضاْ 
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی )عفش، ٔظُ ٚ عطخ خذِبت
 
ِ١ضاْ تّب٠ً ؽّب ثٗ اعتفبدٖ اص عبِبٔٗ اتٛثٛعشأٟ دس فٛست افضا٠ؼ 
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی عشػت عفش آْ
 
 
عشػت عفش،  ؽبًِ(ِ١ضاْ سضب٠ت ؽّب اص و١ف١ت عفش ثب عبِبٔٗ ِتشٚ
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی )ٔظُ، ٚ عطخ خذِبت
 
 ِ١ضاْ اعتفبدٖ ؽّب اص عبِبٔٗ ِتشٚ دس دبي دبضش
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی
 
ؽبًِ عشػت عفش، (ِ١ضاْ سضب٠ت ؽّب اص و١ف١ت عفش ثب عبِبٔٗ ِتشٚ
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی )ٔظُ، ٚ عطخ خذِبت
 
 اعتفبدٖ اص عبِبٔٗ ِتشٚ دس فٛست افضا٠ؼ تؼذاد لطبس٘بِ١ضاْ تّب٠ً ؽّب ثٗ 
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی
 
 
ِ١ضاْ اعتفبدٖ ؽّب اص خذِبت غ١شدضٛسٞ جٙت وب٘ؼ عفش دسْٚ ؽٙشٞ 
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی ...)ِبٕٔذ خذِبت اٌىتشٚٔ١ه، پ١ه ثبدپب، پغت ٚ (
 
دس ) ٚ ِتشٚ ٚ تبوغٟ اتٛثٛط(ِ١ضاْ اعتفبدٖ ؽّب اص دًّ ٚ ٔمً ػِّٟٛ 
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی دبي دبضش
 
اتٛثٛط، تبوغٟ (ِ١ضاْ ػلالٗ ِٕذٞ ؽّب ثٗ عفش ثب دًّ ٚ ٔمً ٚ ػِّٟٛ 
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی )ٚ ِتشٚ
 
 ِ١ضاْ سضب٠تّٕذٞ ؽّب اص ٚضؼ١ت پبسن خٛدسٚ دس عطخ ؽٙش تٙشاْ
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی
 
 )وٕتشي پبسن دبؽ١ٗ اٞ(ؽّب اص طشح پبسوجبْ ِ١ضاْ سضب٠تّٕذٞ 
 ضؼ١ف ِتٛعظ خٛة ػبٌی
 
ِ١ضاْ سضب٠ت ِٕذٞ ؽّب اص فشآ٠ٕذ ثجت ٔبَ ِتمض١بْ آسَ طشح تشاف١ه دس عبي 




 : چٕبٔچٗ دس خقٛؿ ٘ش ٠ه اص گض٠ٕٗ ٘بٞ فٛق ٔ١بص ثٗ اسائٗ تٛض١ذبت ِٟ ثبؽذ روش ّٔبئ١ذ
 
 














 : تبوغٟ ٚ ِغبفشثش٘بٞ ؽخقٟ
 
 
داس٠ذ ... چٕبٔچٗ ؽّب ٔظش ، پ١ؾٕٙبد ٚ ٠ب طشدٟ دس خقٛؿ ِمٌٛٗ دًّ ٚ ٔمً ٚ تشاف١ه اص لج١ً تٛعؼٗ ٔبٚگبْ دًّ ٚ ٔمً ػِّٟٛ ، وب٘ؼ تشاف١ه ٚ 
ثشاٞ اعتفبدٖ اص ٔظشات ٚ طشدٙب٠ٟ اجشا٠ٟ ؽّبسٖ دس فٛست اجشا٠ٟ ثٛدْ لطؼبً اص آْ اعتفبدٖ ِٟ گشدد ٌزا ٌطفبً . ِٟ تٛأ١ذ ثٗ فٛست خلافٗ روش ّٔبئ١ذ
 تّبط خٛد سا ٚاسد ّٔبئ١ذ 
 : ٔبَ 
 
 : ٔبَ خبٔٛادگٟ 
 
 : ؽغً 
 
















Appendix 8: List of Interviews Ordinary Citizens Interviews 
 
Code  Date  Gender  
OC-01 27.02.2010 F 
OC-02 21.02.2010 M 
OC-03 06.03.2010 M 
OC-04 04.03.2010 M 
OC-05 21.02.2010 M 
OC-06 26.02.2010 M 
OC-07 01.03.2010 M 
OC-08 10.04.2010 M 
OC-09 27.02.2010 M 
OC-010 03.03.2010 M 
OC-011 10.04.2010 F 
OC-012 13.04.2010 F 
OC-013 06.03.2010 M 
OC-014 11.04.2010 M 
OC-015 13.04.2010 M 
OC-016 22.04.2010 F 
OC-017 20.04.2010 F 
OC-018 11.04.2010 F 
OC-019 23.04.2010 F 
OC-020 21.04.2010 F 
OC-021 22.04.2010 F 
OC-022 20.04.2010 F 
OC-023 23.04.2010 F 
OC-024 21.04.2010 F 
OC-025 22.04.2010 F 
 
 
              Local Council Interviews 
Code  Date  Gender  
LC-01 17.03.2010 M 
LC-02 25.02.2010 M 
LC-03 10.03.2010 M 
LC-04 08.03.2010 F 
LC-05 17.03.2010 F 
 
               
 
 






               Urban Experts Interviews  
Code  Date  Gender 
UE-01 05.03.2010 M 
UE-02 22.02.2010 F 
UE-03 25.02.2010 M 
UE-04  06.03.2010 M 
UE-05 07.03.2010 M 
 
 
              Private Sector Interviews  
Code  Date  Gender 
PS-01 08.04.2010 M 
PS-02 25.02.2010 F 
PS-03 08.04.2010 M 
PS-04 09.04.2010 M 
PS-05 17.04.2010 M 
 
 
              Civic Associations Interviews  
Code  Date  Gender 
CA-01 03.03.2010 M 
CA-02 25.02.2010 M 
CA-03 21.02.2010 F 
CA-04 10.03.2010 M 
CA-05 06.03.2010 F 
 
 
              Council Representatives Interviews 
Code  Date  Gender 
CR-01 09.04.2010 M 
CR-02 18.02.2010 M 
CR-03 10.04.2010 F 
CR-04 08.03.2010 M 




                  






               Municipality Executives Interviews  
Code  Date  Gender 
ME-01 01.02.2010 M 
ME-02 18.02.2010 F 
ME-03 16.03.2010 M 
ME-04 11.03.2010 F 
ME-05 16.03.2010 M 
 
              Government Official Interviews  
Code  Date  Gender 
GO-01 04.03.2010 F 
GO-02 28.02.2010 M 
GO-03 29.02.2010 M 
GO-04 07.04.2010 M 
GO-05 17.04.2010 M 
 
 






Appendix 9 Interviews in Persian 
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